Ji Lin-lian: From a Chen Shui-bian–Favored General to the Vice Chairman Who Wanted Han Kuo-yu Expanded from the KMT

That Central Standing Committee Meeting on the Afternoon of April 29, 2026

On the afternoon of April 29, 2026, on the third floor of the KMT Central Party Headquarters in the Central Standing Committee conference room, a 78-year-old retired Republic of China Marine Corps general was speaking.

His name was Ji Lin-lian. Earlier that morning, the KMT caucus had just finished debating two versions of a special arms procurement budget: the caucus version led by caucus convener Fu Kun-chi, calling for "NT$380 billion plus N," and the NT$800 billion version advocated by Legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin and reportedly supported by Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu. About 40-plus KMT legislators attended the caucus meeting; among those who spoke, roughly 19 or more supported the NT$800 billion figure, while about 5 backed the caucus version plus N. Opinions had not converged.¹

Then at the Central Standing Committee meeting, Ji Lin-lian ignored Fu Kun-chi's attempts to dissuade him and fired at Han Kuo-yu in front of the media cameras:

"You can kill me, but I will never believe that Brother Guo-yu would do anything to betray the party for personal gain. If such a thing happened, Huang Fuxing would surely step forward to put righteousness above family and recommend expelling Brother Guo-yu from the party."²

He then turned to Legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin: Huang Fuxing had gone all out to support Hsu during the legislative elections and the recall campaigns, and he hoped she would not do anything to cause grief to allies and joy to adversaries.³

A few hours later, Han Kuo-yu posted a poem on Facebook:

"An old ox knows the evening sun is late; in silence it toils on without a sound. In all I have done in this life, I have nothing to be ashamed of before my country, before the people, before my duty, or before the party."⁴

That evening, Cheng Li-wen and Vice Chairman and Secretary-General Li Chien-long each called Han Kuo-yu to express their regards, describing Ji Lin-lian's remarks as "purely accidental and a personal position."⁵ After receiving the call, Han Kuo-yu joked self-deprecatingly: "Calling to expel me?"⁵

The next day, Chen Shui-bian made a rare public statement:

"(Ji Lin-lian) had no problems with his performance back then. People change. We haven't been in touch for 20 years. I had no idea he had changed so much — Ah-Bian doesn't even recognize him anymore!"⁶

The sting in that last sentence was this: the person who promoted Ji Lin-lian and elevated him from deputy commander of the Combined Logistics Command to two-star commander-in-chief was none other than President Chen Shui-bian himself, 20 years earlier.⁷

30-second overview: Ji Lin-lian, born in 1947 in Dalian, ancestral home Hangzhou, Zhejiang, arrived in Taiwan at age three. Republic of China Military Academy Class 38 (Infantry), War College Class of 1987. A Marine Corps officer by career, he served as a Frogman Battalion Commander, the first commander of the Special Service Team, commander of the Dongsha Garrison, Commander of the Republic of China Marine Corps (2000–2003), and Commander of the Combined Logistics Command (2006–2007). In February 2006, the Chen Shui-bian administration promoted him to two-star general. During the 2008 legislative elections, he appeared in civilian clothes campaigning for the DPP's Li Wen-chung and was given two major demerits by Lee Tien-yu. He served as a Presidential Office Strategy Advisor from 2007 to 2011 before retiring. After retirement, he returned to the KMT, served as the last chairman of the Huang Fuxing Party Branch (2021–2024), and in 2024 traveled at his own expense to attend the centennial of the Whampoa Military Academy in China. In 2025, he announced a bid for KMT chairman, withdrew, and threw his support behind Cheng Li-wen. On November 1, 2025, he was sworn in as a KMT vice chairman. On April 29, 2026, at a Central Standing Committee meeting, he named Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu — who supported a larger arms procurement budget — as "betraying the party for personal gain" and called for his expulsion, igniting a split within the KMT.

Dalian, Tainan, and Military Academy Class 38

Ji Lin-lian was born on December 18, 1947, in Dalian, Liaoning Province, with an ancestral home in Hangzhou, Zhejiang. He came to Taiwan with his family at the age of three.⁸ He grew up in Tainan, attended Tainan First Senior High School, and upon graduation entered the Republic of China Military Academy, Class 38, majoring in infantry.

After graduating from the academy, he made a choice that would set him apart from his classmates for the next 20 years: he volunteered for the Marine Corps. Within the Republic of China Armed Forces system, the Marine Corps is a relatively small and brutally trained unit — never the fastest track to career advancement. But he worked his way up from Frogman Battalion Commander, opposing-force company commander, and the inaugural commander of the Special Service Team.⁸ In 1987, he graduated from the War College, which in Taiwan's military education system is equivalent to the final gateway into the pool of general-officer candidates.

