Resolution on Taiwan's Future: The Two Words “Currently” Sustained for Twenty‑Seven Years

30‑second overview: On 8 May 1999, the Democratic Progressive Party passed the Resolution on Taiwan's Future in Kaohsiung, completing a policy shift with the sentence “Taiwan, although presently called the Republic of China under the current constitution, is not subordinate to the People’s Republic of China.” Lin Zhuoshui’s insertion of the two characters “currently” made pro‑independence activists think “there will be a chance to change it later,” while centrist voters felt “the DPP has accepted the status quo.” This document opened the door to the first party‑rotation in 2000 and has formed the underlying discourse on cross‑strait relations for the subsequent twenty‑seven years; to this day, no one dares to clarify its ambiguity.

In early spring 1999, Guo Zhengliang received a task: draft a new cross‑strait stance document for the DPP. President Chen Shui‑bian, through then‑party secretary‑general Yu Hsi‑kun, pushed for a direction that would replace “Taiwan Republic” in the pro‑independence platform with “Republic of China,” aiming to win over centrist voters.¹

Guo wrote “Republic of China.” Lin received the draft and added two characters before “Republic of China”: “currently.”

“The Chen‑Shui‑bian faction was very displeased.”²

“Currently” implied that the state name might change in the future, weakening the commitment to centrist voters. Yet Lin insisted that without those two characters, the DPP would be formally accepting the Republic of China as a permanent state name, which pro‑independence supporters could not accept. He argued that insisting on the Republic of China as the banner carried a very real cost: overseas representative offices might be forced to close, “it is more important for the nation to be able to go abroad.”³

In the end, Lin’s version passed. The two characters soothed both sides and planted an ambiguity that no one in Taiwanese politics has been willing to resolve to this day.

An Eight‑Year Turn

The origin of the future resolution dates back to 1991. On 13 October that year, the DPP adopted the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, advocating “the establishment of a sovereign, independent, autonomous Taiwan Republic.”⁴ The drafter was Lin Zhuoshui. The platform included a proviso: the decision on statehood “should be decided by a referendum of all Taiwanese residents,” but the core message was unambiguous— the DPP sought nation‑building.

Four years later, on 14 September 1995 in Washington, DPP chairman Shih Ming‑te, who had spent twenty‑five years in a political prison, told an international audience a line that would become a turning point: “If the DPP governs, it will neither need nor announce Taiwan independence, because Taiwan has been independent for half a century.”⁵ It soothed the international community but struck a lightning bolt to the party’s pro‑independence camp. After internal debate, the line became the party’s consensus and sowed the seed for the future resolution four years later.

Shih’s argument can be traced back to 1980, when he proposed a “Republic of China model of Taiwan independence” while in prison: Taiwan was already independent, now called the Republic of China. This logic turned “independence” from a future tense into a present fact—no declaration needed, only recognition.⁶

The real catalyst for transformation was the vote. In March 1996, the DPP fielded “the father of Taiwan independence” Peng Ming‑min for president, receiving 21.13 % of the vote—the party’s worst nationwide electoral result since its founding.⁷ American political scientist Shelley Rigger summed it up bluntly: voters thought supporting independence was too risky. After the loss, Peng withdrew from the party and founded the “Nation‑Building Society.” The party paid a heavy price on the policy line: it lost its own presidential candidate.

The post‑election reflection was fierce. In May 1996, over a hundred young party members co‑signed a “New Generation Platform,” penned by Zhou Yicheng, criticizing the party’s “slogan‑style independence” and “abstract culture,” and calling for the independence movement to be based on the national identity of over twenty‑million people.⁸ This platform directly challenged the methodological approach of the Taiwan Independence Party Platform: the direction of nation‑building was correct, but slogans would not achieve it.

External pressure was also rising. On 30 June 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited the People’s Republic of China and, in a joint press conference in Shanghai with Jiang Zemin, publicly announced the “Three‑No Policy”: no support for Taiwan independence, no support for “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas,” and no support for Taiwan joining international organizations as a sovereign state.⁹ In February the same year, the DPP held a major internal debate on China policy: Hsu Hsin‑liang advocated a “bold westward advance” of active exchanges, while Qiu Yiren and the New Tide faction insisted on “strengthening fundamentals and gradual progress,” compromising on a “strong fundamentals, westward advance” approach.¹⁰ At the end of the year, incumbent President Chen Shui‑bian lost the Taipei mayoral race to KMT’s Ma Ying‑jeou. Although the DPP captured Kaohsiung that year under Hsieh Chang‑ting, the Taipei defeat shook the entire party: even a president with high approval could not hold the capital, raising the question of how to win a presidential election. A consensus emerged that the policy line needed a fundamental adjustment.

All these pressures converged on a single direction: the path of outright independence was untenable, and a pragmatic transformation could no longer be delayed.

📝 Curator’s note: The story of the future resolution is often narrated as a “victory of the pragmatists.” Yet those who drove the policy turn were the very architects of the original line. Shih Ming‑te, who first said “no need to declare independence,” was the longest‑imprisoned pro‑independence activist; Lin Zhuoshui, who drafted the independence platform, added two characters eight years later to turn “nation‑building” into “recognition of the status quo.” The people who pushed the turn were those who had walked the longest stretch of the original road.

The Three Authors of Ambiguity

Chen Zhongxin proposed a crucial compromise: do not amend the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, but pass a new resolution instead.¹¹ Writing under the pen name Hang‑zhi, Chen was former editor‑in‑chief of Formosa Magazine and among the first intellectuals to intervene in politics through writing. His proposal precisely addressed the party’s political reality: the independence platform could not be touched, because doing so would be a declaration of war on the “deep green” faction; yet without moving beyond the platform, the DPP could not win the 2000 presidential election. By using a new document to bypass the old one, allowing both to coexist without negating each other, the strategy created the first layer of ambiguity.

