Shi Lang: From Zheng’s General to Qing Commander, Unable to Solely Decide Taiwan’s Fate

30-Second Overview: In July 1683, Shi Lang led Qing forces to defeat the Zheng navy at Penghu. In August of the same year, Zheng Keshuang surrendered; only in 1684 did the Qing court incorporate Taiwan into an administrative order of one prefecture and three counties. ^{1 2} Shi Lang’s role cannot be neatly concluded as either "hero" or "traitor": he was a former general of the Zheng clan, the main commander of the Qing army, and the author of memorials advocating for the retention of Taiwan. However, the Qing court’s decision to keep Taiwan was not persuaded by him alone. ³

_Image: Portrait of Shi Lang, author unknown. Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain Mark 1.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons file page._

Shi Lang was born in 1621 and died in 1696. Between these two years, he was first a general under Zheng Zhilong, and later followed his brother Shi Xian to defect to Zheng Chenggong. Later still, he sided with the Qing court, becoming the Admiral of the Fujian Navy tasked with attacking Taiwan. The National Taiwan Literary and Cultural Museum’s materials summarize this turning point briefly, yet it is all the more striking: a person’s military capability did not change; what changed was the regime he served and his reasons for viewing the Zheng clan. ⁴

He Stood Within the Internal Dynamics of a Maritime Regime

The group Shi Lang joined in his youth was not a force sustained solely by land-based fortresses. The Zheng clan’s power was structured around shipping routes connecting the Fujian coast, Kinmen, Xiamen, and Taiwan, with fleets, ports, trade, and the military interconnected. Zheng Chenggong attacked Dutch-ruled Taiwan in 1661, establishing a Zheng regime based in Taiwan. Shi Lang had fought within this maritime network, knowing how fleets moved and why Penghu was not merely a small dot on a map. ^{4 1}

After Zheng Chenggong’s death in 1622, the Zheng regime still controlled Taiwan, but its footholds along the Fujian coast were gradually lost, increasing both military and financial pressure. Research from the Ministry of National Defense indicates that while the Qing court prepared its navy, it also absorbed Zheng defectors and sailors through amnesty. Internally, the Zheng clan faced power struggles, difficulties in maintaining military equipment, and declining morale. Shi Lang’s subsequent victory cannot be attributed solely to his personal battlefield decisiveness; it must be placed against the backdrop of long-term attrition between the two regimes. ¹

📝 Curator’s Note: Shi Lang’s story is not about one person suddenly becoming stronger, but about a maritime regime gradually losing the sea it was originally best at.

After Zeng De Was Killed, He Brought Family Grudge Across the Strait

The rift between Shi Lang and Zheng Chenggong is usually understood within the context of a military discipline conflict. Shi Lang executed his subordinate Zeng De, which Zheng Chenggong viewed as a violation of orders. After the conflict escalated, Shi Lang’s father, Shi Daxuan, and his brother, Shi Xian, were killed. Shi Lang escaped and eventually defected to the Qing army. This past cannot be treated merely as background for "a famous general changing sides"; it turned the subsequent Battle of Penghu into a national war carrying personal wounds. ^{4 1}

Here is a detail easily obscured by heroic narratives: Shi Lang did not turn against the Zheng regime only after its natural conclusion, but while Zheng Chenggong was still alive and the Zheng clan still controlled Taiwan. To the Qing court, he brought not only combat power but also intelligence and experience from the enemy’s interior. To the Zheng clan, his defection was akin to handing over someone familiar with their inner workings to the enemy. ^{4 1}

📝 Curator’s Note: The hardest part of history to handle is not complex stances, but how private grudges, once taken over by the state, don a uniform of justice.

The Qing court valued precisely this defector who was once familiar with the Zheng navy and the waters around Taiwan. Shi Lang was promoted to Admiral of the Fujian Navy in 1681 and advocated for an attack on Taiwan. But the Qing army could not simply cross the sea upon receiving orders. Military research from the Ministry of National Defense indicates that the Qing court first experienced amnesty, navy preparation, warship construction, and supply planning, slowly transforming its disadvantage in naval warfare into conditions suitable for expedition. ^{4 1}

On July 8, the Qing Army Made Penghu the Door First

Shi Lang’s first target for attack was not Tainan, but Penghu. Located between Fujian and the main island of Taiwan, Penghu served as both a mid-ocean relay and a forward outpost for the Zheng regime. Controlling it was equivalent to first removing the bolt on Taiwan’s west side. The Qing court’s adoption of the strategy to take Penghu first was not because the strait suddenly became easy, but because Shi Lang placed geography, supply, and Zheng army morale on the same operational map. ¹

On July 8, 1683, Qing forces departed from Tongshan Island. Upon reaching the waters south of Penghu on July 10, Shi Lang led the army to attack the area around Magong. The first engagement was not smooth; tides and wind conditions trapped the Qing vanguard, and the Zheng army had the opportunity to surround Qing ships. Shi Lang was also wounded in the engagement. The Battle of Penghu was not a straight line of "Qing forces crushing everything"; it was a war where the sea state and terrain spoke first. ¹

Image: "Taiwan di li tu," Arthur W. Hummel Collection, map dated 1683. Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain Mark 1.0; Source: Wikimedia Commons file page and Library of Congress original data page.

