Taiwan's Shipbuilding Industry: Turning Fish Ponds, Sugarcane Fields, and Shallows into Maritime Industry

30-Second Overview: In 1975, the Kaohsiung China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) shipyard was completed ahead of schedule. Fish ponds, sugarcane fields, and harbor shallows were transformed into a 1-million-ton dry dock, and shipbuilding evolved from a single factory into an industry linking steel, machinery, electrical systems, and ports. ^{1 2} This large-scale industry faced restructuring in 2001, where layoffs, pay cuts, and public funds were exchanged for the opportunity to continue operations. ³ After 2016, CSBC extended its capabilities to offshore wind marine engineering. In 2020, the Kaohsiung shipyard also commenced construction for the submarine indigenous development project. ^{4 5} The focus of Taiwan's shipbuilding industry is not merely on what ships are built, but on whether equipment, workers, supply chains, and national needs can remain connected across different eras.

Image: 2017 CSBC Keelung Yard. Author Taiwankengo, CC BY-SA 4.0, from Wikimedia Commons file page. ⁶

Why a Shipyard Must Start from Shallows

The shipbuilding industry is often simplistically viewed as "welding steel plates into ships." The CSBC shipyard in Xiaogang, Kaohsiung, reminds us that the most difficult first step is not welding, but first creating the space that allows many specialties to work simultaneously. Local publications from the Kaohsiung City Government record that the government had already identified the Kaohsiung Port as the base for a large shipyard in the 1960s. The Kaohsiung Shipyard Preparatory Office was established in 1972, China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) was founded in 1973, and construction officially began in 1974. The original site consisted of fish ponds, sugarcane fields, and shallow waters along the port. ¹

This site selection was not merely swapping agricultural land for industrial use. It simultaneously connected dry docks, ports, steel, and transportation to the same coastal location. A 1975 report in Taiwan Light noted that the hull factory was 750 meters long and 210 meters wide, while the dry dock was 950 meters long, 92 meters wide, with an average depth of 14 meters, reaching a capacity of 1 million tons. Two 350-ton cranes spanned the dry dock, with over seventy other cranes of various types inside the factory. ⁷

This scale carries an implication often obscured by the phrase "Ten Major Construction Projects": it rearranges weight, distance, and waiting time. Steel plates can be processed first in the hull factory, while piping, machinery, electrical installation, and interior fitting can be prefabricated in division, before different trades are finally connected back in the dry dock. Contemporary reports directly stated that shipbuilding is a "comprehensive industry" that drives precision, steel, machinery, and electrical industries. ⁷ The shipyard is therefore not an isolated factory, but an industrial system that composes suppliers, engineers, cranes, dry docks, and deep-water ports into a single rhythm.

📝 Curator's Note
The story of the Kaohsiung shipyard is not just about "Taiwan can also build large ships." More worth preserving is that industrialization here was made into a spatial problem. Shallows must first become ground capable of bearing immense weight, and different trades are then arranged along the sequence of hull manufacturing. Taiwan is often remembered for export containers, wafers, and electronic products. The shipyard places another capability before our eyes, breaking down huge and slow objects into manageable processes, and reassembling them into ships that can sail out to sea. When curating, the 750-meter hull factory, 950-meter dry dock, cranes, and prefabrication processes should be placed in the same narrative so readers can see that industrialization is not a slogan, but an order formed by ground, equipment, and workers. ⁷

World-Class Scale Does Not Guarantee the Market Will Wait

In August 1975, CSBC had already begun building its first new ship: a 445,000 DWT oil tanker. Original reports from Light Magazine recorded that this tanker was 378.4 meters long and 68 meters wide, requiring over 60,000 tons of steel. CSBC planned an annual shipbuilding capacity of 1.5 million DWT and ship repair of 2.5 million GT. ⁷ These figures indicate that the shipyard was designed as a national-level industrial base, not merely a repair yard serving local fishing boats.

