Cho Jung-tai: From Hsieh Chang-ting's Legislative Aide to the Premier Who Refused to Co-sign the Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Act

1987: That Legislative Aide at the Taipei City Council

In 1987, Taiwan lifted martial law. On the third floor of the Taipei City Council, a 28-year-old legislative aide followed newly elected city councilor Hsieh Chang-ting into the chamber.

His name was Cho Jung-tai. A year earlier, Hsieh had founded Taiwan New Culture magazine to critique the political status quo and promote a cultural renaissance in Taiwan; Cho served as a consultant for the magazine.¹ On the eve of the lifting of martial law, Hsieh was elected to the Taipei City Council, and Cho followed him in as an aide. From that year through 2024, he spent 37 years serving as someone else's assistant, deputy secretary-general, secretary-general, and party chairman.

In those 37 years, he almost never once stood at the front as the lead. He was Hsieh Chang-ting's legislative aide, Chen Shui-bian's Deputy Secretary-General of the Presidential Office,² Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan under Lai Ching-te's 2017 cabinet,² and the by-election party chairman put forward to clean up the mess after the DPP's devastating loss in the nine-in-one elections.¹ His labels were "coordinator," "liaison between the Presidential Office, Executive Yuan, and party," and "senior brother of the Hsieh faction."¹ He was not a faction boss, not a local kingpin, not a technocrat. He was the person in Taiwanese politics who spent 38 years coordinating on behalf of others.

On the afternoon of May 20, 2024, he received the official seal from outgoing Premier Chen Chien-jen in the Executive Yuan auditorium, becoming the 31st Premier of the Republic of China. Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim supervised the transfer.³

30-second overview: Cho Jung-tai, born January 22, 1959, in Taipei City, graduated from National Chung Hsing University Law Department in 1984. From 1987, he served as Taipei City Council aide to Hsieh Chang-ting; elected Taipei City Councilor in 1989 (two terms, 1990–1998); Legislator for Taipei City's 1st electoral district, 4th and 5th Legislative Yuan (1999–2004). Served twice as Deputy Secretary-General of the Presidential Office under Chen Shui-bian (2004–05 + 2006–07); Minister without Portfolio and Spokesperson of the Executive Yuan in 2005. Served twice as DPP Secretary-General (2007 + 2017). After the 2018 nine-in-one election loss, cross-factional persuasion led to his January 2019 by-election victory for party chairman with 72.6% of the vote. Assumed office as premier of the Lai Ching-te administration on May 20, 2024, with the cabinet branded the "Active & Innovative AI Cabinet." Key events during his tenure: April 2025 NT$88 billion response to Trump tariffs; February 2026 agreement on a 15% non-stacking U.S.-Taiwan tariff deal; promotion of a NT$1.25 trillion special defense budget; August 2025 total defeat of the Great Recall; September 2025 Cabinet 2.0 reshuffle; December 2025 refusal to co-sign the Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Act (a constitutional first); May 2026 pledge to push the minimum wage past NT$30,000.

From That Taipei Council to the Chung Hsing Law Diploma

Cho Jung-tai was born on January 22, 1959, in Taipei City.² Not Changhua, not Yunlin, not any southern faction's geographic base. His political starting point was urban, northern.

His educational background has a rarely noted twist: he first enrolled at Soochow University Law Department, withdrew, and transferred to the College of Law and Business at National Chung Hsing University, graduating from the law department in 1984.² From Jian-Xin Elementary School, Taipei Municipal Datong Junior High School, to Taipei Municipal Fu-Hsin Senior High School, he followed the standard path through Taipei's public school system. After graduating from Chung Hsing Law in 1984, he practiced law for a period.

1986 was a pivotal year. That year, Hsieh Chang-ting founded Taiwan New Culture magazine to critique the political landscape, and Cho Jung-tai served as a consultant.¹ The two became inseparable from this point on. One would go on to run for president three times without success and eventually serve as Taiwan's representative to Japan after the DPP's 2008 defeat; the other would go on to become Premier of the Republic of China in 2024.

The Man Who Spent 37 Years as a Deputy

Counting from 1987, when he entered the city council as a legislative aide, virtually every position Cho Jung-tai held was a coordinating role — "deputy" or "secretary-general."

