Taiwan's Spectrum of Sovereignty: Four Positions Plus One Status Quo, A Map of Identity Quietly Redrawn Over Thirty Years

On May 13, 2026, during the Trump-Xi meeting. When asked about Taiwan while visiting Beijing, Trump left a statement that was later repeatedly cited: Taiwan is "a place—no one knows how to define it."¹

Lai Ching-te responded twice within seven days.

On May 17, he listed five points on social media, the first of which stated, "Defending the status quo of the Republic of China; there is no independence issue for Taiwan."² Three days later, on May 20, at a meeting of the KMT's Standing Committee, he made a longer statement: "Regardless of whether the name is the Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), or Taiwan, it is already a sovereign and independent state."³

Three names were placed in the same passage: Republic of China (used by the deep-blue faction), Republic of China (Taiwan) (a working concept introduced by Tsai Ing-wen after 2020), and Taiwan (the target national name of the independence movement). A single president compressed these three names into one statement within seven days. From an outside perspective, this is political rhetoric, but from the perspective of the sovereignty spectrum, it is the most honest microcosm of contemporary Taiwan: no single name is sufficient.

30-Second Overview: Contemporary Taiwanese unification stances are no longer a binary "Unification vs. Independence." Academia has organized them into four positions (Independence / China-centric Nationalism / Pro-China Nationalism / Subsumed) plus one fallback (Status Quo). The poll conducted by the NCCU Election Study Center showed that "status quo" rose from 9.8% in 1994 to 33.2% in December 2023, setting a 30-year high; meanwhile, "quick unification" slipped from about 5% to 1.2%. The weight on the spectrum has migrated from the two poles toward the center, and the largest segment is not any active position but "wait." Lai Ching-te's statement on May 20 compressed the three names into one sentence—this is the version of the spectrum written by the president.

Why "Unification vs. Independence" Cannot Describe Today's Taiwan

"Are you pro-unification or pro-independence?" This question was relevant in the 1990s, when the combined population answering either way approached nearly all voters. Asking the same question today, the most common answer is "neither."

The NCCU Election Study Center has tracked public unification preferences since 1994, providing the longest longitudinal data for this spectrum in Taiwan. ⁴ The most dramatic change over thirty-one years is not at the poles of unification and independence, but in the middle:

"Status quo" grew from 9.8% in 1994 to 33.2% in December 2023, a threefold increase, setting a 30-year high for this survey. If we add "status quo until decided," at 27.9%, the "status quo" segment alone accounts for 61.1%.

The two extremes continue to shrink. "Quick unification" slipped from a historical high of about 5% to 1.2% in 2023, becoming less than one-quarter of its former size. "Quick independence" remains around 3.8%. The remaining "pro-unification" and "pro-independence" combined account for less than thirty percent. The middle segment has grown steadily, while the skeletons at the two poles are getting thinner.

However, within the "status quo" segment itself, another more complex axis of identity has emerged:

The NCCU Election Study Center conducted a survey asking a more fundamental question: Do you see yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both? In 1994, the answer was nearly split; over 40% combined were "Chinese" and "dual identity," while about 20% were "Taiwanese only." In February 2024, in the same survey, "Taiwanese only" exceeded 60%, and "Chinese only" fell to less than 5%, reaching a historical low.⁵

When these two figures of 60% appear side-by-side, they create a gap that the binary framework cannot explain:

📝 Curator's Note: "I am Taiwanese" at 60+% and "status quo" at 61.1%. If the question were truly "Unification vs. Independence," those over 60% who identify as Taiwanese should choose independence, but they do not. The gap is not due to a lack of belief, but because this spectrum contains a position that has never been described by the old framework: ontological identity (who I am) has separated from strategic preference (but I choose to remain static). This is where Lai Ching-te's statement on May 20 resides.

Lai Ching-te deliberately placed three names in his May 20 statement. Republic of China corresponds to the traditional ROC faction, Republic of China (Taiwan) corresponds to Tsai Ing-wen's working concept from 2020, and Taiwan is the target national name of the independence movement. The sentence simultaneously avoids offending any one segment—a feat impossible in the binary framework era. However, within the spectrum of four positions plus one status quo, it is a viable path.

Academic Origins of the Four Positions

The division of "Unification vs. Independence" into four positions—Independence / China-centric Nationalism / Pro-China Nationalism / Subsumed—is now common in political commentary, but this framework did not appear overnight.

