2026 Zheng-Xi Meeting: The Ten Minutes of a Decade-Long Reunion Between KMT and CCP Leaders

Ten Minutes in the Fujian Hall

On the afternoon of April 10, 2026, in the Fujian Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The photographers at the door counted the seconds of the handshake between the two protagonists: it was much shorter than the 80-second "handshake of the century" between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping in Singapore in 2015. ¹

The talks inside lasted only about ten minutes. Cheng Li-wen, Chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) and one of the party's representatives in the Legislative Yuan when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in power four months ago, now presented five propositions to Xi Jinping in the name of the "Kuomintang." After listening, Xi Jinping nodded and said that compatriots on both sides of the strait are Chinese. ²

When these ten minutes ended, across the Taiwan Strait from the East China Sea to the South China Sea, approximately 100 PLA Navy and Coast Guard vessels were executing deployments. This number was around 70 at the end of March. ³ International security sources later told Reuters: this might become the "new normal." ⁴

The talks in the Fujian Hall and the 100 ships are two scripts of the same play.

30-Second Overview: On April 10, 2026, KMT Chairman Cheng Li-wen met with Xi Jinping in Beijing, marking the first time a leader of a major political party in the Republic of China has met with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since the 2015 Ma-Xi meeting. Cheng proposed five points including a "peace framework for cross-strait relations" and "returning to the WHA/ICAO," to which Xi responded with the unification narrative that "compatriots on both sides of the strait are Chinese." The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) accused Cheng of not presenting our three major demands, while the AIT reiterated that meaningful cross-strait dialogue must include the elected government. Meanwhile, as the talks proceeded, approximately 100 PLA ships were surrounding Taiwan.

A Person Who Moved from Green Camp to Blue Camp and Then to Beijing

If one person's background is used to reflect the complexity of cross-strait relations in 2026, Cheng Li-wen might be the best choice.

Born in 1969 in Jingzhong Third Village, Tainan, her father was a National Army veteran from Yunnan who came to Taiwan, and her mother was from Yunlin. She grew up in a typical veteran family. ⁵ In 1988, at the age of 19, she joined the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In the post-martial law student movement generation, she stood out for being "daring to speak and show," once advocating for Taiwan independence, and served as Deputy Director of the DPP's Youth Development Department and Deputy Convenor of the National Assembly party group. ⁶

A turning point occurred in 2005. Then-KMT Chairman Lien Chan continuously invited her to cross the boundary. Eventually, she left the DPP and joined the KMT. She subsequently served as KMT Spokesperson, Executive Yuan Spokesperson, and Legislator, remaining active in the blue camp's political commentary circle for twenty years with a "warrior" image.

On October 18, 2025, in a presidential election viewed as a debate on the KMT's direction, Cheng Li-wen defeated former Taipei Mayor Hung Hsiu-chu and Legislator Luo Chih-chiang with 50.15% of the vote to become the KMT Chairman. ⁷ Her campaign slogan was extremely naked: "I am Chinese." A political figure who moved from advocating Taiwan independence to publicly declaring "I am Chinese" was elected chairman of the Republic of China's oldest political party.

Half a year later, she walked into the Fujian Hall with that identity.

The Ma-Xi Meeting Ten Years Ago and What Is Different Today

To understand why the ten minutes on April 10 are worth revisiting, we must first return to another moment ten years ago.

On November 7, 2015, at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore. Then-President of the Republic of China Ma Ying-jeou shook hands with General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping for 80 seconds. This was the first formal meeting between the highest leaders of both sides since the political separation in 1949 -- this "first" took 66 years from the end of the civil war. ⁸

The principles of that meeting were clearly stated by the Ma administration: "equality, dignity," no preset premises, no political negotiations, no signing of agreements, no joint statements, choosing a third location, respecting legislative oversight, no black-box deals. Both sides met as "leaders of Taiwan" and "leaders of the mainland," addressing each other as "Mr." Then-Executive Yuan Premier Mao Chi-kuo's post-meeting interpretation was: "Neither side recognizes the sovereignty of the other, nor denies the governing authority of the other." ⁹

Ten years later, in the Zheng-Xi meeting, every condition has changed.

