The 2026 Cheng-Xi Meeting: Ten Minutes Between KMT and CCP Leaders After a Decade Apart

Ten Minutes in the Fujian Hall

On the afternoon of April 10, 2026, in the Fujian Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, the press photographers outside counted the seconds of the handshake between the two principals: it was far shorter than the 80-second "handshake of the century" between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping in Singapore in 2015.¹

The meeting inside lasted about ten minutes. Cheng Li-wun — Kuomintang (KMT) chairperson and, until recently before the current DPP administration, a key figure in the party's legislative caucus — now presented five proposals to Xi Jinping in her capacity as KMT chairperson. Xi listened and nodded, saying that people on both sides of the strait are Chinese.²

When those ten minutes ended, approximately 100 PLA naval and coast guard vessels were deployed across the Taiwan Strait, from the East China Sea to the South China Sea. In late March that number had still been around 70.³ International security analysts later told Reuters this might become "the new normal."⁴

The ten minutes in the Fujian Hall and the 100 vessels share the same production — two scripts in the same play.

30-second overview: On April 10, 2026, KMT chairperson Cheng Li-wun met Xi Jinping in Beijing — the first time in a decade that a major ROC political party leader had met the CCP General Secretary, since the 2015 Ma-Xi summit. Cheng presented five proposals including a "cross-strait peace framework" and a request for Taiwan to return to the World Health Assembly (WHA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Xi responded with the unification narrative that "people on both sides of the strait are Chinese." Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council accused Cheng of failing to raise Taiwan's three key demands; the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) reiterated that meaningful cross-strait dialogue must include Taiwan's democratically elected government. All the while, approximately 100 PLA vessels encircled Taiwan.

A Person Who Traveled from the Green Camp to the Blue Camp to Beijing

If you want to use one person's biography to refract the complexity of cross-strait relations in 2026, Cheng Li-wun may be the best choice.

She was born in 1969 in Jingzhong Third Village (精忠三村), Tainan — her father a Yunnan-born veteran of the ROC military who came to Taiwan, her mother from Yunlin, raised in a typical military dependents' household.⁵ In 1988, at age 19, she joined the Democratic Progressive Party, rising to prominence in the post-Martial Law student movement era through her "daring speech and flair," at one point advocating for Taiwan independence, and serving as deputy director of the DPP's Youth Development Department and deputy convener of the DPP National Assembly caucus.⁶

The turning point came in 2005. The then-KMT chairperson Lien Chan invited her repeatedly to cross the political divide, and she ultimately left the DPP and joined the KMT. She subsequently served as KMT spokesperson, Executive Yuan spokesperson, and legislator, maintaining a visible presence in blue-camp political commentary for twenty years under the "war general" image.

On October 18, 2025, in a chairperson election widely seen as a KMT ideological debate, Cheng Li-wun won with 50.15% of the vote, defeating former Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin and Legislator Lo Chih-chiang to become KMT chairperson.⁷ Her campaign slogan was starkly explicit: "I am Chinese." A political figure who had gone from advocating Taiwan independence to publicly declaring "I am Chinese" became the chairperson of the Republic of China's oldest political party.

Six months later, she walked into the Fujian Hall in that identity.

The 2015 Ma-Xi Summit, and What Is Different Today

To understand why those ten minutes on April 10 are worth examining, one must first return to another moment ten years ago.

November 7, 2015, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore. Then-ROC President Ma Ying-jeou and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping shook hands for 80 seconds. This was the first formal meeting between the highest leaders of both sides of the strait since the political separation of 1949 — a "first" that, counting from the end of the civil war, had taken 66 years.⁸

The principles of that meeting, as stated by the Ma administration, were clear: "equality and dignity," no preconditions, no political negotiations, no agreements, no joint communiqué, a neutral third location, respect for legislative oversight, no black box. Both sides met as "Taiwan leader" and "mainland leader," addressing each other as "Mister." Then-Premier Mao Chi-kuo's subsequent interpretation: "neither side recognizes the other's sovereignty; neither side denies the other's governing authority."⁹

Ten years later, at the Cheng-Xi meeting, every one of these conditions had changed.

• Venue: Not a neutral third location but the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
• Identity: Not "Taiwan leader" meeting "mainland leader," but "Kuomintang chairperson" meeting "Chinese Communist Party General Secretary." This format removes the ROC government from the picture. The meeting was packaged as "interparty communication," not as the interaction of two political entities.
• Terms of address: In 2015 both sides called each other "Mister." In 2026 the terms of address used were "Chairperson Cheng" and "General Secretary Xi" — party-internal titles.
• Aftermath: After the 2015 summit, Ma Ying-jeou's first act upon returning to Taiwan was to report to the Legislative Yuan; in 2026, Cheng Li-wun reported to the KMT's Central Standing Committee.