_Image: Formsteel Liberty Ship Delivery, Naming, and Launching Ceremony. Author Orizan, CC BY 2.0, from Wikimedia Commons file page.* ⁸

The history of Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation goes even further back. The National Cultural Memory Bank records that Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation was reorganized and established in 1948, with its predecessor being Taiwan Machinery Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., formed in 1946 by the merger of Taiwan Ship Channel Co., Ltd. and Kaohsiung Co., Ltd. Taiwan Iron Works. After its establishment, the company rented Japanese compensation machinery and expanded its equipment, capable at the time of building vessels under 2,000 tons. It was reorganized into China Shipbuilding Corporation in 1978, and renamed Taiwan International Shipbuilding Corporation in 2007. ⁹

This path places two timelines of Taiwan's shipbuilding industry together: one is the post-war era of receiving equipment, repairing, and gradually learning; the other is the 1970s era of rapid expansion through large dry docks and giant cranes. Between the two lies not natural evolution, but the result of mutual promotion among state investment, technology transfer, shipping demand, and industrial policy. Researchers from the Department of History at National Cheng Kung University also pointed out in an article on Science and Technology Garden that from the 1970s to the 1990s, as Taiwan promoted "National Vessels, Indigenous Construction," CSBC undertook most naval construction projects, but early on still had to purchase prototype ships, design drawings, or related technologies from foreign companies, and then send personnel to learn. ¹⁰

Thus, "indigenous construction" was never a state achieved by pressing a button. It includes a process of imitation, cooperation, failure, and gradual acquisition of design capabilities. The same article also records that after the 1990s, private shipbuilding was impacted by policies for the phase-out and construction of fishing vessels, beginning to expand from fishing vessels and workboats to warships. The 1994 "Guanghua III" project, built by the Private United Shipbuilding Corporation for the Chin Chiang class, showed that naval construction capabilities were no longer concentrated solely in state-owned large shipyards. ¹⁰

The Rebirth of "CSBC" Begins with Shrinking

On December 31, 2001, CSBC launched its regeneration plan. Official press releases from the Presidential Office recorded that the company had reduced its workforce by nearly half, with remaining employees facing a 35% pay cut. The government injected NT$3 billion in capital, and the Executive Yuan Development Fund approved an additional NT$3 billion in long-term low-interest loans to assist the company in resuming operations. ³

This data should not merely be written as "the government saving a state-owned enterprise." It simultaneously exposes the two faces of large industry: dry docks and equipment can exist for a long time, but orders, costs, organizational efficiency, and industrial competition will not automatically stabilize just because the factory is huge. The shipbuilding industry has high fixed costs, and the market is affected by shipping cycles, financial crises, defense budgets, and international competition. When a shipyard needs to survive, the cost falls first on the number and wages of workers.

On March 3, 2007, Taiwan International Shipbuilding Corporation was unveiled in Kaohsiung. The Presidential Office press release connects the 2001 "CSBC Regeneration" with the 2007 "CSBC Rebirth" into a single official narrative, but the same data also leaves behind the numbers of restructuring. ³ This juxtaposition is more honest than simply saying "turning defeat into victory": company names can restart, but people's labor conditions and the cost of public funds cannot be deleted from history.

Image: CSBC Haichang Building. Author Ye Youjia, used under the Presidential Office Government Website Open Information Announcement, from Wikimedia Commons file page. ¹¹

The Same Shipyard Also Undertakes Defense Autonomy

On November 24, 2020, the Presidential Office reported at the Kaohsiung CSBC company on the commencement ceremony for the submarine indigenous development project. Official articles reviewed that this project had already undergone over four years of preparation, including budget allocation, contract signing, design, and factory construction, before official commencement, listing CSBC, the National Science and Council (NSC), and the Navy as jointly invested units. ⁵ These materials can fill in a segment easily overlooked in shipbuilding history: the capabilities of the Kaohsiung shipyard serve not only civilian ships, ship repair, and offshore wind energy, but are also placed into the long-term project of defense autonomy.

