Taiwan Elections and Party Politics

30-second overview: In the 1950s, "democracy showcase" elections let people elect councilors but not presidents. By 1996, 14.31 million voters cast ballots in the first direct presidential election in any Chinese-speaking society.¹ In less than half a century, Taiwan experienced three transfers of power (2000, 2008, 2016), transforming elections from a political ornament of the martial law era into a quadrennial civic ritual. From the flames of the Zhongli Incident to the three-party standoff in 2024, this island's democracy was not designed—it was fought for, one ballot at a time.

On November 19, 1977, at polling station 213 in Zhongli, Taoyuan County, a poll worker was observed smudging a ballot with an ink-stained thumb. When the news spread, more than 10,000 citizens surrounded the Zhongli police station. After nightfall, flames engulfed the station building. Two people died: Jiang Wenguo, a National Central University student, was shot in the head; 19-year-old Zhang Zhiping fell dead on the street.²

That fire did not just burn down a building. It sent a signal: Taiwan's voters would no longer tolerate stolen ballots. In that election, independent candidate Hsu Hsin-liang defeated the KMT's Ou Xianyu by a landslide of 230,000 votes.³ The Zhongli Incident became the first fire of Taiwan's democracy movement. Ballots could be stolen, but the popular will could not.

The Evolution of a Single Ballot

The Democracy Showcase (1950s)

In the 1950s, the Nationalist government needed to prove to the United States that it was "Free China." Local elections were that "showcase window," letting America see the form of democracy while the KMT kept a firm grip on the content. The 1950 Taiwan Provincial Assembly election was the first popularly elected body after the war, but the rules were clear: you could elect councilors, not the provincial governor; you could criticize policy, not question the leadership.⁴

Even under tight control, elections still opened cracks. In 1951, Wu San-lien was elected mayor of Taipei as an independent, winning 65.6% of the vote—the first popularly elected mayor of a capital city in the Republic of China.⁵ The KMT quietly supported him behind the scenes, but the very fact that a "non-KMT" mayor stood in Taipei City Hall showed other local politicians what was possible.

War on the Ballot (1970s)

In the 1970s, Taiwan was hit by a series of shocks—withdrawal from the United Nations (1971) and the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States (1979)—and the KMT's legitimacy began to waver. The middle class grew, and opposition voices started to surface in elections.

In 1975, 77-year-old Yilan politician Guo Yuxin ran for the Legislative Yuan. When the results were announced, nearly 100,000 invalid ballots appeared in Yilan County alone—several times the normal rate. Later, during a road construction project, a bag of discarded valid ballots was unearthed, every one circled for Guo Yuxin. The lawyers who fought his election lawsuit were named Yao Chia-wen and Lin Yi-hsiung—four years later, both would become defendants in the Kaohsiung Incident.⁶

Guo Yuxin's votes were stolen. But that lawsuit taught an entire generation of opposition figures: the law could be a weapon.

From Underground to the Grand Hotel (1980s)

The Kaohsiung Incident (1979) dealt a heavy blow to the opposition movement, but it also raised the next generation. The defense lawyers for the arrested leaders—Chen Shui-bian, Hsieh Chang-ting, and Su Tseng-chang—became the new faces of the democracy movement. The families of the arrested—Lu Hsiu-lien, Chen Chu, and Zhou Qingyu—entered politics, becoming the female force of the Kaohsiung generation.

On September 28, 1986, 132 opposition figures gathered in the Dunmu Hall on the second floor of Taipei's Grand Hotel and announced the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party. This violated the then-existing "Period of Communist Rebellion Civic Organization Act"—forming a party was a crime. When the news reached Chiang Ching-kuo, his staff recommended a crackdown. Chiang Ching-kuo said: "The times are changing, the tide is changing, and the environment is changing."⁷

Ten days later, Chiang Ching-kuo told Washington Post publisher Katharine Graham that Taiwan would lift martial law and open up politically. The DPP was not suppressed—the KMT chose tolerance.