• Venue: Not a third location, but the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
• Identity: Not "Leader of Taiwan" facing "Leader of the Mainland," but "Chairman of the Kuomintang" facing "General Secretary of the Communist Party of China." This format removes the Republic of China government from the picture. The talks are packaged as "communication between two parties," rather than interaction between two political entities.
• Equality on the rostrum: In 2015, both sides addressed each other as "Mr." In 2026, the titles used were "Chairman Cheng" and "General Secretary Xi" -- these are intra-party titles.
• Aftermath: In 2015, Ma Ying-jeou's first act upon returning to Taiwan was to report to the Legislative Yuan; in 2026, Cheng Li-wen's reporting target is the KMT Central Executive Committee.

In ten years, two political figures from the Republic of China met the same Xi Jinping. The difference is that one went with a national identity, and the other went with a party identity.

Cheng Li-wen's Five Propositions

Cheng Li-wen proposed five propositions during the talks, using her own words: "promote peace through exchanges, enhance development through cooperation": ¹⁰

1. Enhance Taiwan's International Space: Promote Taiwan's return to the World Health Assembly (WHA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and seek opportunities to participate in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), RCEP, CPTPP, etc.
2. Promote Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations: Construct "institutionalized peaceful development of cross-strait relations" through exchanges and cooperation, gradually achieving a "peace framework."
3. Restore Cross-Strait Consultation Mechanism: Restore cross-strait consultations on the basis of the "1992 Consensus," stacking a cycle of goodwill.
4. Maintain Peace and Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Promote practical economic cooperation to enhance public support for cross-strait peace.
5. Exert the Function of the KMT-CCP Communication Platform: Use the party-to-party channel to promote exchanges and cooperation at all levels.

In the Taiwan public opinion arena, these five propositions immediately split into two interpretations.

Supporters say: Cheng finally placed Taiwan's international space issue on the table of highest-level cross-strait dialogue, something the DPP government never achieved -- Lai Ching-te could not sit at that table.

Opponents say: Cheng Li-wen used the term "peace framework" to quietly slide the future cross-strait relationship from "maintaining the status quo" to "final political resolution" -- and the so-called "final political resolution" is the official CCP vocabulary for the unification roadmap. The MAC's six-point statement afterward directly used the sharpest sentence: "Cheng Li-wen's proposed 'peace framework' is actually a 'unification framework'." ¹¹

Both interpretations make sense -- but only one side can represent the position of the Republic of China through legal principles.

Xi Jinping Said Only One Thing

Cheng Li-wen proposed five points; Xi Jinping responded with one theme.

According to the full text of the speech released after the meeting, ¹² Xi Jinping's speech can be compressed into a few sentences:

• Compatriots on both sides of the strait are Chinese, belonging to the Chinese nation.
• The world is currently not peaceful; peace is precious.
• With the common political basis of "adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence," [he is] willing to strengthen exchanges with all political parties in Taiwan.
• National unification is the trend of history; both sides of the strait are "one family" and should jointly be responsible for national rejuvenation.

Comparing the speeches of both sides reveals a phenomenon: Cheng Li-wen proposed five specific things, while Xi Jinping repeated only one principle.

This is not a failure of dialogue; this is an asymmetry of dialogue. The five propositions are tactics; one principle is strategy. Tactics can be bargained over; strategy can only be accepted or rejected as a whole. Xi Jinping did not need to respond to Cheng's "return to WHA" or "restore two-party consultations"; he only needed to confirm one thing: Do you acknowledge that we are "one family"?

As long as "one family" is tacitly accepted by both sides, all remaining specific matters can be "comprehensively and positively studied." This is why the CCP official media emphasized after the meeting that "regarding the propositions and expectations raised by Cheng Li-wen, every item can be positively facilitated" -- because the premise has already been established, and details become technical issues. ¹³

MAC Vice Chairman Liang Wen-jie's summary afterward was very concise: "We repeatedly asked Cheng Li-wen to present Taiwan's people's three major demands to Xi Jinping -- acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China, respect the will of the Taiwan people, and stop military aircraft and warship harassment. Unfortunately, the Chairwoman did not mention any of them." ¹⁴

Reactions in Taipei and Washington

Within four hours after the talks ended, three messages were sent from different directions.

Executive Yuan: The signal conveyed by the Zheng-Xi meeting is that China attempts to incorporate Taiwan into the "One China framework" through party interactions, laying a political foundation for so-called "peaceful unification." 23 million Taiwanese people will not accept this. ¹⁵

Lai Ching-te (Facebook): "History tells us that compromising with authoritarian regimes only sacrifices sovereignty and democracy, bringing neither freedom nor peace." ¹⁶ He顺势 called on the KMT to support his national defense special budget.

