Taiwan Strait Crises and Cross-Strait Relations Development

Missiles on the Eve of Voting

On March 8, 1996, two weeks before Taiwan's first direct presidential election. That morning, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched Dongfeng-15 ballistic missiles toward target areas off the coast of Keelung and Kaohsiung, approximately 29 and 30 to 150 nautical miles away ¹². Over 70% of Taiwan's commercial shipping had to pass through these two ports, and the routes were instantly interrupted.

The Taipei stock market suffered a heavy decline. Taoyuan Airport saw crowds scrambling for plane tickets. The wealthy moved their capital overseas. Television news repeatedly showed footage of the missile tests.

However, on March 23, two weeks later, 76% of Taiwan's voters went to the polls. Lee Teng-hui was elected with 54% of the vote, about five percentage points higher than pre-missile surveys ¹². The missiles had not scared away the voters; instead, they seemed to have helped him gain votes.

This was perhaps the most ironic scene in seventy years of Taiwan Strait relations: military intimidation achieved the exact opposite of what the intimidator wanted.

The Gate Guarded by One Thousand People

Returning forty years earlier. At seven o'clock on a morning in January 18, 1955, Captain Wang Sheng-ming (王生明), the commanding officer on a small island called Yijiangshan off the coast of Zhejiang, was preparing to face the last day of his life.

The PLA attacked this island with 4,000 to 5,000 troops, over 200 vessels, and more than 180 aircraft ³. The defenders numbered about 1,030 (including members of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army), a vastly outnumbered force. Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) stated during deployment: "People often say to use an ox knife to kill a chicken; this time we must use the knife meant for slaughtering oxen to kill chickens." This was the PLA's first combined arms operation involving ground, sea, and air forces since its founding—Beijing could not afford to lose.

The fighting lasted less than two days. At 2:00 AM on January 19, the island changed hands. Wang Sheng-ming died in battle, and his deputy commander, Wang Fu-bi (王輔弼), was captured. The PLA claimed casualties of 393 dead and 1,027 wounded. The National Defense forces reported 720 dead.

Yijiangshan Island was very small, but it was the gateway to Dachen Island. After losing Yijiangshan, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) decided to abandon the entire Taizhou archipelago. In February 1955, with escort from the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the military and civilians of Dachen Island evacuated completely. Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) was sent to communicate with the residents and accompany them in leaving. Three days later, the PLA occupied all islands along the eastern Zhejiang coast.

Yet, the impact of this small-scale campaign exceeded everyone's expectations ³. The entire First Taiwan Strait Crisis—from the shelling of Kinmen in September 1954 to the fall of Yijiangshan—led to the signing of the U.S.-China Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2, 1954; just ten days after the fall of Yijiangshan, the U.S. Congress passed the "Formosa Resolution" on January 29, 1955, authorizing the President to use military force to defend Taiwan and Penghu. Concurrently, the nuclear threat made by the United States during the crisis was also believed to have pushed Beijing to resolve to develop its own nuclear weapons ⁴. The loss of a thousand-person island unexpectedly reshaped the strategic landscape of East Asia.

Forty-Four Days, 470,000 Shells

On August 23, 1958, the summer in Kinmen suddenly turned into hell.

At 5:30 PM, the PLA concentrated over six hundred heavy cannons and opened fire simultaneously ⁵. The entire island of Kinmen, covering about 150 square kilometers, endured over 470,000 shells during the subsequent 44 days ⁴. This remains one of the records for the highest unit area shelling density in military history.

The first day of bombardment caused catastrophic damage. Zhao Jia-chou (趙家驤) and Zhang Jie (章傑), commanders of the National Defense forces in Kinmen, died on the spot; Ji Xingwen (吉星文) was severely wounded and died three days later from peritonitis. The defense commander Hu Lian (胡璉) and visiting Minister of National Defense Yu Dawei (俞大維) were injured by shrapnel. Ji Xingwen, a legendary military figure who fired the first shot against Japan during the Lugou Bridge Incident, lost his life at the dining table in Kinmen due to shelling.