In 1989, he was elected Taipei City Councilor,⁴ serving two consecutive terms until 1998. Those nine years were the only position he won on his own through election. From February 1, 1999, he served as a Legislator in the 4th and 5th Legislative Yuan, representing Taipei City's 1st electoral district, until May 19, 2004.⁵

Then came two stints as Deputy Secretary-General of the Presidential Office under Chen Shui-bian: May 20, 2004, to January 31, 2005 (just after Chen's second-term inauguration), and January 25, 2006, to October 16, 2007 (returning after Hsieh Chang-ting's term as premier ended).² In between, in 2005, he briefly served as Minister without Portfolio and Spokesperson of the Executive Yuan — the premier at that time was Hsieh Chang-ting.²

In October 2007, during the final months of Chen Shui-bian's presidency, Cho Jung-tai became DPP Secretary-General, serving until around January 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election.² The DPP entered eight years in opposition, and Cho retreated from the center of the system to the sidelines.

On September 8, 2017, Lai Ching-te took office as Premier, and Cho Jung-tai followed him back to the Executive Yuan as Secretary-General.² The following year, in September 2018, he concurrently served as DPP Secretary-General — that was the final stretch of the DPP's election strategy.

On November 24, the DPP suffered a devastating defeat in the nine-in-one local elections, retaining only six of the 22 municipalities and counties. Rising stars such as Chen Chi-mai and Lin Chia-lung lost their races. Tsai Ing-wen resigned as party chair.¹ On December 28, Cho Jung-tai resigned from both the Executive Yuan Secretary-General and party Secretary-General positions, preparing to run in the DPP chairmanship by-election.

In 37 years, this was the first time he left a deputy's position.

That Hot Pot Restaurant and the Decision at 10:30 at Night

Running for the party chairmanship by-election was not something he jumped into on his own. He was pushed out by others.

According to reporting by The News Lens,¹ in December 2018, a group of mid-generation DPP figures — Cheng Wen-tsan, Pan Men-an, Lin Chia-lung, Lin Chih-chien, Huang Wei-che, Chen Chi-mai, and Weng Chang-liang — gathered at a hot pot restaurant for an overnight discussion about who should be party chairman: someone who could stabilize the situation amid the post-election atmosphere without intensifying factional conflict. In the end, they issued a joint statement endorsing Cho Jung-tai's candidacy.

Cho himself later recalled that night:

"I considered it for quite a long time… until about 10:30 at night. If I didn't decide soon, nobody would be able to go home."¹

The line sounds like a joke, but it precisely captures Cho Jung-tai's political position. He is the kind of person who "makes a decision at 10:30 so everyone can go home." He was put forward not because he wanted to be a leader, but because he was present, he could integrate, and he never provoked opposition.

On January 6, 2019, Cho won the by-election with 24,699 votes, a 72.6% vote share.² On January 9, he formally took office as the 16th Chairman of the DPP.

During his 16 months as chairman (January 2019 to May 2020), the DPP went from the low point of the nine-in-one defeat to the high point of Tsai Ing-wen's successful re-election in January 2020. The "Tsai-Lai ticket" (Tsai Ing-wen + Lai Cho Jung-tai) integration effort that Cho led during his chairmanship was one of the key components of that victory. Then he stepped down, and Tsai resumed the party chairmanship by virtue of her presidential office under the party charter.

He retreated back to a deputy's position.

"The Cho Jung-tai Who Understands Lai Ching-te Best"

On January 13, 2024, Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim were elected president and vice president with 40.05% of the vote. On April 10 of the same year, Lai held a press conference to announce the first wave of cabinet appointments, naming Cho Jung-tai as Premier and Cheng Li-hsiun as Vice Premier.⁶

The media widely described this appointment as "the Cho Jung-tai who understands Lai Ching-te best." There were three layers to the reasoning:

First, they were Legislative Yuan colleagues. Cho served in the 4th and 5th Legislative Yuan; Lai served in the 5th through 7th. The two worked together in the legislature for many years.

Second, they worked together in the Executive Yuan. When Lai served as Premier in 2017, Cho was Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan. They had already gone through a round of day-to-day Executive Yuan–Presidential Office coordination.

Third, they were successive DPP chairmen. One of the key tasks during Cho's 2019–2020 chairmanship was facilitating the "Tsai-Lai ticket" integration — Lai was the beneficiary.

