Taiwan's Political Landscape and Electoral System

30-Second Overview: The political system of Taiwan is a paradigm for global democratic transition; from the martial law era of the 1980s, it has evolved into one of Asia's freest democracies. Through the "semi-presidential" central government structure and the "mixed member proportional" electoral technique combining regional representation and party proportionality, Taiwan has established an active political ecosystem (Presidential election turnout has historically been 70-75%, with Legislative Council and nine-in-one local elections around 60-66%). The breakthroughs of the Blue and White parties at the end of 2023, Lai Ching-te's victory in the 2024 tripartite competition, controversies surrounding the 2024 legislative reform bills and Constitutional Review No. 9, the Legislative Yuan's rejection of Supreme Court justice nominations, and the wave of large-scale recall efforts in 2025 have continuously tested constitutional resilience.

I. Constitutional Structure: Separation of Powers and Dual Executive System

The governmental structure of Taiwan originates from the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC), which has evolved into the current Semi-Presidentialism, also known as the dual executive system, after seven key amendments.¹ The President is directly elected by all citizens every four years and is responsible for national defense, foreign affairs, and cross-Strait relations. The President holds the direct appointment power over the Premier of the Executive Yuan (without needing approval from the Legislative Yuan). The Premier is appointed by the President, and heads of various ministries are nominated by the Premier to the President for appointment; the Executive Yuan must be accountable to the Legislative Yuan, and the Premier must resign if the Legislative Yuan passes a vote of no confidence. The Legislative Yuan is a unicameral legislature responsible for legal review, budget auditing, and oversight of the government.

The constitutional design includes the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan, forming a separation of powers structure. However, in practical operation, Taiwan has gradually converged toward the core functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The existence and functional adjustment of the Examination Yuan and Control Yuan remain long-standing topics of constitutional amendment debate in Taiwan, but there are currently no formal amendments in process. Academic debates regarding "whether semi-presidentialism is suitable for Taiwan" continue—constitutional scholars such as Wu Yu-shan and Lin Chi-wen point out that the structural problems inherent in semi-presidentialism are evident during periods of small opposition and large ruling parties.

II. Electoral Mechanisms: The Technology Determining National Direction

Taiwan has a very high frequency of elections, primarily divided into two systems: "National Public Official Elections" and "Local Public Official Elections," which typically alternate every two years.²

The presidential election uses a "plurality system" (relative majority), with no second round; the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected. This often results in high levels of party mobilization and strategic abstention in Taiwanese presidential elections. The Legislative Yuan has 113 seats, utilizing a "single-member district, two-vote system" (mixed member proportional): 73 regional legislators are elected by single-member districts; 34 members from multi-member constituencies are selected based on party lists, with a 5% threshold designed to introduce experts and minority group representatives; and 6 indigenous legislators are elected via "multi-member district" systems for plains and mountain indigenous peoples.

At the local level, the "nine-in-one election," held every four years, simultaneously re-elects nine types of officials, including county/city mayors, council members, and village heads, serving as an indicator of grassroots opinion. Local governments possess a high degree of autonomy in areas such as taxation, land management, and social welfare, making the policy experiments across different counties and cities a testing ground for reform nationwide.

III. Political Environment: From Binary Opposition to Issue-Oriented Politics

Taiwan's political environment is heavily squeezed by both historical memory and international status. Traditionally divided along the fault lines of "national identity" and "cross-Strait policy," the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Green) and the Kuomintang (KMT, Blue) have been the main parties, creating a political habit of "Blue vs. Green confrontation." However, as younger voters pay more attention to domestic issues such as housing, low wages, and energy, third forces like the Taiwan People's Party (founded by Ko Wen-je in 2019, with Huang Kuo-chang succeeding as party chairman) have begun challenging the binary politics, leading to a structural loosening of the political map.

Stratification of the Sovereignty Spectrum

The "Blue vs. Green" dichotomy oversimplifies Taiwan's national identity spectrum. A more nuanced stratification in practice includes: Pro-unification factions (advocating for cross-Strait unification, represented by the New Party and Labor Party); Taiwan proponents (supporting the status quo of the ROC in Taiwan, mainstream KMT); China-independent factions (viewing the ROC as an already independent state, a lineage within the DPP); and Taiwan independence advocates (advocating for statehood separate from the ROC, some factions within the DPP and minor parties). Younger generations often self-identify as "natural Taiwanese" or simply "Taiwanese," showing a significant gap compared to older generations who identify as "Chinese" or "both."

