Chi Lin-lien: From Chen Shui-bian's General to Vice Chair Calling for Han Kuo-yu's Expulsion

The Central Executive Committee Meeting on the Afternoon of April 29, 2026

On the afternoon of April 29, 2026, in the Central Executive Committee meeting room on the third floor of the Kuomintang (KMT) Central Party Headquarters, a 78-year-old retired Marine Corps General was speaking.

His name is Chi Lin-lien. Earlier that morning, the KMT parliamentary group had just discussed two versions of the special budget for arms procurement: the "380 billion + N" party version led by parliamentary group convener Fu Kun-tsai, and the 800 billion version advocated by legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin, which is reportedly supported by Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu. About 40+ Blue legislators attended the parliamentary group meeting, with over 19 speakers supporting the 800 billion version and about 5 supporting the party version plus N; opinions had not converged. ¹

Then, at the Central Executive Committee meeting, ignoring Fu Kun-tsai's attempts to dissuade him from the side, Chi Lin-lien fired at Han Kuo-yu in front of media cameras:

"Even if you beat me to death, I would never believe that Brother Guoyu would do something that betrays the party for personal glory. If such a thing happens, the Huang Xing Fu faction will surely step forward to extinguish the kin for the greater good and recommend expelling Brother Guoyu from the party." ²

He also mentioned legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin: The Huang Xing Fu faction fully supported Hsu Chiao-hsin during the legislative elections and the anti-recall campaigns, hoping she would not do something that pleases the enemy and pains the kin. ³

A few hours later, Han Kuo-yu posted a poem on Facebook:

"The old ox knows the evening sun is late, silently striving with its hooves; what this life has walked through, leaving no shame to the country, no shame to the people, no shame to duty, no shame to the party." ⁴

That evening, Cheng Li-wen and Vice Chair/Secretary-General Li Chien-lung each called Han Kuo-yu to express their regards, stating that Chi Lin-lien's remarks were "purely accidental and personal positions." ⁵ After receiving the calls, Han Kuo-yu joked: "Calling to expel me?" ⁵

The next day, Chen Shui-bian rarely spoke publicly:

"(Chi Lin-lien) performed well back then. People change; we haven't been in touch for 20 years, I don't know he has changed so much, Ah Bian doesn't even recognize him anymore!" ⁶

The sting of this sentence lies in the last part. The person who promoted Chi Lin-lien 20 years ago, rising him from Deputy Commander of Joint Logistics Command to Commander of a Two-Star General, was none other than then-President Chen Shui-bian himself. ⁷

30-Second Overview: Born in Dalian in 1947, with ancestral home in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Chi Lin-lien moved to Taiwan at age three. He graduated from the 38th Class of the Army Officer Academy (Infantry) and the 1987 Class of the Joint Services University War College. A Marine Corps background, he served as Commander of the Frogman Battalion, First Captain of the Special Service Team, Commander of the Dongsha Garrison Command, Commander of the Marine Corps (2000-2003), and Commander of the Joint Logistics Command (2006-2007). Promoted to Two-Star General in February 2006 by the Chen Shui-bian government, he was reprimanded twice by Li Tian-yu for wearing civilian clothes to campaign for DPP candidate Li Wen-chung in the 2008 legislative elections. He served as a Strategic Advisor to the Presidential Office from 2007-2011 before retiring. After retiring, he returned to the KMT, serving as the last Director of the Huang Xing Fu Party Department from 2021-2024. In 2024, he paid his own way to visit the 100th anniversary of the Whampoa Military Academy in China. In 2025, he announced his candidacy for KMT Chair but withdrew to support Cheng Li-wen, and on November 1, 2025, he took office as Vice Chair. On April 29, 2026, at the Central Executive Committee meeting, he named Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu, who supported arms procurement, as "betraying the party for personal glory" and recommended expulsion, igniting a split crisis within the KMT.

