Withdrawal from the United Nations: The 17 Minutes in 1971 When Taiwan Went from “China” to International Orphan

Late at night on October 25, 1971, in the United Nations General Assembly hall in New York, Republic of China foreign minister Chou Shu-kai finished reading a statement, turned, and stepped down from the green marble podium. The entire delegation then filed out. From entering the chamber to leaving it, less than 20 minutes had passed¹. Half an hour later, Resolution 2758 passed by 76 votes to 35. “The representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” were expelled, and the People’s Republic of China formally took over the China seat. Taiwan, which had been a founding member of the United Nations, with Chiang Kai-shek having signed the instrument of ratification for the UN Charter in Chongqing on August 24, 1945², became an outsider to international organizations overnight.

Understand it in 30 seconds: On the surface, this was the Republic of China’s tragic exit under the doctrine that “the Han and the bandits cannot coexist” — the Nationalist claim that the ROC and the Chinese Communist regime could not both be legitimate. In reality, Chiang Kai-shek had already accepted a “two Chinas” compromise by early 1971, and the U.S. State Department even praised Taiwan for showing “extraordinary flexibility”³. The real turning point was Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July of that year. While officials in Taipei and Washington were still in the dark, Kissinger had already shown his hand to Zhou Enlai: the United States would not sincerely fight to keep Taiwan in the United Nations. Half a century later, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, and the Netherlands have successively stated that the words “Taiwan” do not appear anywhere in Resolution 2758.

From Founding Member to the Battle for the Seat

The Republic of China was a founding member of the United Nations and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. On June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, T. V. Soong signed the UN Charter on behalf of the Republic of China, the first representative to do so; on August 24 of the same year, Chiang Kai-shek signed the instrument of ratification in Chongqing².

The problem emerged after 1949: the People’s Republic of China was established in Beijing, and the Republic of China government retreated to Taiwan, but both sides claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of “China.” Beginning in the 1950s, the UN General Assembly argued every year over “China’s representation.” In 1961, the United States introduced the “Important Question” proposal, classifying any “change in Chinese representation” as an “important question” that required a two-thirds majority to pass, thereby blocking Beijing³.

Former foreign minister George Yeh had a famous analogy: “The ‘one China’ policy is like painting the floor of a room — when you finish painting, you have backed yourself out of the room.”⁴ That prediction came true in 1970. At the 25th UN General Assembly that year, Albania’s proposal to “expel us and admit the bandits” won a simple majority for the first time, 51 to 49. The Republic of China kept its seat only because the two-thirds threshold imposed by the “Important Question” proposal still stood in the way³.

The warning light was already flashing red.

Chiang Kai-shek’s Wavering: Two Chinas in the Diary

Scholars long attributed the withdrawal from the United Nations to Chiang Kai-shek’s stubborn insistence that “the Han and the bandits cannot coexist.” But after Academia Historica opened the Chiang Kai-shek diaries and diplomatic files in 2010, the historical picture was rewritten.

Wang Hao, a scholar who studied these files, points out that on December 16, 1970, Chiang Kai-shek clearly instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a National Security Council meeting to study all relevant UN rules and “make the greatest effort to preserve our lawful status in the United Nations, but also prepare for the worst-case scenario of withdrawing from the United Nations”³. At a diplomatic meeting on December 31, he told assembled ambassadors even more explicitly that he did not oppose studying a “dual representation” formula, but that the permanent seat on the Security Council had to be preserved³.

In other words, “the Han and the bandits cannot coexist” was a strategy for maintaining legal orthodoxy domestically and negotiating with the United States; privately, Chiang had already accepted “two Chinas” psychologically. But his red line was the Security Council seat, which represented the legal symbol of the Republic of China as a “great power.”

On May 26, 1971, Vice President Yen Chia-kan presided over a National Security Council meeting on Chiang’s behalf. National Security Council secretary-general Huang Shao-ku and foreign minister Chou Shu-kai proposed a startling shift: if a diplomatic ally wanted to establish relations with Beijing, the ROC could maintain diplomatic relations with that country as long as three conditions were met: it did not recognize the Chinese Communist regime as China’s sole legitimate government, it did not implicate Taiwan as ROC territory, and it continued to recognize the ROC government as the government of the Republic of China rather than a “Taiwan government”³. In substance, this accepted a “two Chinas” arrangement. Chiang Ching-kuo said on the spot that the proposal “needed further thought.”