In ten years, two ROC political figures met the same Xi Jinping. The difference: one went bearing a national identity, the other carrying a party identity.

Cheng Li-wun's Five Proposals

Cheng Li-wun presented five proposals in the meeting, saying in her own words the goal was to "promote peace through exchanges and boost development through cooperation":¹⁰

1. Expand Taiwan's international participation: Push for Taiwan's return to the World Health Assembly (WHA) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and seek opportunities to participate in Interpol, RCEP, and CPTPP.
2. Promote peaceful development of cross-strait relations: Through exchanges and cooperation, build an "institutionalized peaceful development framework for cross-strait relations," gradually achieving a "peace framework."
3. Restore cross-strait negotiation mechanisms: Resume cross-strait negotiations on the basis of the "1992 Consensus," accumulating goodwill in a virtuous cycle.
4. Maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait: Promote practical economic cooperation, strengthen public support for cross-strait peace.
5. Leverage the KMT-CCP communications platform: Use the party-to-party channel to facilitate exchanges and cooperation at all levels.

These five proposals immediately split into two interpretations in Taiwan's public sphere.

Proponents said: Cheng had finally placed Taiwan's international space agenda on the table at the highest level of cross-strait dialogue — something the DPP government has never been able to do. Lai Ching-te cannot sit at that table.

Opponents said: Cheng Li-wun's use of the phrase "peace framework" was quietly sliding the future of cross-strait relations from "maintaining the status quo" toward "final political resolution" — and "final political resolution" is CCP official terminology for a unification roadmap. The Mainland Affairs Council's six-point statement after the meeting used the sharpest possible formulation: "The 'peace framework' that Cheng Li-wun proposed is a 'unification framework.'"¹¹

Both interpretations have merit — but only one party can legally represent the position of the Republic of China.

Xi Jinping Said One Thing

Cheng presented five proposals; Xi Jinping responded with one theme.

Based on the full text of his remarks released after the meeting,¹² Xi's speech can be compressed into a few sentences:

• People on both sides of the strait are Chinese, belonging to the same Chinese nation.
• The world is troubled today; peace is precious.
• On the common political foundation of "upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence," we are willing to strengthen exchanges with all of Taiwan's political parties.
• National reunification is the trend of history; both sides are "one family" and should jointly bear responsibility for national rejuvenation.

Comparing both sides' remarks, a pattern emerges: Cheng Li-wun raised five concrete matters; Xi Jinping repeated one principle.

This is not a dialogue failure — it is the asymmetry of the dialogue. Five proposals are tactics; one principle is strategy. Tactics can be bargained over item by item; strategy can only be accepted or rejected wholesale. Xi Jinping does not need to respond to Cheng's "return to WHA" or "restore cross-strait negotiation mechanisms" — he only needs to confirm one thing: do you acknowledge that we are "one family"?

Once "one family" is tacitly accepted by both parties, all the remaining specifics can be "studied comprehensively and positively." This is also why CCP state media after the meeting emphasized that "every item and matter that Chairperson Cheng proposed and hoped for can be actively promoted" — because the premise has been established; the details become technical questions.¹³

Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie's summary was very succinct: "We repeatedly asked Cheng Li-wun to raise before Xi Jinping the three major demands of the Taiwan people — recognize the existence of the ROC, respect the will of Taiwan's people, and stop harassment by military aircraft and vessels. Regrettably, Chairperson Cheng raised not a single one."¹⁴

Taipei's Response, and Washington's Response

Within four hours of the meeting's conclusion, three messages were sent from different directions.

Executive Yuan: The signals conveyed by the Cheng-Xi meeting show that China is attempting to draw Taiwan into a "one China framework" through inter-party interaction, laying the political groundwork for so-called "peaceful unification" — something 23 million Taiwanese will not accept.¹⁵

Lai Ching-te (Facebook): "History tells us that capitulating to authoritarianism only sacrifices sovereignty and democracy — it brings neither freedom nor peace."¹⁶ He also took the opportunity to call on the KMT to support his special defense budget.

American Institute in Taiwan (AIT): Meaningful cross-strait engagement requires unconditional dialogue between Beijing and Taiwan's democratically elected leadership, and should also include communication with all political parties.¹⁷ Translated plainly: you may talk with the opposition party, but talking only with the opposition party is meaningless for the status quo of the Taiwan Strait.

Placed together, these three responses sketch out three different endpoints in the 2026 cross-strait dynamic. Beijing wants to bypass Lai Ching-te; Washington demands Lai Ching-te be put back at the table; and Taipei's executive apparatus has already prepared to treat the entire matter as a "united front operation."

