The Great Recall Movement

30-second overview:
In 2025, Taiwan saw its largest-scale "Great Recall" action in history. Civil groups launched petitions and votes targeting 31 KMT legislators and Hsinchu City Mayor Kao Hung-an, against the backdrop of a "minority ruling party, majority opposition" configuration in which the blue-white camp forcefully pushed through multiple bills criticized as loosening restrictions on Chinese capital and expanding legislative power. The first wave of 25 cases on July 26 and the second wave of 7 cases on August 23 were all rejected — although "yes" votes in some constituencies broke the 25% threshold, they failed to exceed "no" votes. The action demonstrated civil society's energy and also highlighted the high threshold and political cost of direct democracy tools under intense polarization. The legislative seat count and political landscape ultimately remained unchanged, but it left behind deep reflections on democratic mechanisms and social dialogue.¹²

In the 1990s, Taiwan's people used the Wild Lily movement to knock open democracy's door; in early 2025, at the square in front of Taipei Main Station and petition stations across the island, an elderly white-haired man trembled as he signed, saying to a volunteer: "I don't want my grandchildren to have to go abroad just to breathe free air." This sentence distilled the feelings of many participants.³

This "Great Recall" movement, spontaneously launched by civil groups across the island, arose from the "minority ruling party, majority opposition" configuration that emerged after the 2024 legislative elections. The KMT and Taiwan People's Party joined forces and used their numerical advantage to repeatedly push controversial bills to "second reading" directly, bypassing substantive review by committees and social dialogue. The most attention-drawing bills included the proposed amendment to Article 29 of the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (criticized for loosening restrictions on Chinese capital entering key industries and diluting the sovereignty tone), the proposed amendment to the Broadcasting and Television Act (involving certain media's return), and the Offshore Islands Development Act among others.⁴⁵

Critics argued these bills packaged "peace dividends" as sovereignty concessions; civil society therefore launched recalls, viewing them as the last tool for protecting the democratic line. The KMT maintained this was political retribution by the ruling party and launched counter-recalls against multiple DPP legislators.⁶

The Fuse: Legislative Imbalance and the "Selling Out Taiwan" Controversy

In early 2025, the power balance within the Legislative Yuan was severely tilted. The KMT and TPP joined forces and repeatedly used their numerical advantage to bypass substantive review, forcibly passing multiple bills involving national security. These included proposed amendments to the Broadcasting and Television Act and provisions loosening Chinese capital participation in Taiwan's infrastructure.⁷

"This is not pragmatism — it is surrender." A law scholar participating in street speeches pointed out that when bills package "peace dividends" beneath sovereignty concessions, Taiwan's democratic line is being hollowed out from the inside. For many Taiwanese, this was no longer simply a blue-green confrontation, but a choice about "survival versus extinction."⁸

Legislative Imbalance and Legislative Controversy

From late 2024 to early 2025, the Legislative Yuan saw repeated "blitzkrieg-style" legislation: under the blue-white camp's numerical advantage, bills were directly pushed to second reading, compressing committee review space. The KMT caucus also proposed extending the legislative session, attempting to dominate budget and bill review. These procedural controversies, combined with specific bill content, motivated civil groups to launch large-scale petitions.⁹

The Counter-Recall Countermeasures

The KMT and TPP launched counter-recalls against DPP legislators, but most failed at the petition stage without reaching a vote. By comparison, the Great Recall had strong citizen self-motivation and a concrete sense of policy crisis; the counter-action was seen as partisan retaliation, lacking sufficient social legitimacy and local organizational momentum.¹⁰

KMT Forged Petition Signatures

Facing the failure of in-system checks and balances, the Taiwanese people activated the last weapon granted by the Constitution — the recall right. This action, dubbed the "Great Recall" by media, precisely targeted those legislators who had been most actively shepherding controversial bills through the Legislative Yuan.¹¹

However, this action also came with enormous controversy. The KMT accused the recall petitions of containing large numbers of "death petition signatures" (i.e., signatures forged in the names of deceased persons) and fabricated name lists. The Central Election Commission reported 41 alleged forgery cases to the Supreme Procuratorate, with cases involving pan-blue legislators accounting for a significant proportion.¹²

"You have already been found guilty and expelled by Taiwanese society." The declaration sent by recall groups on social media platforms echoed the resentment behind hundreds of thousands of petition signatures. This force burned from Taipei's streets to Kaohsiung's night markets; the long lines of people queuing at petition stations became Taiwan's most vivid political landscape in 2025.¹³

The Recall Process and Voting Results

Starting February 2025, more than 1.3 million people participated in petitions. After review by the Central Election Commission, recall cases against 31 KMT legislators and Kao Hung-an were formalized, with votes held in three waves:

• July 26, first wave: 24 KMT legislators + Hsinchu City Mayor Kao Hung-an (25 cases), all rejected.
• August 23, second wave: the remaining 7 KMT legislators, all rejected.¹¹⁴

In some constituencies, "yes" votes broke the 25% threshold of total voters in the original constituency (such as Wang Hung-wei, Hsu Chiao-hsin, Fu Kun-chi and others), but "no" votes were generally higher, even exceeding the vote totals with which some legislators had originally won election. The blue camp successfully mobilized supporters to view the recall as "political persecution"; white camp voters largely voted "no" or abstained, causing the pro-recall side to demonstrate energy without achieving the target.¹⁵

Conclusion: The Democratic Mechanism's Self-Examination

The 2025 "Great Recall" was the largest-scale exercise of direct democracy in Taiwan's history. Although it did not change the Legislative Yuan's seat count, it exposed the operational limits of the system under polarization: the high voting threshold, mobilization costs, and the strong defensive power of "no" votes. After the action ended, social discussion about Legislative Yuan review procedures, cross-party dialogue, and civic participation mechanisms continued to ferment.¹⁶

History records this moment: when representative democracy became imbalanced, Taiwan's people chose to express their views using the recall right granted by the Constitution. Regardless of the outcome, this action itself was proof of the island's democratic resilience — the people continue to write their own story, rather than passively accepting it.

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