Two months later, in the legislative election, the DPP won 22.2% of the vote and 12 seats. A party only sixty days old had already found its footing.⁸

Electing Their Own President

Full Legislative Yuan Re-election (1991–1992)

In 1991, the "Ten-Thousand-Year Congress" that had persisted for 43 years was finally fully re-elected. The old legislators and National Assembly members elected on the mainland in 1979, never since re-elected, stepped down. The 1992 full Legislative Yuan election was the first time Taiwanese truly elected their own parliament.⁹

1996: Missiles and Ballots

On March 23, 1996, 14.31 million voters walked into polling stations and cast Taiwan's—and any Chinese-speaking society's—first direct presidential election.

The PRC fired missiles into the waters off Taiwan before the election, intending to intimidate voters. The result was the opposite: turnout surged to 76%. Lee Teng-hui won 5.81 million votes (54%), Peng Ming-min 2.27 million (21.1%), Lin Yang-kang 1.60 million (14.9%), and Chen Lu-an 1.07 million (10%).¹ The missiles scared no one.

2000: Three-Way Race and the First Transfer of Power

The 2000 presidential election was the most dramatic night in Taiwan's political history. The KMT split; former Taiwan Province Governor James Soong left the party and ran as an independent, splitting the pan-blue vote with the KMT's Lien Chan.

The results: Chen Shui-bian 4.97 million votes (39.3%), James Soong 4.66 million (36.8%), Lien Chan 2.92 million (23.1%). The DPP won the presidency with less than 40% of the vote.¹⁰

The key was not who won, but what the losers did. The KMT lost 55 years of power—no military deployment, no coup. Lien Chan and James Soong conceded defeat. Power transferred peacefully. Taiwan proved, for the first time, that its democracy was not just theoretical.

2004: Two Bullets

On March 19, 2004, the day before the election, Chen Shui-bian and Lu Hsiu-lien were shot while campaigning in Tainan. One bullet grazed Chen's abdomen; the other struck the knee pad on Lu's leg. Both were hospitalized and discharged the same day.¹¹

The next day, Chen defeated Lien Chan by fewer than 30,000 votes. Pan-blue supporters gathered in front of the Presidential Office to protest, alleging the shooting was staged. The prime suspect, Chen Yi-hsiung, was found drowned in Tainan's Anping Harbor ten days later. The truth remains disputed to this day.

This was the moment Taiwan's democracy came closest to breaking. The election result was questioned by nearly half the electorate; street protests lasted for weeks. But in the end, legal procedures did their job: recounts, lawsuits, court rulings. The system held.

The Fracturing Party Landscape

Taiwan's party history is not as simple as "two-party system." It is a story of constant splitting, recombination, death, and rebirth.

The KMT's internal line conflicts erupted in the 1990s. In 1993, the New KMT Alliance, dissatisfied with Lee Teng-hui's "localization" direction, broke away and founded the New Party. In 2000, after his election defeat, James Soong established the People First Party. In 2001, after Lee Teng-hui was expelled from the KMT, he backed the founding of the Taiwan Solidarity Union.¹²

The DPP also had its fractures. In 2015, the energy of the Sunflower Movement was channeled into the New Power Party, advocating a more radical Taiwan-centered line than the DPP. In 2019, Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je struck out on his own and founded the Taiwan People's Party, attempting a "beyond blue-green" third way.¹³

By 2024, Taiwan's party landscape had roughly settled into three major forces: the DPP (green), the KMT (blue), and the TPP (white). But history tells us this map could fracture again at any time.

How Taiwanese Vote

Rally Culture: Democracy's Carnival

The most distinctive spectacle of Taiwan's elections is the campaign rally. Candidates rent out a plaza, set up a stage, have entertainers warm up the crowd, and supporters wave flags chanting "Dongsuan! Dongsuan!" (Taiwanese Hokkien for "elected").

A rally is not just political mobilization—it's a community festival. Vendors line the streets; children ride on their fathers' shoulders; elderly people carry stools to claim their spots. Elections are one of the few activities where Taiwanese can simultaneously fulfill political participation, social needs, and entertainment consumption.

Returning Home to Vote: An Annual Migration

Taiwan still has no absentee voting system. Voters must cast their ballots in person at their registered domicile—no mail-in ballots, no early voting.¹⁴

This means that every election day, Taiwan sees a massive "return home to vote" migration. Kaohsiung natives working in Taipei, Yunlin natives working in Hsinchu—all scrambling for train tickets to go home and vote. The high-speed rail adds extra runs; bus companies deploy extra vehicles. Taiwan's HSR stations on election day are more crowded than during Lunar New Year.