Chiang’s diary also reveals his inner torment. He wrote that the ancient teachings of serving as “a pillar in midstream” and “fighting alone” meant a “glorious isolation.” A few days later, he revised this into: “The diplomacy of a weak country cannot avoid being firm within and rounded without. One should have firm decisions in mind, but when the time for implementation has not yet arrived, one must adapt as circumstances require”³. On May 27, he was diagnosed with an enlarged heart. In mid-June he formally fell ill and did not recover until late July — a gap that coincided exactly with Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing.

Dual Representation: The Road Not Taken

In early 1971, the Nixon administration formally proposed the “dual representation” plan: the People’s Republic of China would receive the permanent Security Council seat, while the Republic of China would retain its membership in the General Assembly⁵. On April 23, Nixon sent special envoy Robert Murphy to meet Chiang Kai-shek. To get Chiang’s assent, Murphy made a unilateral promise that he “would cause the Republic of China to retain its Security Council seat” — a promise that plainly exceeded his instructions and authorization from the White House³.

Chiang Kai-shek finally relented. But he warned Murphy that if the Security Council seat were stripped away, he would have “no choice but to prefer shattered jade to an intact tile.”

The problem was that Murphy had no authority to make that promise. On May 27, Nixon spoke candidly to Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers: “I’d just as soon go down fighting on principle and let them get the hell out.” Kissinger suggested something more insidious: another way to be “defeated” was to delay without deciding, then in the end pretend to take a “two Chinas” position and fail — “which would also show that we had made every effort”³.

This delaying strategy ultimately worked. It “deceived Rogers and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations George H. W. Bush, and it deceived Taiwan’s diplomats, as well as many later historians”³. Bush was then a sincere advocate of the dual representation plan, lobbying furiously for votes in the General Assembly until the final moment. He did not know he was being used⁶.

Kissinger’s July: A Knife in the Back

On the afternoon of July 1, 1971, on the eve of his secret trip to Beijing, Kissinger spoke with Shen Jianhong, the Republic of China’s ambassador to the United States. Kissinger vowed: “President Nixon’s friendship toward my president and my government is extremely deep… His determination to do his utmost to preserve our seat in the General Assembly is beyond doubt. President Nixon also absolutely will not consider any measure that would cause us to lose the Security Council seat; on this point, please be at ease.”³

Ten days later, what Kissinger told Zhou Enlai in Beijing meant the exact opposite.

From July 9 to 11, Kissinger feigned a stomachache in Pakistan and secretly flew to Beijing to meet Zhou Enlai. According to the later declassified record of the conversation⁷, Kissinger took the initiative to reveal to Zhou the bottom line of the U.S. “complex dual representation” plan: Beijing could enter the United Nations by a simple majority and obtain the Security Council seat, but expelling the Republic of China would require a two-thirds majority. He promised Zhou: “Once China enters the United Nations, then obtaining a two-thirds vote to expel Taiwan is only a matter of time; the key is that both the United States and China understand this arrangement, reach a tacit understanding, and wait patiently.”³

Zhou Enlai was unimpressed: “We have already waited 21 years.” He also warned: “Taiwan will also oppose it, and opposition will come from all directions.” Kissinger raised his hands in surrender and admitted that this “is a very good way to end this problem”³.

On July 15, Nixon publicly announced Kissinger’s visit to China. Small and medium-sized countries that had still been waiting to see what would happen changed their positions one after another. From October 20 to 26, while the General Assembly was debating China’s representation, where was Kissinger? In Beijing again — this time on a public visit, laying the groundwork for Nixon’s visit to China the following year⁸. Taipei diplomats described the situation this way: “We were fighting bloodily on the front line, while our ally was drinking tea in the enemy’s capital.”

Years later, former vice foreign minister Fredrick Chien said bluntly in an interview: “The United States would rather sacrifice the Republic of China in order to court the Chinese Communists.”⁹

The 17 Minutes: Chou Shu-kai Steps Down

The agenda on October 25 was highly dramatic.