He subsequently served as Commander of the Dongsha Garrison, division commander, commander of the Tri-Service Training Base, and deputy chief of staff of the Navy Command Headquarters.

The Dongsha Islands were not a post given to just anyone. It is Taiwan's southernmost outpost, an isolated island base facing the South China Sea, entirely dependent on sea transport for supplies. Ji Lin-lian later described it in a post-retirement interview: "On Dongsha, apart from sand, everything else has to be shipped in by boat."⁹ That tour as Dongsha Garrison Commander was the farthest from Taipei he ever got in his military career.

Four Years from Lieutenant General Deputy Commander to Full General Commander

In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated as president, marking the first time the DPP took power. On September 1 of that year, Ji Lin-lian assumed command of the Marine Corps, becoming its 18th commanding general.¹⁰ His term lasted until May 31, 2003.

He then served as director of the Operations and Planning Division of the Ministry of National Defense General Staff Headquarters and as deputy commander of the Combined Logistics Command. On February 16, 2006, he took over as commander of the Combined Logistics Command (the 4th commander) and was promoted to full general (two-star) the same month.⁸¹⁰

From lieutenant general deputy commander of the Combined Logistics Command to full general commander — four years in total. That is considered fast in the history of Republic of China military promotions. The Liberty Times later described his position during the Chen Shui-bian administration: "During Chen Shui-bian's presidency, Ji Lin-lian could be called a Chen-favored general, rocketing from lieutenant general deputy commander of the Combined Logistics Command to full general commander within four years."⁷

He became one of only three two-star generals in the history of the Marine Corps.¹⁰

His term as Combined Logistics Command commander ended on January 31, 2007. The next day, February 1, he was reassigned as a Presidential Office Strategy Advisor, serving until December 17, 2011.¹⁰ The Strategy Advisor position is a unique role in the Republic of China military system: nominally still on active duty, receiving colonel-general or above pay, but with no actual command authority — a kind of attic for those who have retired without formally retiring.

The 2008 Incident: Campaigning for the Green Camp and the Demerits

During Ji Lin-lian's tenure as Presidential Office Strategy Advisor, an incident occurred that cemented his "political chameleon" label.

In the 2008 legislative elections, DPP candidate Li Wen-chung was running for re-election in Taichung's third district. Li invited Ji Lin-lian — who at the time was an active-duty military officer serving as a Presidential Office Strategy Advisor — to appear at a campaign rally. Ji showed up in civilian clothes and gave a public speech in support.⁷

This was a clear violation of the Servicemen's Political Neutrality Act, which prohibits active-duty military personnel from campaigning for specific political parties or candidates. After the incident came to light, then–National Defense Minister Lee Tien-yu gave Ji two major demerits.⁷

In May 2008, Ma Ying-jeou took office and the DPP went into opposition. Ji Lin-lian remained in his Strategy Advisor position for another three and a half years until his retirement in December 2011.

If the story had ended there, he would have been a somewhat controversial but clearly legible "Chen-favored retired general": his promotion path came from the green camp, he campaigned for the green camp, and he was tied to the green camp. There were plenty of such stories in Taiwan's military circles.

But the story did not end on the day of his retirement in 2011.

From Green to Blue: The Last Chairman of Huang Fuxing

After retiring, Ji Lin-lian returned to the KMT.

The exact date of his return is not clearly documented in public sources, but it can be inferred from his public appearances: in 2019, he attended events in mainland China commemorating the 70th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance against Japan,¹¹ and on October 5, 2021, he formally took office as chairman of the KMT's Huang Fuxing Party Branch.⁸

The "Huang Fuxing Party Branch" (full name: "KMT Huang Fuxing Party Branch," officially the "KMT Party Branch for Retired Servicemen and Women") was established by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1956. Its membership consisted primarily of retired veterans and military dependents. From 1956 through the 2010s, Huang Fuxing was one of the most organizationally powerful factions within the KMT: veterans had high loyalty and high voter turnout, and could determine the outcome of intra-party primary contests.

But Huang Fuxing's fate took a dramatic turn in 2024. On July 31, the KMT Central Committee resolved to abolish the Huang Fuxing Party Branch and merge it into local organizations. Ji Lin-lian responded at the time by saying it was "very regrettable" that Huang Fuxing was "passing into history," and he resigned as chairman.¹² In other words: he was the "last chairman" during Huang Fuxing's formal existence.

But "Huang Fuxing passing into history" did not mean "Huang Fuxing completely disappeared." Its membership, organizational ties, and retired general networks still existed; there was simply no longer a separate party branch structure. When Ji Lin-lian claimed to "represent Huang Fuxing" in his remarks at the April 29, 2026 Central Standing Committee meeting, he was representing this formally abolished but still substantively operating network.