Dalian, Tainan, and the 38th Class of the Army Officer Academy

Chi Lin-lien was born on December 18, 1947, in Dalian, Liaoning, with ancestral home in Hangzhou, Zhejiang. He moved to Taiwan with his family at age three. ⁸ He grew up in Tainan, attended Tainan No. 1 High School, and after graduation, entered the 38th Class of the Army Officer Academy, majoring in Infantry.

After graduating from the Army Officer Academy, he made a choice that would diverge him from his classmates for the next 20 years: volunteering to join the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is a relatively small unit within the Republic of China military system, with the most rigorous training, and never the fastest track for career advancement. However, he rose from Commander of the Frogman Battalion, Commander of the Fake Enemy Company, to the First Captain of the Special Service Team. ⁸ In 1987, he graduated from the Joint Services University War College, which in the Taiwan military education system is equivalent to entering the final gate for candidate generals.

Afterwards, he successively took command of the Dongsha Garrison Command, Division Commander, Commander of the Joint Services Training Base, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy General Headquarters.

The Dongsha Islands are not a position where just anyone can be sent. It is the southernmost island base facing the South China Sea, with supply relying entirely on sea transport. In a post-retirement interview, Chi Lin-lien described: "Apart from sand, everything else on Dongsha must be shipped by boat." ⁹ This experience as Commander of the Dongsha Garrison Command was the part of his military career furthest from Taipei.

From Deputy Commander as a Major General to Commander as a General in 4 Years

In 2000, when Chen Shui-bian took office as President, it was the first time the DPP took power. On September 1, 2000, Chi Lin-lien took office as Commander of the Marine Corps, becoming the 18th Commander in the history of the Marine Corps. ¹⁰ His term lasted until May 31, 2003.

He subsequently served as Director of the Joint Operations Planning Office of the General Staff Department of the Ministry of National Defense and Deputy Commander of the Joint Logistics Command. On February 16, 2006, he succeeded as Commander of the Joint Logistics Command (4th), and was promoted to Two-Star General in the same month. ⁸¹⁰

From Deputy Commander as a Major General to Commander as a General at the Joint Logistics Command took only 4 years. This is considered fast in the promotion history of the Republic of China military system. Later, Liberty Times described his position in the Chen Shui-bian government: "During Chen Shui-bian's administration, Chi Lin-lien can be called a Chen Shui-bian faction general, rising rapidly from Deputy Commander of the Joint Logistics Command as a Major General to Commander as a General within 4 years." ⁷

He became one of the three Two-Star Generals in the history of the Marine Corps. ¹⁰

His term as Commander of the Joint Logistics Command ended on January 31, 2007. The next day, February 1, he was reassigned as a Strategic Advisor to the Presidential Office, serving until December 17, 2011, when he retired. ¹⁰ Strategic Advisor is a special position in the Republic of China military system: nominally still on active duty, receiving待遇 (treatment/benefits) of Major General and above, but in reality having no command authority over troops; it is a "retired but not quite retired" attic.

The Reprimand for Campaigning for the Green Camp in 2008

During Chi Lin-lien's term as a Strategic Advisor to the Presidential Office, an incident occurred that solidified his "political chameleon" label.

In the 2008 legislative elections, DPP candidate Li Wen-chung challenged for re-election in the Taichung Third Constituency. Li Wen-chung invited Chi Lin-lien, who held the identity of an active-duty military officer and served as a Strategic Advisor to the Presidential Office, to the scene to canvass votes. Chi Lin-lien attended the public campaign speech in civilian clothes. ⁷

This clearly violated the National Military's "Administrative Neutrality Law": military personnel on active duty cannot campaign for specific political parties or candidates. After the incident broke, then-Minister of National Defense Li Tian-yu recorded two major demerits for Chi Lin-lien. ⁷

In May 2008, Ma Ying-jeou took office, and the DPP went out of power. Chi Lin-lien continued to serve in the position of Strategic Advisor to the Presidential Office for another three and a half years, until retiring in December 2011.

