30-Second Overview: In 1982, Lanyu began receiving low-level radioactive waste from across Taiwan; by 1996, the storage site reached capacity, yet this did not mark the end of its "temporary" status. Since 1988, the Tao people have repeatedly demanded relocation, and a 2018 official truth investigation brought the siting process back into public view. This article does not declare a conclusion of "safe" or "dangerous" for either side; instead, it asks: if a home is chosen as a storage site without the residents' knowledge, can subsequent monitoring data alone answer the question of justice?
Further Reading: Lanyu Low-Level Radioactive Waste Storage Site.
Image Source: Taipower Nuclear Back-end Operations website, "September 2022: Reappearing Scenery of 'Lan'-yu, Connecting to the South Island for Half a Century."1
1982: Yellow Barrels Arrive Before the Truth
The Lanyu low-level radioactive waste storage site was not an isolated structure that appeared out of nowhere. According to the historical evolution page of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), in 1972, the Council of Indigenous Peoples (COIP) and the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) convened scholars, nuclear research institutions, and Taipower to evaluate abandoned mines, highlands, uninhabited islands, and outlying islands; at that time, "ocean dumping" was still considered one of the options for low-level radioactive waste disposal technology. At the end of 1975, the Executive Yuan approved the construction plan; in 1978, the first phase of engineering began.2
The importance of this history is not to retroactively frame today's Lanyu storage site as a project destined for failure from the start, but to remind us: it was born in an era of rapid nuclear expansion when ocean dumping had not yet become a taboo. The reasons for site selection included topographical isolation, sparse population, and ease of maritime transport. These same conditions later became the starting point for the Tao people to question "who is being treated as someone who can be isolated."2
In 1982, the storage site officially began receiving radioactive waste. NSC records state that there are 23 storage trenches on-site, with a designed capacity of 133,728 barrels. In July 1990, management responsibilities were transferred from the AEC to Taipower.3 Taipower's own feature article notes that the storage site reached capacity in 1996, and has not accepted new low-level radioactive waste since then.1
"No longer accepting new [waste]" is easily misheard as "the problem is over." But the lifespan of a storage site does not stop on the day the last barrel is delivered. The barrels remain on the island, the trenches still require maintenance, and someone must remain responsible for land leases, environmental monitoring, and the selection of a final disposal site.
Further Reading: On-site inspection of Lanyu nuclear waste barrels, showing workers and waste barrels.
Image Source: PTS "Our Island"
What the Tao People See Is Not a Facility, But a Rewritten Home
To the Tao people, Lanyu is not an empty plot of land that can be calculated by "population density." Research articles from Taiwan Insight point out that Tao life is intimately connected to the sea, rivers, groundwater, farmland, and foraging activities. The risks brought by nuclear waste include not only radiation doses and regulations but also psychological and cultural impacts on traditional beliefs and bodily well-being.4
The PTS Our Island report describes this scale of life more concretely: the sea is a father in the eyes of a child; the taro field is a mother's embrace. Taro is not just a crop, but a part of daily diet and ritual.5 This is not about romanticizing the island, but explaining why "whether the environment outside the site is below standard" and "whether the home is suitable for nuclear waste" have never been the same question in the experience of the people.
In February 1998, hundreds of Tao people living in Taipei went to Taipower headquarters to demand the removal of the storage site, protesting under the name of "expelling the evil spirits of Lanyu." Taiwan Insight records that Taipower once promised to remove the storage site by the end of 2002, but the failure to select a final disposal site caused the relocation to be delayed.4 PTS recorded that between 1988 and 1991, Lanyu held anti-nuclear activities to "expel evil spirits" for three consecutive years on February 20th.5
The protest did not begin from an abstract "anti-nuclear stance," but accumulated from experiences of being informed, being concealed from, and being promised things that never arrived. Those who did not know what would be placed in their home back then have had to spend decades learning about isotopes, storage trenches, and regulations just to demand that the state fulfill its word.
Further Reading: News footage of Lanyu nuclear waste barrels being reorganized.
Image Source: PTS 2011 Lanyu nuclear waste barrel inspection news video details page; thumbnail is the original video hotlink.