That afternoon, Saudi representative Jamil Baroody proposed a compromise: Beijing would receive the Security Council seat, while Taiwan would remain in the General Assembly under the name “Republic of Taiwan,” pending the two sides’ own resolution of their differences⁷. Had this proposal passed, Taiwan’s fate might have been entirely different. But the Republic of China delegation insisted on “one China” and did not actively fight for it; the proposal was shelved.

At 9:47 p.m., the “Important Question” proposal was put to a vote and defeated, 55 to 59. At that moment, the battle was decided.

Chou Shu-kai immediately raised his hand to request the floor. He walked to the podium and read a prepared statement: “The Republic of China has decided to withdraw from the United Nations, which it itself helped to create.” He then led Liu Chieh, then the permanent representative to the United Nations, and the other members of the delegation out of the chamber¹¹⁰.

At 10:25 p.m., Resolution 2758 was put to a vote: 76 in favor, 35 against, 17 abstentions, and 3 absent. The resolution contained only four short paragraphs. Its key sentence was: it “decides to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China… and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.”¹¹

It is worth noting that the words “Taiwan” do not appear anywhere in the resolution, nor does it define the territorial scope of “China”¹¹. This became the spark for the international legal controversy of the next 50 years.

Chiang Kai-shek’s “Message to Compatriots Nationwide” and the Shock on the Island

In the early morning of October 26, Chiang Kai-shek issued the “Message to Compatriots Nationwide on the Republic of China’s Withdrawal from the United Nations”: “Our country, on the basis of the position that ‘the Han and the bandits cannot coexist’ and in order to uphold the dignity of the Charter… has no choice but to announce with pain its withdrawal from the United Nations, which it participated with hardship in creating.”¹² The eight-character slogan at the end, “be solemn and self-strengthening; face change without fear,” would be printed in textbooks and carved at school gates for the next 30 years.

But the shock inside Taiwan was far harsher than the official language suggested. National Taiwan University College of Law alumni Hung San-hsiung and Chen Ling-yu recalled: “When the news reached the country, the dream of ‘counterattacking the mainland and rescuing our compatriots’ collapsed all at once, let alone the fact that ‘the Han and the bandits cannot coexist’ could only be empty words.”¹³ This setback directly ignited the National Taiwan University student movement and the “Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement” between 1971 and 1973. Students began to question the party-state mythology, and many later leaders of the tangwai, or non-KMT opposition, and democratic movements received their political awakening in this storm.

In his 2021 book 1971: The Myth of the United Nations, Yao Chia-wen stated bluntly that Chiang Kai-shek “would rather be expelled than represent Taiwan” — if he had accepted the Baroody proposal and remained under the name “Taiwan,” Taiwan’s later international position would have been completely different¹⁴. But Wang Hao’s research argues that the real problem was that Nixon and Kissinger had already decided to sacrifice Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek “could not have saved it no matter how flexible he became” — this was a story of two national leaders joining hands to dispose of an ally³.

Echoes 50 Years Later: What Did Resolution 2758 Actually Say?

The consequences of the withdrawal from the United Nations unfolded like falling dominoes. From 1971 to 1979, the number of countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of China plummeted from 68 to only 22; Japan severed ties in 1972, and the United States did so in 1979¹⁵. Taiwan was excluded from the WHO, ICAO, and Interpol, and even its passports were often misunderstood.

Since the 2020s, however, the international community has begun to reexamine Resolution 2758.

Beginning in 2024, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Parliament, Australia, the Netherlands, and others successively passed resolutions or issued statements explicitly stating that Resolution 2758 addressed only “China’s representation,” did not address “Taiwan’s political status,” and did not authorize China to represent Taiwan¹⁶. On April 23, 2025, the United States publicly criticized China at the UN Security Council for “distorting” Resolution 2758 for the first time; on May 5, the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, formally confirming this position in domestic law¹⁷.

Return to those 17 minutes in 1971: Chou Shu-kai’s steps down from the podium locked Taiwan into half a century of international constraint. But the text of the resolution itself did not shut the door completely. The gray zone left in the gap is precisely the space that Taiwan’s diplomats are working to hold open today.

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