Combined with Cho's widely noted reputation for "flexibility and skill in negotiation and coordination" [repeatedly described by The News Lens and other media outlets¹], the logic behind Lai's choice of him as "lead-off premier" was clear: a minority government needed a coordinator, not a confrontationalist.

On the afternoon of May 20, 2024, the joint transition ceremony was held in the Executive Yuan auditorium. Cho Jung-tai received the official seal from outgoing Premier Chen Chien-jen, with Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim supervising the transfer. The new cabinet was branded the "Active & Innovative AI Cabinet." In his remarks, Cho said:

"The 'Active & Innovative AI Cabinet' will continue to build on the solid foundation laid over the past eight years under the Tsai administration."³

The policy priorities were "Five Strikes, Seven Safeguards" — cracking down on organized crime, financial crime, firearms, drugs, and fraud, plus seven areas of public safety.³ Cheng Li-hsiun served as Vice Premier, Kung Ming-hsin as Secretary-General, and Shih Shih-kai as Spokesperson. The proportion of female cabinet members was 23.5%, the highest since the Tang Fei cabinet in 2000.

The man who had spent 37 years as a deputy sat in that chair for the first time.

NT$88 Billion and "We Were a Day Late"

On April 4, 2025 — just 11 months after taking office — Cho Jung-tai held a press conference to announce an emergency response plan.

The day before, the Trump administration announced a 32% reciprocal tariff on goods from Taiwan.⁷ Cho announced the mobilization of NT$88 billion in support measures: 9 areas, 20 measures. NT$70 billion was allocated to the industrial sector, NT$180 billion to agriculture. Affected industries included electronics and information technology, steel and metals, machinery, auto parts, building materials, and home appliances; affected agricultural and fishery products included phalaenopsis orchids, edamame, tea, tilapia, and mahi-mahi.

At that press conference, he said a line that would be repeatedly quoted: "We were a day late." This apology was read two ways at the time: externally, it meant "the government is acting"; internally, it meant "we know the response was slow, but the NT$88 billion is real."

The tariff situation shifted dramatically over the following months: 32% → temporary 20% → final 15% (signed February 12, 2026).⁸ The U.S. and Taiwan reached a reciprocal tariff agreement on a "non-stacking MFN" basis, with Taiwan committing to invest US$250 billion in U.S. semiconductor production, purchase US$44.4 billion in liquefied natural gas and crude oil, US$15.2 billion in aircraft and engines, and US$25.2 billion in power generation equipment. Semiconductor and derivative products received "most favorable" treatment globally.

This outcome was the product of collective coordination by Cho Jung-tai, Lai Ching-te, the Executive Yuan Office of Trade Negotiations, and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S. — not the work of any single individual. Cho's role was domestic mobilization — channeling industry concerns upward and translating the negotiation outcomes into concrete implementation of the NT$88 billion support package.

This was still a coordinator's job.

The Night of the Great Recall and "Active & Innovative AI Cabinet 2.0"

On August 23, 2025, the second round of Great Recall voting concluded.

The results tallied throughout the night: all seven Kuomintang (KMT) legislators — Lo Ming-tsai, Lin Szu-ming, Yan Kuan-heng, Yang Chiung-ying, Chiang Chi-chen, Ma Wen-chun, and Yu Hao — retained their seats. The third round of 32 recall proposals plus the nuclear plant restart referendum were all rejected.⁹

This was a clear political signal: the blue-white (KMT + TPP) majority structure in the Legislative Yuan would not be changed through recalls. For the Lai-Cho government, this was the first "vote of no confidence" after more than a year in power.

Eight days later, on September 1, 2025, Cho's cabinet underwent a partial reshuffle: 16 cabinet members changed, affecting 10 agencies. Those stepping down included National Development Council Minister Liu Ching-chih, Economic Affairs Minister Kuo Chih-hui, Health and Welfare Minister Chiu Tai-yuan, and Digital Affairs Minister Huang Yen-nan. Cho Jung-tai announced the launch of "Active & Innovative AI Cabinet 2.0."¹⁰

At the August 28 press conference, he said a line that precisely captured the mood of the moment:

"The Executive Yuan has to storm the beach several times a day."¹⁰

The line bluntly described the current state of affairs. It meant the Executive Yuan was no longer in a period of stable governance — every day was a state of conflict.