One Storage Site, Two Languages of "Safety"
The NSC's explanation of the storage site is very specific: waste is first solidified, then placed in steel barrels, and finally put into concrete trenches. The trenches are equipped with an infiltration water collection system, which is then treated by a concentrator. The governing authorities call this design a "multiple barrier" system and note that since 1996 (Republic of China Year 85), measures for zero-activity discharge have been implemented.6
Taipower's environmental monitoring page explains that annual monitoring includes air, seawater, drinking water, river water, groundwater, agricultural/fishery/livestock products, soil, and coastal sand. Taipower's conclusion is that environmental samples over the years have remained within safe ranges, and that parallel monitoring also falls within the range of background radiation fluctuations.7 This data is half of what is necessary to understand the official regulatory approach.
The other half is letting readers see how the word "safety" is used in the controversy. A 2012 PTS report pointed out that between 1982 and 1996, Lanyu received over 97,000 barrels of nuclear waste, stored in 23 open trenches. The report also stated that inspection works discovered a large number of corroded and damaged barrels.5 The same report presented different interpretations by Taipower, the AEC, and scholars regarding sampling results for Cesium-137 and Cobalt-60, as well as applicable standards. This is not about treating an old report as the final judge, but about preserving the original form of the controversy: the same set of environmental data can yield different public meanings depending on sampling locations, comparison standards, and understandings of risk.
A 2011 Taipei Times editorial also mentioned the debates over soil sampling, Cesium-137, Cobalt-60, and different standards, but it is an editorial, not original research.8 Therefore, what can be strictly written is not "Lanyu has been proven to be contaminated" or "Lanyu has no problems at all," but rather: relevant monitoring has triggered public controversy, and there is inconsistency between officials and critics regarding standards, sampling locations, and data interpretation. This approach is slower, but closer to the facts than pre-judging for the reader.
2018: The State Finally Looks Back to Ask "How Was It Decided?"
On August 1, 2016, the President, representing the government, apologized to the Indigenous peoples and promised to investigate the decision-making process regarding the storage of nuclear waste in Lanyu. The Executive Yuan's Lanyu Nuclear Waste Storage Site Truth Investigation Team later completed the Truth Investigation Report on the Establishment of the Lanyu Nuclear Waste Storage Site, which was published by the Council of Indigenous Peoples in September 2018, totaling 746 pages.9
The importance of this report lies not just in its thickness, but in how it pushes the question back from "what are the current monitoring values" to "what were the initial siting assessments, planning approvals, tribal consultations, land expropriations, and decision-making processes." The table of contents lists these chapters, explaining that the report is positioned as a reference for future reconciliation and equitable negotiation with Indigenous peoples.9
Taiwan Insight's interpretation of the report points out that official documents do not prove that the siting decision obtained the informed consent of the Tao people. The article also divides the controversy into three dimensions: distributive injustice, recognition injustice, and procedural exclusion.4 In other words, the truth investigation did not turn nuclear waste into a mere object to be handled through engineering means; it reconnected a stretch of concrete trenches to the history of land, ethnic groups, and state power.
Compensation Can Be Calculated in Money, But Not Necessarily as a Home
On November 29, 2019, Taiwan Insight recorded that Tao anti-nuclear activists at the Executive Yuan refused to accept compensation as a substitute for relocation. They demanded the establishment of a communication platform, the institutionalization of nuclear waste disposal and compensation into law, and the redirection of funds toward relocation.4 This choice should not be interpreted as "the people do not need compensation," but rather understood as: when the core of an issue is who decides the fate of a home, money cannot necessarily replace consent and relocation.
There is a contradiction familiar to Taiwanese society, yet often discussed in isolation: the state can use engineering language to explain how trenches prevent seepage, use monitoring numbers to show the environment is below limits, and use subsidies to explain what the locality has gained. But what the people may be asking is another question—why was this decision not something we could participate in from the beginning?
Placing this question back into Taiwan's nuclear history, Lanyu is more than just a geographical question of "where is the waste placed." It reveals how energy interests are linked to land governance, and shows that Indigenous informed consent is not merely a procedure on the last page of a policy briefing, but a prerequisite for deciding whether a place can be used to bear national risk.