Opponents of absentee voting worry that more than a million Taiwanese working in China could be influenced by Beijing if they could vote remotely. Supporters argue that not allowing people to vote where they live is a de facto voting barrier. This debate has yet to reach a consensus.

Election Night

Taiwan's vote counting is a nationwide live broadcast. After polling stations close at 4 p.m., election workers open the ballot boxes on the spot and count ballots one by one, reading each aloud. TV stations set up cameras at every polling station for live coverage.

No country's vote counting is more transparent than Taiwan's. You can stand outside a polling station and watch every ballot be displayed, read aloud, and tallied. From the closing of polls to a roughly settled result, it usually takes only three to four hours.

Recent Key Moments

2018: The Han Wave and the Referendum Tsunami

The 2018 local elections were a political earthquake. KMT's Han Kuo-yu, a political outsider, parachuted into Kaohsiung and defeated the DPP's Chen Chi-mai with 890,000 votes, ending 20 years of green rule in the city.¹⁵ Across Taiwan, the KMT won 15 county and city mayor seats; the DPP was left with only 6. Tsai Ing-wen resigned as party chair.

The simultaneous citizen referendums were even more shocking. Ten referendum questions covered energy, food safety, same-sex marriage, and gender equality education—voters faced ten referendum ballots at once, and polling stations saw long lines. The referendum defining marriage as between a man and a woman passed, creating a head-on collision between public opinion and the law on Taiwan's path to becoming Asia's first country to legalize same-sex marriage.¹⁶

2020: 8.17 Million Votes

Two years later, the 2020 presidential election saw a complete reversal. The Hong Kong anti-extradition movement concretized Taiwanese society's fear of "one country, two systems." Tsai Ing-wen staged a comeback from her 2018 rout, winning 8,170,186 votes—the highest vote total for any candidate in Taiwan's electoral history. Han Kuo-yu received 5.52 million votes; turnout was 74.9%.¹⁷

The number 817 later became a political symbol, embraced by supporters as a symbol of democratic will and cited by opponents as evidence of polarized politics.

2024: Three-Way Race Redux

The 2024 presidential election reprised the three-way standoff of 2000. Lai Ching-te (DPP) won with 5.58 million votes (40%), Hou Yu-ih (KMT) 4.67 million (33.5%), and Ko Wen-je (TPP) 3.69 million (26.5%).¹⁸

This was the first time in Taiwan's direct election history that a candidate won with less than 50% of the vote, and the first time a party won the presidency for three consecutive terms. At the same time, the DPP lost its Legislative Yuan majority—executive and legislative power fell to different camps, and Taiwan entered a new era of "divided government."

A Democracy Still Evolving

In 2005, the National Assembly voted to abolish itself—this body, elected in Nanjing in 1979, completed its final task in Taiwan and passed into history. The same constitutional amendment cut the Legislative Yuan from 225 to 113 seats, extended terms from three to four years, and changed the electoral system to a single-district, two-vote system. Future constitutional amendments must pass a citizen referendum, with a threshold so high it is nearly impossible to cross.¹⁹

Taiwan's electoral system continues to evolve. A 2022 citizen referendum proposed lowering the voting age from 20 to 18, but because this was a constitutional amendment, it required more than 9.61 million approvals—in the end, only 5.64 million voted yes, and it failed. Money politics, disinformation, and voting system reform are all unfinished business.

From the flames of the 1977 Zhongli Incident to 14 million people quietly lining up to vote in 2024—Taiwan spent less than half a century transforming elections from a right that required fire to protect into a habit that runs without anyone needing to remind it.

Not every election is perfect. But every time, the losers left, and the winners took office. On this planet, that is not as self-evident as it looks.