If the story ended here, he would be a somewhat controversial but clear-path "Chen Shui-bian faction retired general": his promotion path came from the green camp, he campaigned for the green camp, and was bound with the green camp. Stories like this are common in the Taiwan military system.

But the story did not end on the day he retired in 2011.

From Green to Blue: The Last Director of Huang Xing Fu

After retiring, Chi Lin-lien returned to the KMT.

The exact point of return is not explicitly written in public data, but it can be inferred from the traces of his attendance at events: In 2019, he attended the "Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Victory of the War of Resistance" related occasions in mainland China commemorating the victory of the War of Resistance, ¹¹ and on October 5, 2021, he officially succeeded as the Director of the Kuomintang Huang Xing Fu Party Department. ⁸

The full name of the "Huang Xing Fu Party Department" is the "Kuomintang Huang Xing Fu Party Department," officially named the "Kuomintang Retired Personnel Party Department." It was established by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1956, with party members mainly composed of retired veterans and military family dependents. From 1956 to the 2010s, Huang Xing Fu was always one of the most organized and mobilizable factions within the KMT: veterans had high loyalty and high voting rates, and could determine the outcome of intra-party primaries in factional competition.

But Huang Xing Fu's fate in 2024 was extremely dramatic. On July 31, 2024, the KMT Central Committee decided to abolish the Huang Xing Fu Party Department and merge it into local organizations. Chi Lin-lien directly stated at the time that "it is regrettable that Huang Xing Fu has entered history," and resigned as Director. ¹² In other words: he was the "last director" during the formal existence of Huang Xing Fu.

But "Huang Xing Fu entering history" does not mean "Huang Xing Fu completely disappears." The members, organizational relationships, and retired general networks of Huang Xing Fu still exist, just without an independent party department structure. When Chi Lin-lien spoke on behalf of "Huang Xing Fu" at the Central Executive Committee meeting on April 29, 2026, what he represented was this formally abolished but substantially still operating network system.

Another thing happened in 2024: the 100th anniversary of the Whampoa Military Academy. Chi Lin-lien paid his own way to visit the old site of the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou, China. ¹¹ For a retired general who had previously obtained a Two-Star General rank in the Taiwan military system, campaigned for Chen Shui-bian, and was reprimanded twice by Li Tian-yu, this carries significant symbolic meaning: he chose to use his personal identity and pay his own way to graft himself back into the "Whampoa" historical context that crosses the strait.

2025: First Running for Chair, Then Withdrawing, Then Becoming Vice Chair

In the 2025 KMT Chair election, Chi Lin-lien was one of the early people to announce his candidacy.

But he later withdrew. At the same time as withdrawing, he directed his supporters to another candidate, Cheng Li-wen. ¹³ In public opinion, he was called the "key plate for Cheng Li-wen's victory": the votes of the Huang Xing Fu retired generals are the most mobilizable single votes within the KMT, and Chi Lin-lien transferred these votes to Cheng Li-wen.

On October 18, 2025, Cheng Li-wen was elected as the 12th Chair of the KMT with about 50% of the votes. On October 22, 2025, Cheng Li-wen announced the first wave of party affairs personnel: Vice Chair and Secretary-General Li Chien-lung, and another Vice Chair, Chi Lin-lien. ¹⁴ On November 1, 2025, Cheng Li-wen took office, and Chi Lin-lien took office as Vice Chair on the same day.

From the last Director of Huang Xing Fu to the KMT Vice Chair, after 14 years of retirement, he obtained a position with "substantial intra-party power" for the first time. Media reports also discussed at the time: Huang Xing Fu was abolished, yet Chi Lin-lien became Vice Chair; what signal is this? Lin Kuan-yu, Director of the KMT Communications Committee, responded at the time: "The KMT's path of rejuvenation and internalization has been affirmed." ¹⁴ In other words: Chi Lin-lien's appointment was positioned as a compromise of "integrating the military elder network, but not restoring Huang Xing Fu."