The lives of Kinmen residents were completely changed. Over 9,000 houses were destroyed or partially damaged; 618 military personnel and civilians died, and 2,610 were injured ⁵. Residents were forced to live in underground tunnels. Kinmen entered a period of military administration lasting 36 years (1956-1992), with the entire island under military control. The daily activities, communications, and economic life of residents were all managed by the military. Curfews were enforced at night; fishermen needed permits to go out to sea, and letters had to be censored.

Air combat during the shelling was equally fierce. The United States provided the most advanced Sidewinder missiles available to the National Defense Air Force, creating air superiority. The U.S. Seventh Fleet helped break the blockade and maintain supply lines.

On October 6, Beijing issued the "Letter to Compatriots in Taiwan" under the name of Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai (彭德懷), announcing a one-week ceasefire based on a "humanitarian standpoint." This was later changed to "single-day shelling, double-day truce": shellings occurred on single days, and truces were observed on double days. This absurd rhythm continued until January 1, 1979—the day the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC—when Beijing formally announced a halt to the bombardment.

The peculiar aspect of the Aug. 23 shelling was that its objective from the beginning was not merely to occupy Kinmen ⁵. Mao Zedong (毛澤東) wanted to test the commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan's outlying islands, while also signaling his stance on "liberating Taiwan" to the international community. The shells were a political signal; the homeland of the people of Kinmen was the price paid.

A report by BBC Chinese cited an opinion circulating in Taiwan [^1]: after this shelling, military counterattack against the mainland was unlikely, leading the Taiwanese government to pursue democratic freedom. In this sense, Aug. 23 was a "Taiwan defense war." Only after entering a long period of peace and maintaining cross-strait separation did economic miracles and democratization occur later on.

The President Who Stayed Overnight on an Airplane in Hawaii

The seeds of the 1996 missile crisis were actually sown as early as 1994.

That year, Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), returning from South America, stopped for refueling at Honolulu, Hawaii. His application for a U.S. visa was denied. The Clinton administration would not allow him to leave the military airport where his plane landed; he was forced to spend the night on his own aircraft. A State Department official admitted that the situation was "embarrassing," and Lee Teng-hui complained that he was treated like a second-rate leader ¹.

This humiliation triggered a chain reaction in Washington. Pro-Taiwan legislators began to work, lobbying the firm Cassidy & Associates to intervene. In May 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution with 396 votes to zero, and the Senate passed it with 97 votes to one, demanding that the State Department allow Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S. The State Department yielded.

On June 9, 1995, Lee Teng-hui returned to his alma mater, Cornell University, as an alumnus to give a lecture titled "What the People Desire is Long in My Heart" ⁶. He did not utter the words "Taiwan independence," but the entire speech repeatedly referred to "the Republic of China in Taiwan" and discussed "sovereignty belonging to the people," effectively setting the tone for Taiwan's national identity on an American stage. Beijing’s reaction was one that could not be tolerated ⁴.

In July, Xinhua News Agency announced that the PLA would conduct missile tests. However, through secret channels, Beijing had previously informed Zeng Yongxian (曾永賢), a National Strategy Advisor to Lee Teng-hui, that missiles would be fired toward Taiwan in a few weeks, and they did not need to worry ¹. Zeng Yongxian had met with Yang Sang-keun (楊尚昆) as an envoy for Lee Teng-hui in 1992 ². This secret line made both sides aware of the bottom line.

Starting July 21, 1995, a second artillery unit continuously fired six Dongfeng-15 missiles over waters 36 miles north of Taiwan ¹². In August of the same year, the East Sea Fleet conducted exercises with 59 warships and 192 air sorties ¹.

In early 1996, as the first direct presidential election in Taiwan approached, Beijing intensified its actions. From January to February, 100,000 troops gathered along the Taiwan Strait coast ¹. The missile launch on March 8 directly targeted the waters off Keelung and Kaohsiung. The U.S. response was to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups: USS Independence and USS Nimitz. This was the largest military deployment by the United States in Asia since the Vietnam War ⁴².