The decisive academic organization comes from Chen Fang-yu. He is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science at Dongwu University and a PhD from the Department of Political Science at NCCU. On October 20, 2017, he published "What is Taiwanese Independence? How to Classify Different Unification Claims?" in Marketplace Politics, using a tree classification diagram to divide positions into the "Factual Recognition Layer" (whether Taiwan's status is already independent) + the "Normative Layer" (which path the nation should take).⁶ This article became the most frequently cited canonical reference by academia and commentators, with a more widely circulated version published in Mingrentang that same year.

The popularization of the 4-position framework occurred roughly between 2022 and 2024. Political commentator Huang Wei-han clearly delineated the four factions—Independence / China-centric Nationalism / Pro-China Nationalism / Subsumed—in an interview with Newtalk on June 27, 2024, positioning himself as belonging to the China-centric Nationalism faction.⁷ He stated that he had proposed this framework "two years ago," indicating its circulation in political circles around 2022.

The higher academic origins can be traced back to Taiwan nationalism studies in the late 1990s. Shelley Rigger's work from 1999/2000 systematically described the rise of post-war Taiwanese identity. Wu Yu-shan of the Academia Sinica Institute of Political Science analyzed identity, legality, and economy using a "strategic triangle" framework. The accumulation of knowledge in the field of Taiwan national identity is the foundation upon which the 4-position classification stands.

Looking at the evolution timeline of this framework: the early 1990s were still the binary "Unification vs. Independence." After the first direct presidential election in 1996, the NCCU Election Study Center separated "status quo" as a third item; after the Resolution on Taiwan's Future in 1999, "China-centric Nationalism" began to take shape in discourse; after Hung Hsiu-chu's "One China, Different Expressions" claim in 2015, the Pro-China Nationalism faction split into radical and moderate wings; Chen Fang-yu made the canonical academic organization in 2017; Tsai Ing-wen incorporated the China-centric Nationalism discourse into the mainstream of the KMT with her inauguration speech in 2020; and Huang Wei-han brought the four factions into the public language sphere in 2024. In thirty years, the binary was expanded to five segments, each with its own history and representative figures.

The framework itself has accumulated academic criticism: Hsiao Yi-ching and Chou Ching-hsin questioned the measurement validity of the six classifications in Taiwan Political Science Journal ⁸; EOISS (Wang Li Second Research Institute) argued that a one-dimensional classification is overly simplistic, and that the actual unification spectrum requires layering axes such as "economic reliance on China," "cultural identity," and "generational differences" for explanation.⁹ This paper adopts the 4-position + Status Quo framework as an academic canonical organization, but it is not a closed descriptive tool.

The Independence Faction: Nation Building, Not Just an Idea

The core claim of the independence movement is direct: Taiwan should be an independent nation, and its national name should not be "Republic of China." The constitution, system, and national name of the Republic of China are legacies of a government-in-exile; they should be replaced through constitutional construction to become the "Republic of Taiwan" or "Taiwan."

However, under the umbrella of "independence," there are actually three different paths. The Legal Nation-Building Faction argues for establishing a new state through constitution-making and referendums—this is the most classical version of the independence discourse; the Name-Change Faction argues to retain the existing system but change the national name (the most common proposals are "Taiwan" or "Republic of Taiwan"); and the Natural Independence Faction is a stance gradually accepted by younger generations after the Sunflower Movement in 2014: "Taiwan was independent from the start," which is the default cognition, requiring no further action.

This path can be traced back to the 1960s. In 1964, Peng Ming-min and two students published the Declaration of Taiwan Self-Rescue Movement, advocating for overthrowing one-party dictatorship and establishing a new nation; the three were subsequently arrested.¹⁰ During the 1970s and 80s, Shih Ming wrote A History of the Taiwanese People Over Four Hundred Years overseas, narrating Taiwanese history separately from Chinese history. On October 13, 1991, the KMT's Fifth National Congress passed the independence party platform, formally advocating for "establishing a sovereign and independent Taiwan Republic," with Lin Zhuo-shui as one of the drafters.¹¹

1996 was a deep setback for the independence movement. The KMT nominated Peng Ming-min, a "godfather" of Taiwanese independence, to run for president; he received 21.13% of the vote, which was the biggest national election defeat since the party's founding. Post-election reflection directly led to an ideological shift, and in 1999, the Resolution on Taiwan's Future was passed, leading the mainstream within the party to accept the China-centric Nationalism discourse: "Taiwan is already independent, and the name is Republic of China."

The Sunflower Movement in 2014 reignited a generational shift. Surveys after the movement showed that the proportion who "identify as Taiwanese" exceeded 80% among younger demographics; "Taiwan was inherently an independent nation" became common knowledge for the generation under 20, not just a claim.¹² This generation does not need to march for independence; it is their default.