Another event also took place in 2024: the centennial of the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy. Ji Lin-lian traveled at his own expense to the former Whampoa Military Academy site in Guangzhou, China.¹¹ For a retired general who had reached two-star rank in Taiwan's military, campaigned for Chen Shui-bian, and been given two major demerits by Lee Tien-yu, the symbolic significance was considerable: he chose, in a personal capacity and at his own expense, to graft himself back into the cross-strait historical narrative of "Whampoa."

2025: First Running for Chairman, Then Withdrawing, Then Becoming Vice Chairman

In the 2025 KMT chairmanship election, Ji Lin-lian was one of the early declared candidates.

But he later withdrew. Upon withdrawing, he directed his supporters to another candidate, Cheng Li-wen.¹³ In public opinion, this was described as "a key bloc in Cheng Li-wen's victory": the votes of Huang Fuxing retired generals were the most mobilizable single voting bloc within the KMT, and Ji transferred those votes to Cheng.

On October 18, 2025, Cheng Li-wen was elected the 12th chairperson of the KMT with approximately 50% of the vote. On October 22, Cheng announced her first wave of party appointments: Li Chien-long as vice chairman and secretary-general, and Ji Lin-lian as the other vice chairman.¹⁴ On November 1, when Cheng took office, Ji was sworn in as vice chairman the same day.

From the last chairman of Huang Fuxing to KMT vice chairman, 14 years after retirement, he had obtained for the first time a position with "substantive intra-party power." At the time, there was also discussion within the party: Huang Fuxing had been abolished, yet Ji had become vice chairman — what signal did that send? KMT Culture and Communications Committee Chair Lin Kuan-yu responded at the time: "The KMT's path toward youth-oriented reform and internalization has already gained recognition."¹⁴ In other words: Ji's appointment was positioned as a compromise — "integrating the old military networks without restoring Huang Fuxing."

Less than six months later, this compromise developed a crack.

The Version Dispute Within NT$1.25 Trillion

To understand what happened at the April 29, 2026 Central Standing Committee meeting, one must first understand the arms procurement budget battle raging beneath the surface.

After Lai Ching-te took office as president in May 2024, the Executive Yuan advanced the "Special Act for Strengthening National Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Warfare Capability Construction," planning to invest NT$1.25 trillion over eight years (2026–2033), covering U.S. arms procurement, commercial procurement, and domestic defense self-sufficiency programs.¹ This was the single largest defense budget package in Taiwan's postwar history.

The problem was that the proportion of "U.S. arms procurement" within the NT$1.25 trillion total was not clearly allocated in the draft act. The Ministry of National Defense had announced seven procurement categories, with 5 of 9 U.S. arms procurement cases publicly disclosed (totaling approximately US$3 billion), while the remaining 4 were still under U.S. review.¹

The KMT caucus was divided in its response to the NT$1.25 trillion. The official caucus version advocated "NT$380 billion plus N": approve NT$380 billion first, and add the remainder only after the U.S. issues Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs). Legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin, on the other hand, directly advocated an NT$800 billion version.¹ At the caucus meeting on the morning of April 29, more than 40 members attended; among those who spoke, roughly 19 or more supported NT$800 billion, while about 5 backed the caucus version plus N. Opinions had not converged.¹

Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu was reported to have privately expressed support for NT$800 billion to KMT legislators. This was the trigger for Ji Lin-lian naming him at the April 29 Central Standing Committee meeting and accusing him of "betraying the party for personal gain."

But the real gap between "NT$800 billion" and "NT$380 billion plus N" depended on whether "N" would ultimately be approved. If the U.S. never issued LOAs, the caucus version's "NT$380 billion plus N" would effectively be just NT$380 billion; if the U.S. issued LOAs, the total would approach NT$800 billion. Cheng Li-wen had already stated publicly on April 28: "I do not oppose NT$800 billion in arms procurement, on the condition that the U.S. issues LOAs."¹

In other words: when Ji Lin-lian fired his salvo at the Central Standing Committee, the targets of his "betraying the party for personal gain" accusation — Han Kuo-yu and Hsu Chiao-hsin — were not far from party chair Cheng Li-wen's substantive position. Everyone agreed on the principle of "sign only after the U.S. issues LOAs." The difference was whether to write the blank number into the statute in advance.

Escalating this technical legislative strategy dispute to "betraying the party for personal gain" and demanding "expulsion from the party" — that leap was Ji Lin-lian's choice that day.

The Same Person, Different Banners

The sting in Chen Shui-bian's rare public response — "I had no idea he had changed so much" — was not in the lament but in the memory.

The Presidential Office Strategy Advisor who stood on stage at a Li Wen-chung rally in civilian clothes in 2008 and the vice chairman who named Han Kuo-yu at the 2026 Central Standing Committee meeting and accused him of "betraying the party for personal gain" were the same person. The banners in between had changed: from "Chen-favored general" to "Huang Fuxing chairman" to "Cheng Li-wen's vice chairman." But the person standing there speaking never changed.