The Yellow Barrels Remain; Time Has Not Closed the Case for Either Side
According to the NSC's English regulatory page updated in December 2024, the Lanyu storage site is still listed as a controlled site for low-level radioactive waste. The page also preserves the history of siting in the 1970s, receipt in 1982, and transfer to Taipower in 1990.3 Taipower, in a 2022 feature article, explained that the storage site is still managed by its nuclear back-end unit, listing safety maintenance and ecological restoration as part of its work.1
These official pages do not provide a completed date for the relocation issue. They tell us how the facility operates, how it is monitored, and how it is maintained. The truth investigation report and the history of Tao resistance ask why, in existing data, there is no evidence of obtaining informed consent from the Tao people, and why subsequent promises did not end in 2002.
The reason Lanyu's yellow barrels have become an object of Taiwanese history is not because they look special, but because they press forty years of time into a specific place: one island, a group of residents, 23 trenches, and a future that has yet to be mutually agreed upon. A true end will not be merely moving barrels from one coordinate on a map to another; it must also allow those who were once excluded to become the ones who decide the next coordinate.
Further Reading
- Executive Yuan Truth Investigation Report on the Establishment of the Lan-yu Nuclear Waste Storage Site
- Nuclear Safety Commission: Lan-yu Storage Site Safety Control Explanation
- Taiwan Insight: Tao People’s Fight for Environmental Justice and Subjectivity on Orchid Island
- Discussion on Taiwan and Nuclear Power — 2026 Nuclear Plant 3 Restart Review and Referendum No. 22: A Nuclear Waste Solution is One of Three Conditions for Restart; Lan-yu and Nuclear Plant 3's Fuel Pool Still Await Disposal Sites
References
- Taipower Nuclear Back-end Operations website: September 2022 "Reappearing Scenery of 'Lan'-yu, Connecting to the South Island for Half a Century" — Taipower feature article explaining the site's activation in 1982, transfer in 1990, capacity in 1996, and Taipower's official stance on safety maintenance and ecological restoration.↩23
- Nuclear Safety Commission: The Oversight of Lan-yu Storage Site — NSC official English historical page, explaining the 1972 siting assessment, 1975 approval, 1978 commencement, and that ocean dumping was considered in early disposal options.↩2
- Nuclear Safety Commission: The Oversight of Lan-yu Storage Site — NSC English regulatory data updated in 2024, recording 23 trenches, a design capacity of 133,728 barrels, receipt in 1982, and transfer to Taipower in 1990.↩2
- Taiwan Insight: Tao People’s Fight for Environmental Justice and Subjectivity on Orchid Island — Article from the University of Nottingham's Centre for Taiwan Studies, analyzing Tao environmental justice, the 1998 protests, the 2002 relocation promise, and the informed consent controversy.↩234
- PTS "Our Island": Yellow Cans and I — Public Television report on the 1988–1991 protests, the number of waste barrels and corrosion, environmental sampling controversies, and residents' lived experiences of their home.↩23
- Nuclear Safety Commission: Lanyu Storage Site Safety Control Explanation — NSC Chinese regulatory page, explaining the five barriers, trench seepage prevention, infiltration water treatment, and zero-activity discharge measures.↩
- Taiwan Power Company: Lanyu Low-Level Waste Storage Site Operational Status—Environmental Monitoring — Taipower environmental information page, listing sampling items such as air, water, agricultural/fishery/livestock products, soil, and coastal sand, along with official monitoring conclusions.↩
- Taipei Times: EDITORIAL: Living in a nuclear wasteland — 2011 English editorial summarizing the public controversy over Cesium-137, Cobalt-60 sampling, and applicable standards; this article treats it as an editorial source, not original research.↩
- Alilin Indigenous E-book Store: Truth Investigation Report on the Establishment of the Lanyu Nuclear Waste Storage Site — Page for the 746-page primary investigation report published by the Council of Indigenous Peoples in 2018, listing chapters such as siting assessment, tribal consultation, land expropriation, and decision-making analysis.↩2