The premier who remained in his seat was pushed from the "coordinator's" position to the "beach stormer's" position — someone trying to land on shore under enemy fire.

The NT$30,000 Pledge

During roughly the same intense period, Cho Jung-tai repeatedly made one promise: to keep raising the minimum wage.

On September 30, 2025, delivering his policy address at the Legislative Yuan, he said:

"The minimum wage must continue to rise. I believe that in one more year, the minimum wage will reach NT$30,000."¹¹

The historical context of this pledge: from 2017 to 2026, under DPP governance, the minimum wage rose ten consecutive times, from NT$20,008 per month (2016) to NT$29,500 (2026) — a cumulative increase of 47.4%; the hourly wage rose from NT$120 to NT$196, a cumulative increase of 63.3%.¹¹

On January 1, 2026, the monthly minimum wage of NT$29,500 (hourly NT$196) took effect.

Seven months later, on April 29, 2026, at the Ministry of Labor's Model Workers Awards ceremony on the eve of Labor Day, Cho guaranteed once again:

"I can guarantee that next year the minimum wage will definitely exceed NT$30,000."¹²

NT$30,000 was a slogan DPP candidates shouted in 2017; by 2026, it was a specific number the premier was promising for the following year.

For Cho personally, this was also one of the few policies he did not need to coordinate — the minimum wage is set by the Executive Yuan's Minimum Wage Review Committee and is not subject to Legislative Yuan review.¹² This was the only promise he could unilaterally deliver under the triple pressure of a blue-white majority Legislative Yuan, Trump's tariffs, and the arms procurement blockade.

NT$1.25 Trillion and "Three Good Pitches"

In November 2025, the Executive Yuan introduced the "Special Procurement Act for Strengthened Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Capabilities." The budget was NT$1.25 trillion (approximately US$40 billion), spread over eight years.¹³ President Lai Ching-te personally announced it.

Cho Jung-tai publicly broke down the contents of this spending on April 28, 2026:

"The special defense budget has three pieces to the puzzle — none can be missing. Together they form the Taiwan Shield, introduce a high-tech kill chain, and most importantly, achieve autonomous development of defense-related industries. Three good pitches are needed to contain the other side — none can be missing."¹⁴

The "Taiwan Shield" consists of Tiangong missiles, various air defense, anti-ballistic missile, and counter-UAS systems, integrated with existing Patriot and Sky Bow missiles. The "high-tech kill chain" involves integrated combat systems for reconnaissance, target acquisition, decision-making, and strike. "Autonomous development of defense-related industries" means expanding domestic manufacturer capacity through U.S.-Taiwan cooperation and defense drone demand.

But the bill's fate in the Legislative Yuan was highly unfavorable.

From its submission in November 2025 through December 23, 2025, the Legislative Yuan's Procedure Committee, with blue-white legislators leveraging their majority, blocked the NT$1.25 trillion defense special act from being placed on the legislative agenda for the fourth time.¹⁵ KMT Legislator Lo Chih-chiang's argument was: "The one truly blocking the bill is President Lai Ching-te, because President Lai proposed this special act but dares not come to the Legislative Yuan to report and take questions — President Lai himself is blocking the arms procurement."[^^14]

DPP Legislator Wang I-chuan responded: "The KMT says it wants to strengthen the Republic of China's defense, but in reality it dares not schedule the bill — it's laughable."¹⁵

Entering 2026, both sides remained in negotiations. On April 10, during the "Cheng-Li meeting" in Beijing, KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen's five-point proposal included "institutionalizing peaceful cross-strait relations and gradually achieving a 'peace framework'" — Atlantic Council researcher Wenti Sung analyzed that the policy implication of this framing was "slowing defense buildup and reducing U.S. weapons procurement."⁹

Cross-strait relations and arms procurement are two sides of the same structural problem. Cho Jung-tai used the baseball metaphor of "three good pitches" to try to translate this structural issue into something concrete and understandable to most people — but a metaphor is not the same as scoring runs.

Refusal to Co-sign: The Day the Coordinator Pulled Out Article 37

On the afternoon of December 15, 2025, Cho Jung-tai announced that he would refuse to co-sign the Legislative Yuan's revised version of the Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Act.