Representative contemporary advocates include the Taiwan Nation Building Corps, the Taiwanese Church, and the Tâi-liên (Taiwan Alliance), as well as the phrasing used by Lai Ching-te when he referred to himself as a "Taiwanese independence worker" during his early tenure as Premier. The academic versions are composed of international law paths from Chen Lung-chih (Yale University) and policy discourse from Lin Zhuo-shui. The independence party platform has never been frozen, canceled, or modified; it has merely been superseded by the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan's Future.

The China-centric Nationalism Faction: Accepted, Incorporated, Taken as Default

The thesis of the China-centric Nationalism faction is almost a mirror image of the independence movement: the Republic of China was originally a sovereign and independent state that continued in Taiwan, Kinmen, and Matsu after 1949, and it has no jurisdiction with the People's Republic of China. There is no need to declare independence; instead, the goal is to defend the de facto independence of the Republic of China.

This path contains three important sub-positions. The Traditional ROC Faction legally retains the territory of Formosa from the 1947 ROC Constitution but exercises governance only in Taiwan, Kinmen, and Matsu. The ROC Taiwan Faction, proposed by Tsai Ing-wen in her second inauguration speech in 2020, uses "Republic of China (Taiwan)" as a working concept—not changing the national name but centering the content on Taiwan. The No Subordination Faction was advanced by Lai Ching-te in 2024: "The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other," making the legal position of cross-Strait relations clearer than his predecessor; this line of discourse can be traced back to the predecessor's "Four Commitments" framework and continues the trajectory of "not declaring Taiwanese independence separately" by Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen.¹³

The decisive academic anchor for the China-centric Nationalism faction is the Resolution on Taiwan's Future passed by the KMT on May 8, 1999. Lin Zhuo-shui, one of the drafters, added the word "currently" before "Republic of China," allowing the independence faction to feel that there was a "chance in the future," and making middle voters feel that the KMT had finally become pragmatic. In July of the same year, Lee Teng-hui proposed the "Special Country and Country Relations" (Two Countries Theory) during an interview with Voice of Germany—another cornerstone of the China-centric Nationalism discourse.¹⁴

Over two decades later, this path was incorporated into the KMT mainstream. Tsai Ing-wen organized it into the "Four Commitments" in her National Day speech in 2021: upholding a constitutional system based on liberal democracy; maintaining that the Republic of China is not subordinate to the People's Republic of China; defending sovereignty against invasion and absorption; and insisting that the future of Republic of China (Taiwan) must be decided by all Taiwanese people.¹⁵ Lai Ching-te continued this axis in his 2024 inauguration speech, and the five points after the May 17 Trump-Xi meeting and the "three names are sovereign and independent" statement at the KMT Standing Committee on May 20 are contemporary variations of this China-centric Nationalism discourse.

📝 Curator's Note: The ordering of the three names in Lai Ching-te's May 20 statement is intentional: "Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), or Taiwan." The first name soothes the deep-blue base and the United States; the second corresponds to Tsai Ing-wen's working concept from 2020; and the third opens a door toward the target national name of the independence movement. The phrase "Regardless of whether the name is X" itself is an extension of Lin Zhuo-shui's two words, "currently," in 1999: the same vague strategy expanded from one word into a whole sentence.

The characteristic of the China-centric Nationalism faction is not its radicalism, but its ability to allow most people to avoid taking sides. The deep-blue can say "Republic of China," the light green can say "Republic of China (Taiwan)," and the dark green can say "Taiwan"; all are covered. The political language of contemporary Taiwan functions, in part, because this path has loosened the correspondence between names and positions.

Pro-China Nationalism Faction: Shrinking for Thirty Years in the Blue Camp

The Pro-China Nationalism faction argues that cross-strait relations should unify, but unification should occur under the banner of the Republic of China (ROC), not the People's Republic of China (PRC). The ideal scenario is Taiwan leading China toward democratization while retaining the territory of Formosa at the constitutional level.

This path also has two branches. Traditional Pro-China Nationalism / One China, Different Expressions was the mainstream version in the blue camp during the 2000s, accepting the literal meaning of "One China" but reserving space for "different expressions": the Republic of China claims to be China, and the People's Republic of China claims to be China; both sides do not challenge this ambiguity. The KMT passed the National Unification Guidelines in 1991, writing the unification goal into policy documents; the "1992 Consensus" was interpreted by the blue camp as a concrete realization of One China, Different Expressions (this differs from Beijing's interpretation of the same meeting).¹⁶ During Ma Ying-jeou's term from 2008 to 2016, this discourse was the mainstream framework of governance.