Less than half a year later, this compromise showed cracks.

The Version Dispute in the 1.25 Trillion

To understand what happened at the Central Executive Committee meeting on April 29, 2026, one must first understand the arms procurement budget war set over the bridge.

After Lai Ching-te took office as President in May 2024, the Executive Yuan promoted the draft of the "Special Act on Strengthening National Defense Resilience and Building Asymmetric Combat Capabilities," planning to invest 1.25 trillion yuan over eight years from 2026-2033. The content includes arms procurement from the US, commercial procurement, and domestic national defense self-production. ¹ This is the largest single national defense budget package in Taiwan's post-war history.

The problem lies in the fact that the "proportion of arms procurement from the US" in the total figure of 1.25 trillion was not explicitly allocated in the draft act. The Ministry of National Defense had published 7 major procurement categories; among 9 US arms procurement cases, 5 have been made public (totaling about 3 billion USD), while the other 4 are still under review in the US. ¹

The KMT parliamentary group's reaction to the 1.25 trillion was split. The official party version advocated "380 billion + N": first approve 380 billion, and add the rest after the US issues the LOA (Letter of Acceptance). Legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin directly advocated the 800 billion version. ¹ At the parliamentary group meeting on the morning of April 29, over 40 people attended, with over 19 speakers supporting the 800 billion version and 5 supporting the party version plus N; opinions had not converged. ¹

Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu reportedly privately expressed support for the 800 billion version to KMT legislators. This was the trigger for Chi Lin-lien to name him "betraying the party for personal glory" at the April 29 Central Executive Committee meeting.

But the real gap between "800 billion" and "380 billion + N" lies in whether "N" will ultimately be approved. If the US never issues the LOA, the party version's "380 billion + N" is actually just 380 billion; if the US issues the LOA, adding it approaches 800 billion. Cheng Li-wen had already publicly stated on April 28: "I do not oppose 800 billion in arms procurement, provided the US issues the LOA." ¹

In other words: when Chi Lin-lien fired at the Central Executive Committee, the "betraying the party for personal glory" targets he attacked (Han Kuo-yu, Hsu Chiao-hsin) were not much different in substantial position from KMT Chair Cheng Li-wen. Everyone agreed on the principle of "signing only when the US issues the LOA." The difference lies in whether to first write the blank numbers into the law.

Escalating this technical legislative strategy dispute to "betraying the party for personal glory" and demanding "expulsion from the party" was the leap Chi Lin-lien made that day.

The Same Person, Different Signboards

The sting of Chen Shui-bian's rare public response, "I don't know he has changed so much," is not in the sigh, but in the memory.

The Presidential Office Strategic Advisor who stood in civilian clothes at Li Wen-chung's campaign event in 2008, and the Vice Chair who named Han Kuo-yu "betraying the party for personal glory" at the Central Executive Committee meeting in 2026, are the same person. The signboard in between changed: from "Chen Shui-bian faction famous general" to "Huang Xing Fu Director," and then to "Cheng Li-wen Vice Chair." But the person standing there speaking did not change.

Chao Shao-kang's counterattack on May 1 made this layer even more explicit: "In this position, he only destroys unity; every time I see him, I think of Han Kuo-yu being told by him that he would be expelled from the party." ¹⁵ Chao Shao-kang directly demanded that Cheng Li-wen "remove Vice Chair Chi Lin-lien." Cheng Li-wen's response on April 30 was to smooth things over: "Vice Chair Chi speaks a bit impulsively," and added a supplementary remark that outsiders find harder to interpret: "He and President Han are old comrades of decades, and it was also earnest advice." ¹⁶

The phrase "old comrades of decades" actually points out a fact easily ignored by observers in 2026: Han Kuo-yu is also from the KMT Huang Xing Fu system. Born in 1957 in Banqiao, Taipei, as a second-generation foreign province native, graduated from the Army Officer Academy Special Training Class, Han Kuo-yu is by definition a person of the Huang Xing Fu system. Chi Lin-lien used the threat of "Huang Xing Fu will surely step forward to extinguish the kin for the greater good" against Han Kuo-yu; this threat has no meaning at the institutional level (Huang Xing Fu was abolished in 2024), but at the narrative level, it is an internal清算 (settlement/cleansing): You are also one of our Huang Xing Fu people; if you don't follow our path, we will push you out.