Cheng Li-wun herself, after returning to Taiwan and speaking to the media, emphasized that Xi Jinping's response was "particularly positive" and that he mentioned that "every item and matter can be studied comprehensively and positively."¹⁸ But the Mainland Affairs Council returned fire with one sentence: "Liable to reverse course at any time — hard to pin any hope on."¹⁹

100 Vessels, No Rest

During the ten-minute meeting in Beijing's Fujian Hall, and throughout the entire day that followed, the Taiwan Strait was not quiet.

According to Reuters citing international security analysts, the number of PLA naval and coast guard vessels deployed across the area from the East China Sea to the South China Sea increased from around 70 in late March to around 100 during the week of the meeting.²⁰ What makes this number noteworthy is that its appearance did not coincide with a typical military exercise cycle, nor was it in response to any specific provocation — it was simply there.

The security analysts' assessment: this could become "the new normal." The new normal means that the background noise of the Taiwan Strait will no longer be "China is not here" but "China's 80-100 vessels are always here."

This created a surreal parallel with the ten-minute meeting. Inside the meeting: discussing "promoting peaceful development of cross-strait relations." Outside the meeting: "peacetime deployment of 100 combat vessels." When peace becomes a topic that must be discussed, warships become background — paradoxically becoming the unremarkable common knowledge that requires no discussion.

The Void Before the Xi-Trump Summit

Why did this meeting happen in early April 2026?

An Asia-focused analyst interviewed by U.S. NPR offered one reading on the timing: Cheng Li-wun's "peace mission" happened before Trump's expected visit to China. Her strategy was to exploit Taiwan society's anxiety about uncertainty under the Trump administration, pushing for "a more hedging, more centrist" strategic choice for Taiwan.²¹

The Atlantic Council's Wen-ti Sung offered another angle: Cheng Li-wun's "institutional arrangements to prevent war," translated into plain language, actually points in the policy direction of "slowing defense buildup and buying fewer American weapons."²²

The two analysts' views together point toward one judgment: the Cheng-Xi meeting's true target audience was not in Beijing or Taipei, but in Washington. Xi Jinping wanted to demonstrate before the Xi-Trump summit that "Taiwan's internal opposition to resistance to China is not a monolith"; Cheng Li-wun wanted to signal to Washington that "America is not Taiwan's only option."

Those ten minutes of the Cheng-Xi meeting were a performance for a third party.

Conclusion: The Dual Scripts of Peace and Force

Ten years have passed — past one American president, a semiconductor war, and three Taiwan Strait crises.

The 2015 Ma-Xi summit was symmetrical: two countries' current highest leaders, an 80-second handshake, addressing each other as "Mister." That was an era when both sides were still willing to pretend they were equal. The 2026 Cheng-Xi meeting is asymmetrical: the ROC government is absent; the ROC opposition party chairperson is present. One side raised five concrete proposals; the other repeated one unification premise.

Cheng Li-wun went to Beijing with five proposals, but the meeting lasted only ten minutes; the moment she said "peace framework," 100 Chinese vessels were encircling Taiwan. Peace is the script; armed force is the stage direction.

The five proposals Cheng Li-wun brought back to Taiwan will be debated, contested, and digested. But after the meeting ended, those 100 vessels remained in the Taiwan Strait — they do not debate, do not contest, do not digest. They are simply there.

This is the cross-strait reality of 2026: peace is what is discussed at the negotiating table; what is under the table is gunpowder. Peace is spoken aloud because armed force has been brought in; armed force is permitted to remain because peace is still being spoken. The two scripts explain each other — neither can exist alone, and neither truly believes in the other.

The 2015 Singapore meeting was a handshake; the 2026 Beijing meeting is a performance. For whom is this performance being staged? Perhaps for Trump, perhaps for 23 million Taiwanese, perhaps for history. But when the performance is over and the lights come up, what will remain is 100 vessels — and that answer that changes every ten minutes: where is Taiwan going?

Further Reading:

• Taiwan Strait Crises and the Development of Cross-Strait Relations (zh only) — Seventy years of cross-strait interaction from 1949 to 2016; the Cheng-Xi meeting is only the latest chapter in this long river
• Taiwan's Political Environment and Electoral System (zh only) — Understanding "why Cheng Li-wun" requires first understanding the KMT's 2025 intra-party ideological debate
• Taiwan's Democratic Transition (zh only) — Why does AIT emphasize "dialogue with democratically elected leadership"? The roots of that principle are here
• Taiwan Defense and Military Modernization (zh only) — Behind Cheng's "institutional arrangements to prevent war" is the political battle over the defense budget
• Lai Ching-te (賴清德) — The other protagonist of this drama: the one deliberately kept out of the frame
• Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) — From the student activist fasting for Taiwan independence at NTU's gates in 1988, to the KMT chairperson saying "people on both sides of the strait are Chinese" in Beijing in 2026
• Han Kuo-yu — Legislative Yuan president; this week's presiding figure in the Legislative Yuan budget negotiations; another key actor in this drama

References