The Political Landscape After 2024

The January 2024 election results did not just decide who would be president—they redrew the power map for the next four years. Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim entered the Presidential Office with 40.1% of the vote, but the DPP won only 51 Legislative Yuan seats, the KMT 52, and the TPP 8. No party held a majority. Taiwan entered its first strictly defined "opposition-controlled legislature" in constitutional history—the ruling party simultaneously lost its Legislative Yuan majority and the speakership.²⁰

Opposition-Controlled Legislature: Blitzkrieg and Procedural Disputes

Starting in May 2024, the KMT and TPP, with a combined majority of 60 seats, pushed "Congress Reform Bills" granting the Legislative Yuan greater investigative and hearing powers. The DPP accused the blue-white coalition of using their numerical advantage to "proceed directly to second reading," bypassing substantive committee review. The Constitutional Court subsequently ruled multiple provisions unconstitutional in its 2024 Judgment No. 9.²¹

Over the next eighteen months, similar procedural disputes played out repeatedly. Budget review, amendments to the Fiscal Revenue Allocation Act, proposed amendments to Article 29 of the Cross-Strait Relations Act, amendments to the Election and Recall Act—almost every vote in the Legislative Yuan was accompanied by occupation of the speaker's podium, physical confrontations, and late-night voting. The blue-white cooperation demonstrated the power of a majority, but the two parties were not always in lockstep. The TPP held back on several controversial bills, and KMT legislators also publicly expressed disagreement with caucus resolutions. The stability of the majority coalition needed to be reconfirmed before every vote.

The 2025 Great Recall

When institutional checks and balances proved ineffective, civil society activated the final tool granted by the Constitution: the right of recall. Starting in February 2025, more than 1.3 million people signed petitions, launching recalls against 31 KMT legislators and Hsinchu Mayor Ann Kao.²²

The first wave of 25 recall votes on July 26 and the second wave of 7 on August 23 all failed. In some districts, yes votes did exceed the 25% threshold of the district's total electorate (e.g., Wang Hung-wei, Hsu Chiao-hsin, Fu Kun-chi), but no votes were generally higher, even surpassing the original vote counts of the legislators in question.²³

The recall results did not change the Legislative Yuan's composition, but they left several traces worth watching long-term. The mobilization energy civil society displayed during the petition phase was unprecedented—whether this energy will extend to the 2026 local elections remains unknown. The position of third forces (TPP, New Power Party, Taiwan Statebuilding Party) during the recall process was relatively ambiguous; most TPP supporters voted no or abstained, posing a test for whether the white camp can sustain its third-way path in 2026. Another tension lies in the relationship between mobilization and civic will: in some districts, recall yes votes exceeded the legislator's original election vote count, but still lost to consolidated no-vote mobilization. Whether direct democratic tools can succeed in a highly polarized environment is a question Taiwan's politics will face in every election after 2025.²⁴

For the full event timeline, see Great Recall.

Blue-White Cooperation and the 2026 Institutional Test

On March 18, 2026, the KMT Central Standing Committee and the TPP Central Committee each passed the "2026 Joint Governance and Local Election Cooperation Agreement" on the same day. The agreement, jointly promoted by newly elected KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun (who took office in October 2025) and TPP Chair Huang Kuo-chang, established five core elements: shared policy vision, county/city mayoral nomination cooperation mechanisms, integrated execution methods, joint campaign mechanisms, and post-election cooperative governance. County/city mayoral integration would follow "nominate first, then integrate, jointly recommend one person," with all-member public opinion polls to decide when necessary, and poll questions must include head-to-head comparisons with the main opponent.²⁵

The three priority launch cities and counties were New Taipei, Chiayi City, and Yilan. Their shared characteristics: long-term blue-green tug-of-war, third forces with some local support base, and incumbent mayors/county magistrates whose terms were ending.²⁶

This agreement represents a new form in Taiwan's history of party cooperation. The 2020 Tsai Ing-wen–Hsiao Bi-khim "presidential-vice presidential ticket" was an internal party pairing; the 2024 Ko Wen-je–Wu Hsin-ying ticket was an internal TPP nomination. The 2026 blue-white cooperation is an institutional integration between two independent parties at the local election level—joint polling, joint nomination, joint governance. It also differs from the collapsed "blue-white cooperation" of late 2023 (the Hou-Ko presidential election integration): a presidential election has only one position, making integration zero-sum; local elections cover 22 cities and counties, allowing district-by-district negotiation.

The success or failure of blue-white cooperation will feed back into the party landscape of the 2028 presidential election. If integration proceeds smoothly, the third force–major party cooperation model could become a new political structure; if it fails, the TPP may return to the independent path of the Ko Wen-je era. This article does not predict outcomes, but records this node of March 18, 2026: Taiwan's party politics is trying a new, historically unproven form of cooperation.