Another way to observe this move is: after the Huang Xing Fu retired general network system lost its formal party department in 2024, it needed a position to speak at the Central Executive Committee to prove they still have political presence. Chi Lin-lien's Vice Chair appointment gave him this position. Naming Han Kuo-yu at the Central Executive Committee (regardless of whether expulsion is truly possible) is a declaration of "we Huang Xing Fu are still here."

Both versions hold. Maybe both hold. Maybe there is a third: when a 78-year-old retired general, who rose from Major General to General in 4 years, and campaigned for two opposing camps, publicly threatened to expel the Legislative Yuan President from the party at the Central Executive Committee, his personal motives and the factional demands he represents have become indistinguishable.

Ending: The Same Person in Two Versions

Chen Shui-bian's "I don't know he has changed so much" and Han Kuo-yu's "The old ox knows the evening sun is late" are two sides of the same mirror on the evening of April 29.

One side reflects the past: the green camp boss who promoted him 20 years ago and was later abandoned by him. One side reflects the present: the blue camp president who was named by him and responded with a poem. In between lies a retired general who has never publicly explained why his political position keeps changing, yet always gets to speak.

Perhaps the key is not "he changed," but that this island of Taiwan has never truly defined "what retired military should do." Retired generals can campaign for the green camp and be reprimanded, can speak for the blue camp director and Vice Chair to call for expulsion, can pay their own way to the 100th anniversary of the Whampoa Military Academy in China. These actions themselves are not illegal under the system. What is violated is only a certain unwritten expectation of "military personnel should remain neutral," and this expectation has never been legislatively defined as a specific red line in the 39 years since Taiwan's martial law was lifted in 1987.

Chi Lin-lien's story is a case in this undefined space: neither an isolated example nor the whole picture. Before him, a batch of retired generals attended China's "September 3 Military Parade"; after him, there may be more. What is more dramatic about him is: he is someone who stepped over the reprimand red line in 2008 and returned to the center of the spotlight in 2026. A red line for military personnel, he has stepped over it twice, and every time he steps from which side to which side is the clearest coordinate for observing the process of militarization of politics on this island of Taiwan.

The remaining question is less "which side will he step on next," but rather: Who is drawing this red line?

Further Reading:

• Cheng Li-wen — The object Chi Lin-lien withdrew from the 2025 KMT Chair election to support; the boss in 2026; to understand the political context of Chi Lin-lien's Vice Chair appointment, one must first read Cheng Li-wen's full arc
• Han Kuo-yu — The Legislative Yuan President named by Chi Lin-lien at the April 29, 2026 Central Executive Committee meeting as "betraying the party for personal glory, recommending expulsion from the party"; the true target impacted by Chi Lin-lien's words is this person
• Taiwan National Defense and Military Modernization — The background of the 1.25 trillion arms procurement special budget and the dispute between "380 billion + N vs 800 billion"; to understand the trigger of Chi Lin-lien's April 29 Central Executive Committee remarks, this larger national defense issue framework is needed
• Chuo Jung-tai — In the arms procurement controversy where Chi Lin-lien threatened to expel Han Kuo-yu, the Premier who presented the 1.25 trillion budget plan was Chuo Jung-tai; the two "coordinators" of Blue and Green face each other at the same table
• Taiwan Political Environment and Electoral System — Why can a 78-year-old retired general threaten to expel the Legislative Yuan President at the 2026 KMT Central Executive Committee? The entry point for institutional backgrounds such as the Huang Xing Fu Party Department, Vice Chair appointment, and intra-party factions

References