The result was clear to everyone. Lee Teng-hui won the election with 54% of the vote, and voter turnout was 76% ². The lesson Beijing learned was: its military power is too far behind the United States. Jiang Zemin (江澤民) ordered the PLA to launch a ten-year modernization plan.

Islands Without People in the Cold War

Between the second and third Taiwan Strait crises lay thirty-plus years of cold war confrontation.

In 1971, the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations. Nixon visited China in 1972. In 1979, the U.S. established diplomatic relations with Beijing and severed ties with Taipei. Taiwan became increasingly isolated internationally, but within the island, the economy took off at an astonishing speed, becoming one of the Asian Four Little Dragons. These thirty years were a period where cross-strait politics was completely cut off, and civilian cultural connections were maintained only by memory.

In 1987, martial law was lifted in Taiwan. That year, veterans were allowed to return home for visits. Some young people who left the mainland at around twenty were middle-aged elders upon their return. Forty years of life were severed by a strait.

In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECFA) and the Cross-Strait Association held talks in Hong Kong, reaching an ambiguous agreement later known as the "1992 Consensus." Beijing interpreted this as "both sides adhere to one China," while Taipei interpreted it as "one China, respective interpretations." This subtle ambiguity maintained a framework for cross-strait relations for two decades.

Sunflower Festival and the New Generation of Taiwanese Identity

During the Ma Ying-jeou era (2008–2016), 23 agreements were signed between the two sides, including ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement). In 2015, Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping shook hands in Singapore—the first meeting between leaders from both sides since 1949.

But the Sunflower Festival in 2014 changed everything. Students occupied the Legislative Yuan for 24 days to protest the "Services Trade Agreement." On the surface, it was a concern about economic opening; the deeper anxiety was: would Taiwan lose its political autonomy due to economic integration?

After the Sunflower Festival, Taiwanese society experienced a generational gap in attitudes toward cross-strait relations. Surveys tracked by the Graduate Institute of Political Science showed ⁷ that the proportion identifying as "Taiwanese" continuously rose from 17.6% in 1992 to over 60% in the 2020s, while the proportion identifying as "Chinese" dropped below 3%. The vast majority always believed they should "maintain the status quo," but the definition of the "status quo" changed with each generation. For the younger generation, the status quo meant that Taiwan was already a de facto independent state.

Pelosi Arrives: Taiwanese People Playing Basketball

On the evening of August 2, 2022, Speaker Nancy Pelosi's plane landed at Songshan Airport in Taipei. A report by BBC Chinese reporter Lu Jiahong described a scene that confused international media [^2]: on the basketball court next to the airport, young people finished playing and left; no one waited for this globally powerful female politician to arrive.

Two of the reporter's friends in Taipei were both working in the video industry and heavy internet users, yet they had no knowledge of the visit by this powerful American woman ⁸.

Beijing announced military exercises around Taiwan, and missiles crossed the island's airspace for the first time. International media extensively reported whether a war was imminent in the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan, citizens went out as usual to dine, shop, and watch dramas. Zhang Jieping (張潔平), an intellectual who moved to Taiwan after studying in Guangzhou, wrote on Facebook: "I really realized only after coming here that the Taiwan imagined and understood by the world (which is the most dangerous place on Earth) is completely not the same as the Taiwan where Taiwanese people live" ⁸.

Some compared the reaction of the Taiwanese people to the attitude of Koreans facing North Korean missiles: fear existed, but it was already accustomed.

However, real anxiety appeared in the markets. The Taiwan stock market fell. CEO Mark Liu (劉德音) of TSMC rarely gave an interview to CNN to discuss war: "If China invades Taiwan, there will be no winner; everyone will lose" ⁸⁹.

After Pelosi's visit, military pressure from Beijing became routine. PLA aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait became daily news. In 2022, a total of nearly 1,700 military aircraft approaches were detected throughout the year, far exceeding previous records. This high level was maintained annually thereafter. The activities of the Chinese Navy around Taiwan also increased significantly.

Behind these numbers is a fundamental change: before 2022, the median line in the Taiwan Strait was a tacit buffer zone for both sides; afterward, this line seemed to have disappeared.