This was a constitutional first.¹⁶

Article 37 of the Republic of China Constitution stipulates that the president's promulgation of laws and issuance of orders requires the co-signature of the Premier or the Premier together with the relevant ministry heads. "Refusal to co-sign" means the Premier invokes constitutional authority to refuse to endorse a law, preventing it from completing the promulgation process.

Historically, only Hau Pei-tsun had refused to co-sign a personnel matter. Refusal to co-sign legislation was unprecedented.

Cho's reasoning had three layers:

First, the revised Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Act violated the principle of separation of powers;
Second, the legislative process violated principles of procedural transparency and substantive deliberation;
Third, implementation would cause irreversible harm to national development.¹⁶

On December 16, Cho fired back at a press conference: "If the legislature is dissatisfied, it can move a no-confidence vote."¹⁶ The threshold for a no-confidence vote is a proposal co-signed by one-third of legislators, passed by a majority, after which the premier must resign within 10 days. In the end, the blue-white majority in the Legislative Yuan did not actually move a no-confidence vote — this reflected the legislature's political calculation: keeping Cho Jung-tai as premier was more advantageous to the opposition than a no-confidence vote, after which the president would have the right to appoint a new premier and the existing legislative battlefield could be lost.

The "coordinator" had reached a constitutional first. The legislative aide who followed Hsieh Chang-ting into the Taipei City Council in 1987 was, 38 years later, publicly wielding Article 37 of the Constitution as a weapon at a press conference.

A United Daily News editorial described him as "a general in a maze." Critics argued that the refusal to co-sign was the executive and judicial branches ganging up on the legislature, damaging democratic principles. Supporters argued it was the last resort of a majority-opposed government facing bad laws, and was precisely what the constitutional system was designed for. The same act had two completely opposite interpretations, and both were true.

Epilogue: The Coordinator's Stage No Longer Belongs to the Coordinator

On the eve of the lifting of martial law in 1987, Cho Jung-tai followed Hsieh Chang-ting into the Taipei City Council as an aide. He was 28 years old, and no one knew where he would end up. The most likely script was: he would follow Hsieh all the way up, serve as chief of staff when Hsieh ran for president, and retreat to the margins of the system when Hsieh lost.

But after Hsieh's 2008 defeat, he did not run for president again. Cho Jung-tai's career instead developed independently — DPP Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General of the Presidential Office, Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan, party chairman by-election, Premier. Every position required coordination.

His greatest ability was getting people from different factions to sit down and talk, and ensuring his boss's decisions reached all 50 people who needed to hear them.

But the structure of Taiwanese politics after 2024 placed the stage of coordination out of his reach. The blue-white majority Legislative Yuan blocked arms procurement four times; Trump unilaterally decided tariffs; Lai Ching-te drove major decisions like the NT$1.25 trillion budget and the refusal to co-sign. When Cho announced the refusal to co-sign on December 15, 2025, and fired back the following week with "if the legislature is dissatisfied, it can move a no-confidence vote" — this posture was far from the coordinator's habitual move, resembling instead a reflexive action pushed to the structural breaking point.

The aide who followed Hsieh Chang-ting into the city council in 1987, by April 2026, was at a press conference talking about "three good pitches." What he was really saying was the same thing he had always said: coordinators, too, get pushed here by structure, and no one coordinates their way out anymore.

And the blue-white majority in the Legislative Yuan did not actually move a no-confidence vote. Cho Jung-tai remained in that chair.

Further Reading:

• Lai Ching-te — The person who put Cho Jung-tai in the premier's seat, from miner's son to Taiwan's 16th president
• Hsiao Bi-khim — The vice president who handed the official seal to Cho Jung-tai at the May 20, 2024 transfer ceremony, returning from Washington as representative to the U.S.
• Cheng Li-wen — The KMT chairwoman who addressed Xi Jinping in Beijing in April 2026, one of the political opponents behind the blue-white blockade of the NT$1.25 trillion budget
• Taiwan Defense and Military Modernization — The full policy context of Cho Jung-tai's "three good pitches," the NT$1.25 trillion special budget, and the Taiwan Shield
• Taiwan's Diplomatic Allies and International Diplomacy — The 2026 U.S.-Taiwan tariff agreement and Trump's second-term diplomatic framework, the largest external variable facing Cho's cabinet

References