Radical Pro-China Nationalism / One China, Same Expression / Quick Unification is the version proposed by Hung Hsiu-chu during her nomination for KMT presidential candidacy in 2015. Hung advocated that cross-strait relations should achieve "One China, Same Expressions" (both sides achieving consensus on one China) and insisted on "ultimate unification."¹⁷ Her stance was directly labeled as "Quick Unification" by many commentators, placing her in the gray area between Pro-China Nationalism and Subsumed.

📝 Curator's Note: Hung Hsiu-chu's position is often directly called "Subsumed" or "pro-China" in popular discourse, but it is mostly classified as a "radical faction within Pro-China Nationalism / Quick Unification" academically because she still insists on unification under the ROC framework, rather than accepting the PRC framework to absorb Taiwan. This discrepancy itself is worth noting: when the mainstream of Pro-China Nationalism shrinks to only 1.2% who want "quick unification," radical Pro-China Nationalism is pushed further out in public opinion. But classification is classification, and mainstream cognition is mainstream cognition; both must be seen.

The true characteristic of contemporary Pro-China Nationalism is its shrinkage. After the 2020s, most deep-blue members shifted toward China-centric Nationalism (the ROC faction); the number who explicitly advocate "quick unification" was only 1.2% in the NCCU Election Study Center survey in December 2023. Thirty years ago, Pro-China Nationalism was the mainstream framework of the blue camp; today, those who claim "unification" (regardless of which banner) account for less than 8%.

The Subsumed Faction: Smallest Scale, Largest Transparency Controversy

The core claim of the Subsumed faction (also often called "Red Unification") is to accept that cross-strait unification occurs within the framework of the People's Republic of China (PRC), or to acknowledge that the PRC has sovereignty over Taiwan.

This path is the smallest segment in contemporary Taiwan. Even if we add the 6.2% who are "leaning toward unification" from the NCCU Election Study Center survey in December 2023 and the 1.2% who want "quick unification," totaling 7.4%, less than 3% of this group clearly supports the PRC framework.

However, this path has the largest transparency controversy. The China Unification Promotion Party (founded by Chang An-le) is the most visible PRC framework faction, and it has been repeatedly questioned regarding its relationship with accepting PRC funding.¹⁸ Later groups such as the New Party, United Alliance Party, and New Tongmeng are also categorized in this spectrum. The Taiwanese judicial system has indicted "local collaborators" multiple times over the past decade, some of whom have connections to subsumed factions. Legally, these organizations still exist, but their transparency regarding external funding sources has been long questioned.

The Subsumed faction differs structurally from the other three positions: the core debate among the first three is the "interpretation of the status quo" (already independent vs. not independent / whether to declare / national name change), whereas the subsumed faction crosses a larger red line by accepting absorption by another political entity. In the contemporary Taiwanese political landscape, supporters of this path are few, but its existence is an indispensable segment of this spectrum.

Status Quo: A Fallback or a Stance?

If ranked by numbers, "status quo" is the largest segment in contemporary Taiwan. But "largest" does not mean it is a position; it is more like a default behavior.

The 61.1%—comprising 33.2% who want "always maintain status quo" and 27.9% who want "status quo until decided"—are the figures from the NCCU Election Study Center in December 2023. This 61.1% is an accumulation of the choice to "do nothing," where most people did not actively vote for either unification or independence. The classification study by the Taiwan Democracy Foundation (executed by the NCCU Election Study Center) further divides the public into three categories: Taiwanese Nationalism at 26.5%, Pragmatism at 13.1%, and Chinese Nationalism at 18.7.¹⁹ The sum of these three categories is far less than the 61.1% of "status quo," because most people do not belong to any specific "ideology."

The internal structure of the status quo can be broken down into four layers:

• Cognitive Layer: The cognition that "Taiwan (ROC) is an independent state" exceeds 70% in most polls.
• Preference Layer: "Status quo," with 61.1% not choosing any active change.
• Action Layer: "Not actively changing the status quo," meaning they do not treat unification or independence as a main issue when voting.
• Identity Layer: "Identifying as Taiwanese" exceeds 60%, which is an identity, not a political option.

These four layers describe the same phenomenon: Taiwanese people choose one side in terms of identity, but choose to remain static in strategy. This highly overlaps with the claims of the China-centric Nationalism faction; the difference is that China-centric Nationalism is an active stance, while status quo is a passive preference.