DPP Factional Evolution

The DPP was never a monolithic block from its first day. The 132 people who founded the party at the Grand Hotel in 1986 came from different sources—the Opposition Editorial Writers' Association, the Opposition Public Policy Association, local politicians, and others. The two major factions at the party's founding: the New Tide faction (tracing its origins to the 1983 Opposition Editorial Writers' Association, formally organized in 1987 by Chiou I-jen, Wu Nai-jen, and Lin Chui-shui) and the Kaohsiung Incident faction (evolving from the "Kaohsiung Incident Line" within the Opposition Public Policy Association, centered on victims of the Kaohsiung Incident and their defense lawyers).²⁷

In the mid-1990s, a new generation brought new factional differentiation. Chen Shui-bian, Hsieh Chang-ting, and Su Tseng-chang—a group that belonged neither to the New Tide nor fully to the Kaohsiung Incident faction—gradually forged two new lines: on September 28, 1992, Chang Chun-hsiung, Yao Chia-wen, Hsieh Chang-ting, and Shih Ming-teh founded the "Welfare State Alliance" (later known as the Welfare State faction), advocating social welfare policy and a pragmatic cross-strait line; in the mid-to-late 1990s, the "Justice Alliance" gradually took shape around Chen Shui-bian, with a line leaning toward Taiwan-centered identity and local deep cultivation.²⁸

After Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, the Justice Alliance briefly became the party's strongest faction. But after Chen left office in 2008 and his legal cases erupted, the Justice Alliance rapidly declined. The Kaohsiung Incident faction also gradually split into "New Century" (led by Chang Chun-hung) and "New Power" (the Hsu Hsin-liang line) and other offshoots. The New Tide, with the strongest organizational discipline and the most consistent line, became the DPP's most enduring faction—Tsai Ing-wen's "Ing faction" during her era and the New Tide during Lai Ching-te's era both trace their lineage to this line stretching back to the 1980s.²⁹

The connection between factions and regional support bases is another layer of the DPP's political geography. The New Tide in southern Taiwan (especially Yunlin, Chiayi, and Tainan) echoes the "Southern Hegemon" tradition; the Welfare State faction has deep roots in Kaohsiung; the Justice Alliance was once a vote-getter in Greater Taipei. These regional factional structures never appear in central election platforms, but they influence nominations, campaign support, and mobilization in every local election.³⁰

After Tsai Ing-wen was elected president in 2016, the party's factional structure underwent another wave of reorganization. Tsai's relationship with the New Tide evolved from cooperation to tension to a substantive alliance, gradually shaping the "Ing faction"—a sub-faction centered on Tsai's core staff, with a line highly overlapping with the New Tide but organizationally independent. After Lai Ching-te took over the presidency in 2024, the New Tide once again became the strongest organizational force in the party headquarters. From 1987 to 2024, the New Tide has spanned nearly forty years, making it one of the longest-lived factions in Taiwan's party history.

KMT Factional Evolution

The KMT's factional structure has existed since the party's relocation to Taiwan, but the word "faction" has referred to different things in different periods. The biggest early divide was "mainstream vs. non-mainstream"—the mainstream faction, led by Lee Teng-hui, advocated localization and democratic reform; the non-mainstream faction, centered on Hau Pei-tsun, Lin Yang-kang, and Lee Huan, advocated continuing the Chiang line and emphasizing ROC constitutional legitimacy. The 1993 departure of the New KMT Alliance to form the New Party was the non-mainstream faction's first large-scale split.³¹

After the Lee Teng-hui era, the KMT's factional narrative gradually shifted from line-based division to personality-centered "mountain tops": the Lien faction (Lien Chan, party chair 2000–2005), the Ma faction (Ma Ying-jeou, party chair 2005–2007 and 2009–2014), the Chu faction (Eric Chu, party chair 2014–2016 and 2021–2025), and the Han faction (Han Kuo-yu, Kaohsiung mayor 2018–2020 and presidential candidate). Each faction had its own local organization, legislator network, and media ecosystem. The Ma-Wang political struggle (Ma Ying-jeou's 2013 handling of Wang Jin-pyng's alleged judicial interference case) was the most representative internal conflict of this phase.³²