The Blue-White Breakthrough at the End of 2023

In November 2023, the KMT Hou Yu-ih camp and the Taiwan People's Party Ko Wen-je camp attempted negotiations for a "Blue-White alliance" ahead of the 2024 election, hoping to jointly promote a non-Green candidate. The two sides held a public meeting at the Grand Hyatt Taipei on November 23, with Guo Tai-ming present, but the talks broke down over disagreements regarding "polling methodology" and "the configuration of presidential and vice-presidential candidates." On the following day, November 24, was the registration deadline, and both sides registered separately. The breakdown of the Blue-White alliance was a key prerequisite for the 2024 election result (Lai Ching-te's victory in the tripartite competition).

Taiwan possesses active civil monitoring energy. g0v Zero-Hour Government promotes government transparency through civic technology, making budgets and laws visible. Taiwan also has relatively low thresholds for recall and referendum mechanisms, subjecting politicians to direct public scrutiny at any time. This tool of direct democracy was fully mobilized during the large-scale recall wave in 2025.

IV. Post-2024 Election: Constitutional Tests Amidst Small Opposition and Large Ruling Parties

On January 13, 2024, the presidential and legislative elections were held on the same day. The DPP's Lai Ching-te was elected with 40% of the vote in a tripartite competition (the previous three-way contest was in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian won with 39.3%), but the DPP secured only 51 seats in the Legislative Yuan, falling short of the majority threshold (57 seats).³ The KMT obtained 52 seats, and the Taiwan People's Party gained 8 seats, giving the two parties a combined majority of 60 seats in the legislature. Han Kuo-yu was inaugurated as the Chairman of the 11th Legislative Yuan on February 1, 2024. Lai Ching-te took office as the 16th President on May 20, 2024.

In May and June 2024, the opposition majority in the Legislative Yuan (KMT + Taiwan People's Party) pushed forward the "Legislative Reform Bill," which included controversial clauses such as expanding the investigative powers of the legislature, hearings, and immediate presidential intelligence reporting, raising concerns about government unconstitutionality and triggering large-scale public protests (the Qingniao movement). The bill was eventually subjected to constitutional review requested by President Lai Ching-te and the DPP caucus. On October 25, 2024, the Constitutional Court issued Judgment No. 9 of Year 113, ruling several clauses unconstitutional, famously known as "Constitutional Review 113 No. 9."

The crisis in Supreme Court nominations was the most severe constitutional challenge during this period. In October 2024, 7 out of the 15 justices on the Constitutional Court had reached the end of their terms (including incumbent Chairman Hsu Tsung-li and Vice-Chairman Tsai Shih-tun). Lai Ching-te nominated 7 replacements in August 2024, but the Legislative Yuan unanimously rejected them on December 24, 2024, leaving the Constitutional Court operating for a long time with only 8 members. The Legislative Yuan subsequently amended the Act on Constitutional Litigation to raise the threshold calculation for the total number of justices, further squeezing the operational space of the Constitutional Court and leading to subsequent debates over constitutional efficacy.⁴

In 2025, the DPP and civil society organizations launched large-scale recall actions against several opposition legislators, known as the "Great Recall Wave." Multiple recall cases crossed the signature threshold and entered the voting stage, becoming the largest simultaneous recall action in Taiwanese democratic history, once again testing the procedural design of the recall system.⁵

V. Challenges and Resilience

Information warfare is a long-standing external pressure on Taiwan's democracy. Due to geopolitical influences, Taiwan often becomes a testing ground for disinformation attacks from abroad, forcing the government and civil society to cooperate in developing fact-checking mechanisms, and media literacy education has become part of school curricula.

Constitutional deadlock is an internal challenge. When the presidential party differs from the legislative majority party (small opposition/large ruling party), budget review and policy promotion face tension. Taiwan's constitutional amendment threshold is extremely high; a valid consent vote by citizens must exceed half of the total electorate⁶, which makes it difficult for some outdated regulations to adjust quickly with changing times.

The resilience of Taiwanese democracy stems from its decentralized design, as well as the high level of civic engagement in politics. Every constitutional crisis is accompanied by gatherings in public squares and mobilization on social media; this bottom-up pressure is a vital defense line in Taiwan's democratic operation.

References

Further Reading

• Taiwan's National Defense and Military Modernization — How small opposition/large ruling parties affects defense policy in practice
• Taiwan's Diplomatic Relations and International Diplomacy — How party differences extend to fluctuations in diplomatic routes
• 2026 Zheng-Shi Meeting: Ten Minutes of Leaders from KMT and DPP Meet After a Decade — The ideological debate during the KMT presidential election in 2025
• Ji Lin Lian — Retired general serving as Vice Chairman of the KMT; the structural issues of the Huang Fu-xing Party revealed at the 2026 Central Standing Committee meeting
• Great Recall — The Great Recall Wave in 2025, where all 33 cases failed, a first national-scale test of the recall system under the small opposition/large ruling party structure.