Image: Submarine Section Assembly Factory. Author Kenchen945, CC BY-SA 4.0, from Wikimedia Commons file page. ¹²

Here, a sense of scale must be maintained. The Presidential Office article records the commencement, preparatory work, and the political goal of defense autonomy, which is not equivalent to all technical achievements being completed. For Taiwan.md, the value of the photo lies not in treating the factory as "proof of success," but in allowing readers to see how defense industry relies on factories, ship sections, design, supply chains, and long-term organizational capabilities. This is similar to the problem of building dry docks in the 1970s, the difference being that today's engineering bears higher sensitivity and national security expectations.

From Shipbuilding to Marine Engineering: Changing Markets, Not the Sea

CSBC's recent shift is not abandoning shipbuilding, but extending shipbuilding capabilities beyond ships. Official CSBC data indicates that the Offshore Wind Marine Engineering Industry Alliance M-Team was organized by CSBC in November 2016, inviting domestic industry, academia, and research units, with cooperation goals including offshore wind marine engineering technology, business cooperation, and marine engineering vessel construction. On January 27, 2018, the Taiwan Offshore Wind Turbine Foundation and Marine Engineering Association was established. ⁴

Industry data from the National Development Council breaks down this shift more clearly: offshore wind energy is not just wind turbines, but also includes underwater foundations, onshore power facilities, installation, transportation, maintenance, and engineering vessel construction. Engineering vessel construction is categorized under the Ship and Floating Facility Manufacturing Industry. The page also lists CS Steel, CS Steel Structure, CS Steel Machinery, CSBC, CSBC Anti-corrosion, and other manufacturers in the Kaohsiung supply chain. ¹³ Shipbuilding here reverts to being an intermediary industry connecting steel structures, welding, anti-corrosion, maritime transport, and construction.

This does not mean Taiwan has completed a green energy transition without problems. Official data describes industrial scope and supply chain configuration, not that all operators are already profitable, nor that every technology is fully autonomous. CSBC's own data uses phrases like "promoting localization" and "establishing autonomous technology and construction capacity," which precisely indicates that this is still an ongoing project, not a completed achievement. ⁴

📝 Curator's Note
The 1970s Kaohsiung shipyard turned fish ponds, sugarcane fields, and shallows into dry docks. Post-2016 marine engineering takes welding, lifting, ship design, and offshore construction capabilities to wind farms. The 2020 submarine indigenous development commencement makes the same shipyard face defense autonomy, sensitive information, and long-term engineering management. ^{4 5} When curating, one cannot only display photos of completed new ships, wind turbines, or factories; one must also retain data on layoffs, pay cuts, and public funds during restructuring. Industrial transformation is not changing to a popular term, but asking whether the workers, machinery, and organizations left by the previous era can truly be brought into the next era.

What the Shipyard Leaves Behind Is Not a Victory Photo

From the 1948 Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation, to the 1970s CSBC Kaohsiung Shipyard, to the 2007 Taiwan International Shipbuilding Corporation, the path Taiwan's shipbuilding industry has walked is not a single route. It first received equipment and technology, then used state planning to build massive dry docks. It once displayed industrial capability with large oil tankers and national warships, and during restructuring, it exchanged layoffs, pay cuts, and public funds for the opportunity to continue operations. Today, it connects ship manufacturing to offshore wind energy and marine engineering.

The importance of this history lies not in proving that Taiwan "can build anything." A more accurate statement is: Taiwan has practiced, and is still practicing, how to keep an industry that requires steel, ports, design, welding, electrical installation, shipping, and national policy support on the island. Ships will be launched, but what shipbuilding truly leaves behind is an organizational capacity to face huge objects, long-cycle investments, and repeated transformations. This capacity is worth remembering, and worth asking who bears its cost, and ultimately for whom it serves.

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