Han Kuo-yu's 2018 "Han Wave" rise reshuffled the KMT's grassroots political mobilization logic—the Han faction brought not a new policy line but a "commoner/anti-establishment" campaign style. After Han's 2020 presidential election defeat, Eric Chu retook the party chairmanship in 2021, leading the KMT to a major victory in the 2022 nine-in-one elections and the 2024 presidential nomination. On October 18, 2025, Cheng Li-wun was elected party chair with 50.15% of the vote, succeeding Eric Chu, whose term had ended. Cheng Li-wun, a product of the student movement generation whose political career began in the DPP, became the second woman elected as KMT chair by direct member vote after Hung Hsiu-chu.³³

After 2024, Lu Shiow-yen's sustained popularity in Taichung and Cheng Li-wun taking over party headquarters, the KMT's factional structure is undergoing another round of reshuffling. Whether Lu Shiow-yen will run in the 2028 presidential election, how Cheng Li-wun coordinates with traditional party mountain tops, and how blue-white cooperation is implemented at the county/city level—these variables will determine the trajectory of the KMT's factional map in the coming years. This article does not comment on individual politicians' strategies, but records one observation: compared to the DPP, KMT factions tend to be more "person-centered" with relatively loose organizational discipline; DPP factions are more "line-centered" with more institutionalized organizational mechanisms.³⁴

There is another long-undervalued line in the KMT's factional structure: the localist faction. From Lee Teng-hui's localization line in his era, to Wang Jin-pyng's local networks in the Legislative Yuan, to the commoner discourse that surfaced in Han Kuo-yu's 2018 campaign, the divide between "localist" and "mainlander" factions within the KMT has persisted from the 1990s to the present. This line is directly connected to regional support bases—the KMT's long-term advantage in central Taiwan (especially Taichung and Changhua) and some eastern districts is deeply tied to the localist faction's local foundations.

The Position of Third Forces

The TPP's situation in 2026 is particularly noteworthy. In the 2024 presidential election, Ko Wen-je won 3.69 million votes (26.5%), the highest single-election vote total for a third-force candidate since James Soong in 2000. But after Ko was detained in late 2024 over the Core Pacific City case, the TPP entered a period of simultaneous organizational and popularity decline. Party chairmanship passed to Huang Kuo-chang, and the line shifted from "beyond blue-green" to "blue-white cooperation."³⁵

The New Power Party lost 3 seats in the 2020 legislative election and was reduced to 0 at-large seats in 2024, with organizational energy visibly declining. The Taiwan Statebuilding Party also entered a low ebb after Chen Po-wei's 2020 legislative by-election defeat. The real test for third forces in 2026 is whether the TPP can translate organizational energy into local support through blue-white cooperation while retaining its own identity.³⁶

From the founding of the New Party in 1993 to the 2026 blue-white cooperation, Taiwan's third forces have repeatedly followed a similar trajectory: born from dissatisfaction with the two major parties, rising rapidly on the strength of charismatic leaders, then gradually declining under the dual pressure of institutions (single-district, two-vote system) and resources (local organizations). Whether this cycle will be broken in 2026 is the next observation point in Taiwan's party political history.

It is worth noting that the single-district, two-vote system implemented in 2018 structurally compressed the survival space of third forces. The 73 district legislative seats are elected by single-district plurality—the candidate with the second-highest vote total gets no seat. Even if a third force achieves a certain national vote share, as long as it cannot place first in local districts, its seat count will struggle to reflect voter support. This institutional design codifies the two major parties' advantage and forces every third-force rise to eventually return to the choice of "alliance or marginalization."

Further Reading

• Taiwan's Democratic Transition — The full picture of forty years of transition from martial law to democratization
• Kaohsiung Incident — The night in 1979 that changed Taiwan's fate
• Martial Law Period — How thirty-eight years of martial law shaped Taiwanese society
• Resolution on Taiwan's Future — How the DPP's line shift from independence party charter to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future rewrote the landscape of Taiwan's electoral politics
• Great Recall — The full timeline of civil society's launch of the largest recall campaign in history in 2025
• 2026 Nine-in-One Elections — Battle layout and institutional test across 22 cities and counties
• What Are the Nine-in-One Elections — Institutional explanation of the nine-in-one local official elections
• Village Chief System — Taiwan's most grassroots elected position
• Councilor System — Institutional history of county/city councilors and special municipality councilors
• Politics Hub — Overview portal of Taiwan's political environment

References