The map places Taiwan and Penghu in the same field of vision, explaining why Shi Lang viewed Penghu as the opening move. Taiwan’s coastline is long; if Zheng forces dispersed their main strength evenly, any point could become a Qing landing site. If they concentrated their main force at Penghu, it was equivalent to betting the war on the fortifications, harbors, and supplies of an outer island. The Zheng army’s choice to fight a decisive battle at Penghu was a rational arrangement under limited forces, but it also made the consequences of defeat more concentrated. ^{1 2}

On July 11, Shi Lang reorganized at Bazao Island. Subsequently, Qing forces captured Hujing Island and Tongpan Island, gradually shortening the distance to Penghu Harbor. On the morning of July 16, Qing forces launched a general attack, advancing in three directions and using the "Five Plum Blossom Formation" (five ships forming a team, concentrating firepower on a single target) to break the Zheng army’s formation. The Zheng army originally had support from fortifications and coastal works, and their ship numbers were not necessarily at a overwhelming disadvantage. What truly changed the situation was Shi Lang’s tactical adjustment after the initial setbacks, allowing the Qing army to transform scattered firepower into individual points capable of crushing the opponent. ¹

📝 Curator’s Note: The key to Penghu is not just "who won," but how it compressed an island’s fate into a single maritime gateway; only when the gatekeeper changed did the war rapidly become a governance issue.

After the Fall of Penghu, What Remained for the Zheng Clan

After the defeat at Penghu, Liu Guoxuan led the remaining forces back to Taiwan. The Zheng regime did not receive another chance for a decisive naval battle to turn the tide. Zheng Keshuang accepted surrender in August 1683, and Shi Lang led the army into Taiwan; this moment marked the end of Zheng rule, but it did not mean the Qing court had already figured out how Taiwan would be managed next. ^{4 1}

This distinction is important. Capturing Penghu was a military issue; accepting Zheng Keshuang’s surrender was a regime handover; deciding to keep Taiwan, establishing prefectures and counties, and arranging garrisons was an imperial governance issue. Compressing these three things into the single phrase "Shi Lang recovered Taiwan" makes readers miss the debates in between that truly changed Taiwan’s institutions. ^{3 2}

A Memorial, Lacking the Power of a Single Individual

After Zheng Keshuang’s surrender, Shi Lang did not immediately receive an answer agreed upon by all. The Qing court internally discussed whether Taiwan should be retained or whether residents and troops should be withdrawn, handing it back to the sea winds. In the 22nd year of the Kangxi reign, on the 22nd day of the 12th lunar month, Shi Lang submitted the Memorial on the Abandonment and Retention of Taiwan (Gong Chen Taiwan Qi Liu Shu), using geography, population, resources, and coastal defense to explain why Taiwan could not be lightly abandoned. ^{5 6}

He wrote in the memorial: "A truly fertile and rich area, a domain of险阻 (dangerous obstacles)." This was not a slogan condensed by later generations, but his original words, left after he personally visited Taiwan and argued the land and coastal defense together. He then wrote: "To defend Taiwan is to secure Penghu. Taiwan and Penghu are defended together." In Shi Lang’s strategic imagination, Taiwan was not an isolated overseas land, but the depth required to secure Penghu. ⁵

There is another layer in the memorial worth pausing to consider. Shi Lang discussed not only military matters but also the people, land, and livelihood remaining in Taiwan: if everyone were moved away, they would face issues of limited ships, large population, and unemployed residents drifting; if Taiwan were abandoned, maritime forces might find a foothold again. This was a general writing a governance proposal for the court, not merely seeking credit for himself. ⁵

This memorial was powerful, but it cannot be written as a "single-person myth" where Shi Lang’s letter persuaded Kangxi. Huang Youwei’s 2020 research, comparing records such as the Veritable Records (Qijuzhu) and court deliberation records, indicates that the Qing court may have already decided to rule Taiwan before Shi Lang’s initial memorial on retention; Kangxi controlled the rhythm of deliberation, and the political dynamics of Manchu-Han relations and ministers like Mingzhu jointly pushed toward the final consensus. Shi Lang’s memorial was important, but "providing reasons" and "completing the decision" are two different things. ³

This correction also changes how we view Shi Lang. He was not a hero standing alone, pushing Taiwan from "abandonment" to "retention," but a general within the court’s established direction, providing personal experience of conquering Taiwan, strategic language, and governance plans. Viewed this way, his merits are not erased; they are simply placed back into the political system, rather than above it.