American Institute in Taiwan (AIT): Meaningful cross-strait exchanges require unconditional dialogue between Beijing and Taiwan's elected leadership, and should also communicate with all political parties. ¹⁷ Translated into plain language: You can talk with the opposition party, but talking only with the opposition party has no significance for the status quo of the Taiwan Strait.

Placing these three reactions together outlines three different endpoints of cross-strait interaction in 2026. Beijing wants to bypass Lai Ching-te; Washington demands Lai Ching-te be put back on the table; and Taipei's administrative system is already prepared to treat the entire event as "unification warfare behavior."

After returning to Taipei, Cheng Li-wen accepted media interviews, emphasizing that Xi Jinping's response was "particularly positive" and that he mentioned "every item can be comprehensively and positively studied." ¹⁸ But the MAC also fired back with one sentence: "They can flip their faces at any time; it is difficult to expect [anything]." ¹⁹

100 Ships, No Rest

During the ten-minute talks in the Fujian Hall in Beijing, and for the entire day after they ended, the Taiwan Strait did not quiet down.

According to Reuters citing international security sources, the number of PLA Navy and Coast Guard vessels deployed between the East China Sea and the South China Sea increased from approximately 70 at the end of March to approximately 100 during the week of the talks. ²⁰ This number is noteworthy because its timing was not a typical military exercise cycle, nor a response to a specific provocation -- it was simply there.

The judgment of international security sources: This may become the "new normal." The so-called new normal means that the background noise of the Taiwan Strait is no longer "China is not here," but "China's 80-100 ships are always here."

This forms an absurd parallel scene with the ten-minute talks. What was discussed in the talks was "promoting peaceful development of cross-strait relations"; the scene outside the talks was "deploying 100 combat vessels in peacetime." When peace becomes an issue to be discussed, warships become the background, instead becoming a common sense that does not need to be discussed.

The Void Before the Trump-Xi Meeting

Why did this meeting happen in early April 2026?

Asian affairs analyst Yin, interviewed by US NPR, offered an interpretation of this timing: Cheng Li-wen's "peace journey" occurred before Trump's expected visit to China. Her strategy is to use Taiwan society's anxiety about the uncertainty of the Trump administration to promote a "more risk-averse, more centrist" strategic choice for Taiwan. ²¹

Song Wendi of the Atlantic Council offers another perspective: Cheng Li-wen's talk of "institutional arrangements to prevent war," translated into plain language, is actually the policy direction of "slowing down national defense military building, buying fewer US weapons." ²²

Adding the views of the two analysts points to a judgment: The true target audience of the Zheng-Xi meeting is neither in Beijing nor in Taipei, but in Washington. Xi Jinping wants to demonstrate before the Trump-Xi meeting that "Taiwan's internal opposition to protecting Taiwan is not a solid block"; Cheng Li-wen wants to send a signal to Washington that "the United States is not Taiwan's only option."

These ten minutes of the Zheng-Xi meeting are a performance for a third party.

Ending: The Dual Scripts of Peace and Force

Ten years have passed, separated by one US President, a semiconductor war, and three Taiwan Strait crises.

The 2015 Ma-Xi meeting was symmetrical -- the current highest leaders of two countries shook hands for 80 seconds, addressing each other as "Mr." This was an era when both sides of the strait were still willing to pretend they were equal. The 2026 Zheng-Xi meeting is asymmetrical -- the Republic of China government was not present; the KMT opposition chairman was present; one proposed five specific propositions, the other repeated one unification premise.

Cheng Li-wen went to Beijing with five propositions, but the talks lasted only ten minutes; the moment she said "peace framework," 100 Chinese ships were surrounding Taiwan. Peace is the script; force is the stage direction.

The five propositions Cheng Li-wen brought back to Taiwan will be discussed, disputed, and digested. But after the talks ended, those 100 ships remained in the Taiwan Strait -- they do not discuss, do not dispute, do not digest. They are just there.

This is the reality of cross-strait relations in 2026: What is discussed at the negotiation table is peace; what is placed under the table is gunpowder. Peace is spoken because gunpowder is brought in; gunpowder is allowed to stay on site because peace is still being spoken. The two scripts explain each other; neither can exist alone, and neither truly believes the other.