Structural Stalemate

The seventy-year history of crises in the Taiwan Strait has a recurring logical chain: one side takes an action perceived by the other as changing the status quo; the other responds with military displays; the United States intervenes to balance; and all parties retreat one step short of full war. This happened in 1954, 1958, 1996, and roughly so in 2022.

But the conditions supporting this cycle are changing. In 1996, deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups by the U.S. could make Beijing retreat; today, the PLA's anti-access capabilities mean that U.S. aircraft carriers can no longer easily approach the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's economic dependence on the mainland began to decline from its peak during the Ma Ying-jeou era, but global reliance on Taiwanese semiconductors reached a historical high. The "Silicon Shield" has become Taiwan's latest security barrier.

Civilian exchanges between the two sides partially resumed after the pandemic, but trust continued to erode. Data from Political Science surveys illustrates everything: Taiwanese identification continues to rise, support for unification continuously declines, while Beijing's will for unification never loosens. This is a set of parallel curves that cannot be bridged by negotiation.

When Xi Jinping publicly proposed the "One Country, Two Systems Taiwan Plan" in 2019, the reaction from the Taiwanese public was almost uniformly rejection. The timing of the Hong Kong anti-extradition movement reduced the persuasiveness of this proposal to a minimum.

The Granite Tunnels of Kinmen

The granite beneath Kinmen is filled with tunnels. During the period of military administration after the Aug. 23 shelling, the island was riddled with defensive tunnels—from the military Zhaishan Tunnel to civilian defense shelters in Qionglin and Jincheng—dug by hand by troops and civil defense forces. Residents hid from shelling and air raids inside them. After the end of military administration, these tunnels became tourist attractions. Tour guides led visitors from Taiwan and mainland China past where shells were hidden, pointing out ideological slogans carved into the walls.

After the opening of "Small Three Links" in 2001, people from Kinmen could take boats to Xiamen. They drank coffee, bought daily necessities, and did business there. Some relatives of people from Kinmen lived on the other side of the shelling zone. The distance between Masan in Kinmen and Jiaoyu across the strait was only 1.8 kilometers. On a clear day, you could see the high-rise buildings across the water with the naked eye.

In August 2022, when the PLA conducted missile exercises around Taiwan, some missiles landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone. Daily life in Kinmen did not change significantly. The lion statues on the island still guarded the intersections, and duty-free shops operated as usual. For seventy years, the people of Kinmen have known what war looks like better than anyone, and they are also better at living amidst threats than anyone.

The shell fragments from those granite tunnels were later used by blacksmiths in Kinmen to forge kitchen knives. The "Kinmen Kitchen Knife" became a tourist specialty; it was said to be as sharp and durable as ordinary knives. Shells turned into tools for cutting food.

Further Reading:

• Makers: The Century's Bet — Xiao Ju-ching, 2025 documentary, interviewing 80+ semiconductor veterans over five years; major investment centers in Pudong/Wisconsin/Michigan under the CHIPS Act in 2026.
• Taiwan Defense and Military Modernization — From Hogu Strategy to M1A2T Tanks: Fundamental changes in Taiwan's defense logic after three Taiwan Strait crises.
• Taiwan's Diplomatic Status and International Diplomacy — Another front beyond military confrontation: how Taiwan seeks presence within the international system.
• The 2026 Zheng-Xi Meeting: Ten Minutes of Leaders from ROC and PRC Meet — The latest chapter in seventy years of cross-strait interaction: the ten minutes when the KMT Chairman met Xi Jinping in Beijing.
• Ma Ying-jeou — The golden period and post-tenure controversies of the leader who met Xi in Singapore on 11/7/2015, signed ECFA, and visited China twice in 2023 and 2024.
• Teresa Teng — Another battlefield of soft power during the Cold War: her songs permeated the mainland; she held a "anti-management" banner in Guangzhou in 1989; she spoke to the mainland from Masan Observatory in 1991.
• Taiwan Future Resolution — The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis accelerated the pragmatic transformation of the DPP, leading to this document that defined cross-strait positions for twenty-seven years after three years.

References