Shao Kang's counterattack on May 1 made this layer even more explicit: "In this position, he only destroys unity. Every time I see him, I think of him saying Han Kuo-yu should be expelled from the party."¹⁵ Shao directly demanded that Cheng Li-wen "remove Ji Lin-lian as vice chairman." Cheng's response on April 30 was conciliatory: "Vice Chairman Ji's words were a touch impulsive," adding a remark outsiders found harder to interpret: "He and Speaker Han are old comrades of decades, and his words came from a place of deep concern."¹⁶

The phrase "old comrades of decades" actually pointed to a fact that 2020s observers could easily overlook: Han Kuo-yu was also a product of the KMT's Huang Fuxing system. Born in 1957 in Banciao, Taipei, to a mainlander family, a graduate of the Republic of China Military Academy's specialized training class, Han was by definition a Huang Fuxing man. Ji Lin-lian's threat that "Huang Fuxing would surely step forward to put righteousness above family" against Han was institutionally meaningless (Huang Fuxing had been abolished in 2024), but at the narrative level it was an internal reckoning: you are one of us in Huang Fuxing; if you don't follow our path, we will push you out.

Another way to read this move: the Huang Fuxing retired-general network, after losing its formal party branch structure in 2024, needed a position from which to speak at Central Standing Committee meetings to prove it still had political relevance. Ji's vice chairman appointment provided that position. Naming Han Kuo-yu at the Central Standing Committee (regardless of whether expulsion was ever actually possible) was a declaration that "we Huang Fuxing are still here."

Both readings are valid. Perhaps both are valid. Perhaps there is a third: when a 78-year-old retired general — promoted from lieutenant general to full general in four years, who has campaigned for two opposing camps — publicly threatens to expel the legislative speaker from the party at a Central Standing Committee meeting, his personal motives and the factional demands he represents have become indistinguishable.

Epilogue: Two Versions of the Same Person

Chen Shui-bian's "I had no idea he had changed so much" and Han Kuo-yu's "An old ox knows the evening sun is late" were two mirrors reflecting the same evening of April 29.

One mirror faced the past: the green-camp boss who promoted him 20 years ago and was later cast aside by him. The other faced the present: the blue-camp speaker he named and who responded with a poem. Sandwiched between them was a retired general who had never publicly explained why his political position kept changing, yet always had a platform to speak from.

Perhaps the key is not "he changed," but that this island of Taiwan has never truly defined what "retired military officers should do after leaving service." A retired general can campaign for the green camp and receive demerits, can serve as a blue-camp party branch chairman and vice chairman calling for party expulsions, can travel at his own expense to the Whampoa Military Academy centennial in China. None of these actions are illegal per se. What they violate is an unwritten expectation that "military officers should remain neutral" — and that expectation has never been codified into a clear red line in the 39 years since Taiwan lifted martial law in 1987.

Ji Lin-lian's story is one case within this undefined space: neither an isolated incident nor the whole picture. Before him, a group of retired generals attended China's September 3 military parade; after him, there may be more. What makes his case more dramatic is that he is someone who crossed the demerit red line in 2008 and returned to the center of the spotlight in 2026. A red line for military officers — he has crossed it twice, and each time, which side he crossed from and which side he crossed to is the clearest coordinate for observing the militarization of politics on this island.

The remaining question, rather than asking "which side will he cross to next," should be: who is drawing this red line in the first place?

Further Reading:

• Cheng Li-wen — The candidate Ji Lin-lian withdrew his 2025 KMT chairmanship bid to support, and his superior in 2026; understanding the political context of Ji's vice chairman appointment requires reading Cheng's full arc
• Han Kuo-yu — The Legislative Speaker whom Ji Lin-lian named at the April 29, 2026 Central Standing Committee meeting as "betraying the party for personal gain" and recommended for expulsion; the person most directly impacted by Ji's remarks
• Taiwan Defense and Military Modernization — Background on the NT$1.25 trillion special arms procurement budget and the "NT$380 billion plus N vs. NT$800 billion" debate; understanding the trigger for Ji's April 29 Central Standing Committee remarks requires this broader defense policy framework
• Cho Jung-tai — In the arms procurement controversy in which Ji Lin-lian threatened to expel Han Kuo-yu, it was Cho Jung-tai who, as Executive Yuan Premier, put forward the NT$1.25 trillion budget proposal; two "coordinators" from the blue and green camps facing each other across the same table
• Taiwan's Political Environment and Electoral System — Why could a 78-year-old retired general threaten to expel the Legislative Speaker at a 2026 KMT Central Standing Committee meeting? An entry point into the institutional background of the Huang Fuxing Party Branch, vice chairman appointments, and intra-party factions

References