The One Prefecture and Three Counties Connected After the Warships

The victory at Penghu in 1683 ended the Zheng regime; the one prefecture and three counties in 1684 marked the Qing court beginning to treat Taiwan as an administrative space. Data from the Academia Sinica on administrative history records that in the 23rd year of Kangxi, Taiwan Prefecture was established, subordinate to the Fujian Province’s Taiwan and Xiamen Military Affairs Dao, governing Taiwan, Fengshan, and Zhuo counties, and including the 36 islets of Penghu under its jurisdiction. ²

The one prefecture and three counties was not a neutral administrative table. It placed the Taiwan Prefecture city, the southern plains, the land north of Zhuo, and Penghu into the same official language, rewriting the space originally operated by Zheng military-political structures, local communities, and maritime merchants into administrative units through which the Qing court could collect taxes, station troops, and direct resources. Behind the administrative establishment lies the question of how power re-arrived at villages and ports. ^{7 2}

But drawing administrative boundaries on a map did not mean the Qing court already understood this island. Research from the National Palace Museum indicates that after defeating Zheng Keshuang and experiencing the abandonment-retention debate, the Qing court’s governance of Taiwan in the Kangxi reign was偏向 (leaning towards) passive; it was only later, facing internal troubles and external threats, that it gradually corrected its Taiwan policy. Warships could change regimes in ten days, but the government needed more time to know exactly what it had taken over. ⁷

📝 Curator’s Note: The speed of conquest often makes people mistakenly believe governance is complete; in fact, only after the cannon fire stops does the system reveal how unfamiliar it is.

The General Who Conquered Taiwan Also Became a Merchant of Land and Sea

Shi Lang’s influence in Taiwan did not stop at memorials and official positions. Lin Yu-ru’s lecture abstract, published in the Tainan City Government’s "Tainan 400" series, describes him as an important landlord and maritime merchant in late 17th-century Taiwan: after conquering Taiwan, he acquired large amounts of land, intervened in sugar exports, and controlled trade between Taiwan, Penghu, and Xiamen under the guise of raising military funds. This aspect reminds us that the victory of war redistributes not only official seals, but also land, commodities, and shipping routes. ⁸

This material comes from a lecture abstract published by local government, not from original ledgers of Shi Lang’s era, so it is suitable for raising questions rather than treating all land figures as conclusions. It at least adds a necessary inquiry to the biography: After Shi Lang acquired Taiwan for the Qing court, where did Taiwan’s sugar, land, and maritime traffic flow? ⁸

Therefore, Shi Lang cannot be placed only in the frame of a naval hero. To the Qing court, he was someone familiar with the maritime frontier, capable of completing conquest; to Taiwan’s local society, he was the center of power in the post-war redistribution of resources. Military merit and governance controversies can coexist; there is no need to delete one side to make room for the other.

Hero, Traitor, Who Needs Whom

The reason Shi Lang’s later image repeatedly changes color is not because historical materials suddenly ceased to exist, but because different eras pick out different Shi Langs from the same batch of materials. Ronald C. Po’s English research indicates that Chinese official and public narratives often place Shi Lang into a heroic framework of pacifying Taiwan and completing national unification; Taiwan, meanwhile, long viewed him as a former Zheng general who defected to the Qing court, or even an authoritarian ruler, until the 1990s when more re-evaluations appeared. ⁹

"Hero" and "Traitor" each captured part of the truth. Shi Lang indeed led Qing forces to defeat the Zheng navy at Penghu, and indeed participated in Taiwan’s retention and governance as a Qing official; simultaneously, his defection to Qing and conquest of Taiwan were connected to the private trauma of his family’s killing, and the post-war land and trade power left shadows that local society could not ignore. Erasing one side yields a Shi Lang that seems clean but is actually unreliable. ^{4 8 9}

What is most worth reading about Shi Lang is perhaps that he stood on several boundaries: the line between Ming and Qing, the strait between Fujian and Taiwan, the line between general and governor, the line between personal revenge and national war. He could end a regime in 1683, but he could not alone decide whether an island should be kept; he could change Taiwan’s rulers with a naval battle, but he could not prescribe for future generations how people should remember him.

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