📝 Curator's Note: "Status quo" is often criticized as having "no position," but this criticism misreads strategic preference as ontological identity. Interviews show that most people who choose "status quo" are not unclear about who they are; rather, they are usually very clear that they are Taiwanese. They choose the strategy of "wait," which is a different position from "I don't know who I am." Confusing these two layers leads to misreading the muscle behind the entire spectrum.

Scotland, Catalonia, Northern Ireland, Quebec: Four Counterparts

Placing Taiwan's sovereignty spectrum alongside independence/integration disputes in other countries reveals a larger picture.

Scotland 2014: The referendum was held on September 18, with 55% voting against and 45% supporting. The SNP (Scottish National Party) is similar to the Legal Independence Faction of Taiwan: constitution-making for a new state; the UK Labour and Conservative parties are similar to the China-centric Nationalism/Status Quo factions, advocating for deeper devolution but not independence.²⁰ The biggest difference from Taiwan is institutional: Scotland has a legal framework where the central British government agrees to hold a referendum; Taiwan does not have a corresponding arrangement.

Catalonia 2017: When the independence referendum was held on October 1, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled it unconstitutional, but the Catalan autonomous government proceeded with the vote, and the central Spanish government suppressed the voting centers with police force. Independence support has long been in the 40-50% range. Catalonia is similar to Taiwan in the structural situation where "the referendum is deemed unconstitutional by the sovereign state and met with countermeasures."

Northern Ireland 1998: The Good Friday Agreement established a long-term framework of "shared governance + mutual consent of the people of Northern Ireland for integration." If the majority of the people of Northern Ireland chooses to unify with Ireland in the future, Britain agrees to accept it. A crucial element in this design is the reciprocal commitment between both parties. The PRC has no corresponding design regarding Taiwan.

Quebec 1995: The independence referendum was extremely close at 49.4% vs. 50.6%. The Canadian central government subsequently legislated the Clarity Act, which stipulates that an independence referendum must have a "clear question + clear majority" to be recognized. This is a procedural solution for mature democracies dealing with separation disputes.

These four counterparts collectively show one thing: the core difficulty in how contemporary democratic nations handle independence/integration disputes is procedural legitimacy and mutual commitment. Taiwan's difficulty on this spectrum is not about which segment is "correct," but that the four issues below have not yet been resolved in Taiwan: a legal framework for referendums, reciprocal commitments between parties, sovereign state recognition, and procedural clarity.

The Power of "Currently"

Returning to the opening statement.

Lai Ching-te's May 20 statement—"Regardless of whether the name is the Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), or Taiwan, it is already a sovereign and independent state"—and Lin Zhuo-shui's addition of the two words "currently" before "Republic of China" in the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan's Future are the same technique. Placing three names side-by-side in one sentence, or inserting the two words "currently" into a phrase, is not about definition; it is about retaining ambiguity so that people across the entire spectrum can stand.

Twenty-seven years ago, Lin Zhuo-shui added two words to support a resolution. Twenty-seven years later, Lai Ching-te used an entire sentence to support his two speeches within seven days. What happened in between was the expansion of this spectrum from binary to four segments, and then the growth of a "status quo" segment larger than all four combined.

The spectrum has been redrawn, but no one has formally announced it. The representative figures of each segment do not claim to have crossed into another segment, and voters may not realize they have moved beyond the "Unification vs. Independence" question. Change was never completed by a document, a conference, or a referendum. It is a shape slowly grown over thirty years, piece by piece, within opinion polls, in speeches, in an unrevoked party platform, and in an uncancelled resolution.

What will the next version look like? Does Taiwan's sovereignty debate require a new document, a new dialogue, to reincorporate the four positions and one status quo into a sentence clearer than "currently"? How long will this spectrum continue to quietly redraw itself?

References

Further Reading

• Resolution on Taiwan's Future — The decisive academic anchor of China-centric Nationalism discourse from 1999; the starting point of Lin Zhuo-shui's two words "currently."
• Tsai Ing-wen — Proposer of the "Republic of China (Taiwan)" working concept, a representative sub-spectrum of the China-centric Nationalism faction.
• Lai Ching-te — The executor of contemporary China-centric Nationalism discourse regarding "non-subordination to cross-strait relations," the main actor in the May 20 three-name statement.
• Taiwan Elections and Party Politics — A broader context of how unification preferences reshape the blue-green political lines through elections.
• Taiwan Democratic Transition — The historical background for the birth of the sovereignty spectrum: from one-party dictatorship to competitive elections.
• Cross-Strait Crisis and Development of Cross-Strait Relations — The long trajectory of the sovereignty spectrum under continuous external pressure.
• Invisible Nation — The context in which Tsai Ing-wen stated, "Taiwan was inherently an independent nation," in this documentary.