Singapore in 2015 was a handshake; Beijing in 2026 is a play. Who is this play for? Perhaps for Trump, perhaps for the 23 million Taiwanese people, perhaps for history. But when the play ends and the lights come on, what remains is 100 ships -- and the answer that changes every ten minutes: Where is Taiwan going?

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Further Reading:

• Taiwan Strait Crises and the Development of Cross-Strait Relations — The seventy-year history of cross-strait interaction from 1949 to 2016; the Zheng-Xi meeting is just the latest chapter in this long river.
• Taiwan Political Environment and Electoral System — To understand "why Cheng Li-wen," one must first understand the intra-party line debate of the KMT 2025 Chairmanship Election.
• Taiwan's Democratic Transition — Why does the AIT emphasize "dialogue with elected leadership"? The foundation of this principle lies here.
• Taiwan's National Defense and Military Modernization — Behind Cheng's "institutional arrangements to prevent war" is the political offensive and defensive of the national defense budget.
• Lai Ching-te — The other protagonist of this play, the one deliberately kept out of the frame.
• Cheng Li-wen — From the student movement girl who went on a hunger strike for Taiwan independence at the NTU gate in 1988, to the KMT Chairman who said "compatriots on both sides of the strait are Chinese" in Beijing in 2026.
• Han Kuo-yu — Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, the host of the Legislative Yuan budget negotiations this week of the Zheng-Xi meeting; another key character in this play.
• Taiwan and Eswatini — Lai Ching-te's diplomatic discourse during his visit to allied countries in the same period, the juxtaposition of "The Republic of China (Taiwan) is a sovereign country belonging to the world" and "compatriots on both sides of the strait are Chinese."

References

1. Historical Review! The 2015 Ma-Xi Meeting Handshake Lasted 80 Seconds - Yahoo News — Yahoo News compiled historical footage and time details of the 2015 Singapore Ma-Xi meeting, including the official principle of addressing each other as "Mr." and the record of the 80-second handshake.↩
2. Zheng-Xi Meeting Ends, Cheng Li-wen: Proposed 5 Propositions Including Enhancing Taiwan's International Space - CNA — CNA's on-site record of the pre- and post-meeting process of the Zheng-Xi meeting, listing Cheng Li-wen's five propositions and Xi Jinping's response points verbatim; it is the first-hand record of the official news agency.↩
3. Zheng-Xi Meeting Shouts Peace, Reuters: 100 Chinese Ships Surrounding Taiwan Will Become "New Normal" - Liberty Times Net — Liberty Times Net cited Reuters reporting, detailing the deployment timeline and scale changes of CCP ships increasing from 70 at the end of March to about 100 during Cheng Li-wen's visit to China.↩
4. China's Xi meets Taiwan opposition leader ahead of key summit with Trump - NPR — In-depth analysis from US Public Radio, including Asian affairs analyst Yin's judgment that Cheng Li-wen's strategy is "hedging / middling," and Xi Jinping's consideration of the timing.↩
5. Cheng Li-wen - Wikipedia — Wikipedia records Cheng Li-wen's family background, birthplace, parents' ancestral homes, and growth environment, as well as her political path from the DPP to the KMT.↩
6. Who is Cheng Li-wen? What are her studies, experience, and stories? - KidsMedia — KidsMedia's special article compiles Cheng Li-wen's annual positions and turning points from the DPP Youth Development Department to KMT Spokesperson, Executive Yuan Spokesperson, and Legislator.↩
7. Cheng Li-wen Breaks Through with Warrior Image, Green Camp Background Elected KMT Chairman - CNA — CNA reported the vote counting results of the 12th KMT Chairmanship Election on October 18, 2025. Cheng Li-wen defeated Hung Hsiu-chu and Luo Chih-chiang with 50.15% of the vote, becoming the second female chairman elected directly in KMT history.↩
8. Cross-Strait Leaders' Meetings - Wikipedia — The Wikipedia entry "Cross-Strait Leaders' Meetings" records the historical context of the 2015 Ma-Xi meeting, the background of 66 years of political separation, and the details of the meeting at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore.↩
9. Ma-Xi Meeting / Ma Ying-jeou's Full Speech Calls for Revitalizing China and Expanding Cross-Strait Exchanges - ETtoday — ETtoday recorded Ma Ying-jeou's full speech at the 2015 Singapore Ma-Xi meeting on November 7, as well as Mao Chi-kuo's post-meeting official interpretation of "neither side recognizes the sovereignty of the other, nor denies the governing authority of the other."↩
10. Cheng Li-wen Proposes Taiwan's Return to Participate in International Organizations, Xi Jinping: Highly Values, Actively Considers - United Daily News — United Daily News compiled the original text of Cheng Li-wen's five propositions, including the specific listing of returning to WHA, ICAO, CPTPP, and Xi Jinping's positive response record of "highly values, actively considers."↩
11. MAC: Cheng Li-wen's "Peace Framework" Is "Unification Framework" - ETtoday — The MAC's six-point official statement released afterward directly interpreted Cheng's proposed "peace framework" as a technical packaging of the unification framework, representing the official position of the Executive Yuan system.↩
12. [Zheng-Xi Meeting] Xi Jinping's Full Speech Exposed, Proposes Conditions for Cross-Strait Peaceful Exchange - Newtalk News](https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2026-04-10/1029065) — Newtalk News exposed Xi Jinping's full speech at the Zheng-Xi meeting, including the core expression of "compatriots on both sides of the strait are Chinese" and the prerequisite conditions of "adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence."↩
13. Zheng-Xi Meeting CCTV: Xi Jinping Proposes "Four Adherences" to Point the Direction for Cross-Strait Relations - United Daily News — The CCP official media CCTV's official interpretation of the Zheng-Xi meeting, including Xi Jinping's "Four Adherences" discourse structure and the CCP's statement on the strategic significance of the meeting.↩
14. MAC: What Cheng Li-wen Was Asked to Say "Was Not Said at All," Repeatedly Echoing the Mainland - ETtoday — ETtoday cited MAC Vice Chairman Liang Wen-jie's direct criticism of the Zheng-Xi meeting, pointing out that Cheng Li-wen did not present Taiwan's three major demands to Xi Jinping (acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China, respect Taiwan's will, stop military aircraft and warship harassment).↩
15. Zheng-Xi Meeting Ends, Executive Yuan: Incorporating Taiwan into One China Framework, 23 Million People Will Not Accept - United Daily News — United Daily News compiled the Executive Yuan's four-point official statement on the Zheng-Xi meeting, positioning the meeting as CCP's unification warfare behavior to incorporate Taiwan into the "One China framework" through party interactions.↩
16. Taiwan opposition leader calls for 'reconciliation' after meeting Xi - Al Jazeera — Al Jazeera English report, recording Lai Ching-te's Facebook statement "compromising with authoritarian regimes only sacrifices sovereignty and democracy" and Atlantic Council analyst Wen-ti Sung's interpretation.↩
17. Meaningful cross-strait ties require dialogue with Taiwan's gov't: AIT - Focus Taiwan — CNA English version Focus Taiwan recorded the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)'s formal response to the Zheng-Xi meeting, emphasizing that meaningful cross-strait dialogue requires unconditional dialogue between Beijing and Taiwan's elected leadership.↩
18. Cheng Li-wen Reveals "Xi Jinping Positive Response," MAC: Flipping Faces at Any Time Is Difficult to Expect - ETtoday — ETtoday recorded Cheng Li-wen's description of Xi Jinping as "particularly positive" when accepting media interviews after the meeting, and the MAC's rebuttal response of "flipping faces at any time."↩
19. Responding to Zheng-Xi Meeting, MAC 6-Point Statement: Cheng Li-wen's Proposed Peace Framework Is "Unification Framework" - United Daily News — United Daily News compiled the content of the MAC's six-point official statement on the Zheng-Xi meeting, including the direct deconstruction and critical stance of the "peace framework" vocabulary packaging.↩
20. China's Xi meets Taiwan opposition leader ahead of key summit with Trump - NPR — NPR synthesized international security sources' judgments, pointing out that the deployment timeline and scale of CCP ships increasing from 70 at the end of March to 100 may become the "new normal" for the Taiwan Strait.↩
21. China's Xi meets Taiwan opposition leader ahead of key summit with Trump - KPBS — KPBS Public Media recorded NPR analyst Yin's commentary, pointing out that Cheng Li-wen's visit to China timing was to use Taiwan society's anxiety about the Trump administration to promote a "more centrist" strategic choice.↩
22. Taiwan opposition leader calls for 'reconciliation' after meeting Xi - Al Jazeera — Al Jazeera cited Atlantic Council Global China Hub researcher Wen-ti Sung's analysis, pointing out that Cheng Li-wen's "institutional arrangements to prevent war" actually implies slowing down national defense military building and reducing US weapons procurement.↩