The drafting team comprised three people, each representing a different force. Guo Zhengliang was the primary author, standing with the Chen‑Shui‑bian faction’s electoral pragmatism; Chen Zhongxin coordinated the various camps, a scholar‑activist who had risen from Formosa Magazine; Lin Zhuoshui guarded the line’s bottom line, representing the New Tide’s theoretical insistence. Lin later described his role: “(I) acted as the guard against the resolution tilting too far toward the Chen‑Shui‑bian or Yu‑centric middle road.”¹²

On 8 May 1999, at the second plenary session of the DPP’s 8th National Representative Congress in Kaohsiung, the future resolution was adopted.¹³

The core paragraph was written with extreme precision:

✦ “Taiwan is a sovereign, independent state whose territorial scope includes Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and their affiliated islands, as well as territorial waters and contiguous zones in accordance with international law. Taiwan, although presently called the Republic of China under the current constitution, is not subordinate to the People’s Republic of China, and any change to the present independent status must be decided by a referendum of all Taiwanese residents.”

The preamble of the resolution reviewed Taiwan’s democratization, noting that “through the Democratic Progressive Party and the people’s long‑term arduous struggle, the Kuomintang abandoned martial law and one‑party rule, embracing democratic reform,” which has made Taiwan “in practice a democratic independent country.”¹⁴ The seven points covered a complete national‑position framework: (1) Taiwan is a sovereign independent state; (2) it does not belong to the People’s Republic of China; (3) it should join the United Nations; (4) it should abandon the “One China” claim; (5) it should enact a referendum law; (6) both parties should build a consensus on external affairs; (7) cross‑strait relations should be built through dialogue toward a peaceful structure.

Point 7 is the most subtle. A document asserting that Taiwan does not belong to China ends with a clause calling for “comprehensive dialogue to seek deep mutual understanding and economic‑trade cooperation, establishing a peaceful framework.” This ending prevents the resolution from being a purely confrontational declaration and leaves space for future cross‑strait exchanges.

Compared with the 1991 independence platform, the difference is clear. The platform called for “the establishment of a sovereign, independent, autonomous Taiwan Republic,” i.e., a change of the status quo. The future resolution says “Taiwan is a sovereign independent state,” declaring that the status quo already exists. The wording shifts from “to do something” to “to recognize that something has already been accomplished.” The state name changes from “Taiwan Republic” to “currently called the Republic of China under the constitution.” The function of a referendum flips: from a trigger for nation‑building to an insurance protecting the status quo.

The ambiguity works because each side reads what it wants to see. Pro‑independence supporters see “currently” and think the name can be changed later, keeping the nation‑building dream alive. Centrist voters see “currently called the Republic of China” and feel the DPP has finally become pragmatic, no longer fearing cross‑strait war. The KMT sees “Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other” and argues it is merely a re‑packaged version of independence. Beijing agrees with the KMT’s assessment, labeling it “a form of disguised independence.”¹⁵

Each interpretation is grounded in the text. No side is wholly wrong. That was the drafters’ intention.

The Door That Opened

On 18 March 2000, Chen Shui‑bian was elected president with 39.3 % of the vote, marking the first party‑rotation.¹⁶

Chen ran a “new centrist line”: deliberately vague on diplomacy and defense, emphasizing bipartisan cooperation and anti‑corruption reform, shifting the campaign focus from unification‑independence to governance competence. The future resolution gave this strategy a stable foundation—the party’s cross‑strait stance was already articulated, so the candidate did not have to answer daily “Will you declare independence?” questions.

The role of the resolution in the campaign can be summed up in one sentence: it removed the fear among centrist voters. The equation “DPP in power = declaration of independence = cross‑strait war” was dismantled by the resolution. Since the DPP itself said Taiwan was already independent, the state name was the Republic of China, and any change required a referendum, voting for the DPP meant a change of ruling party, not a change in the nation’s direction.

When Chen took office, he announced the “Four‑No, One‑No‑More” policy: no declaration of independence, no change of state name, no constitutional amendment to adopt a “two‑state theory,” no push for a unification‑independence referendum, and no abolition of the National Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines.¹⁷ These five commitments addressed both Washington and Beijing, constituting a carefully calibrated political guarantee. They sound like concessions, but within the logic of the future resolution they are the inevitable extension of the status quo: because Taiwan is already independent and any change requires a referendum, “no declaration of independence” merely states that a non‑event will not happen. The precision of the wording was pre‑designed during drafting.

In 2001, the DPP attempted to formally elevate the future resolution’s status so that it would supersede the independence platform.¹⁸ The attempt failed. The independence platform was neither cancelled nor frozen nor amended; it was simply covered by another document.

The Un‑Touched Foundation

The future resolution has lived for twenty‑seven years, longer than any subsequent discourse. Its longevity is simple: every attempt to surpass or roll back it has failed.

In September 2007, toward the end of Chen’s second term, the DPP passed a “Normal State Resolution,” aiming to go one step further: rename the state as Taiwan, draft a new constitution, and join the United Nations under the name “Taiwan.”¹⁹ The future resolution, wearing the Republic of China’s hat, acknowledged factual independence; the normal‑state resolution sought to remove the hat and pursue de jure independence. The party’s moderate wing saw it as Chen’s attempt to divert attention from governance disputes. The DPP suffered a crushing defeat in the 2008 election; Hsieh Chang‑ting’s 41.55 % vote share left the normal‑state resolution shelved.

In 2014, Guo Zhengliang and more than forty party representatives jointly proposed to freeze the independence platform. Their rationale was blunt: DPP presidents and candidates “have already acted as if they accept the Republic of China,” and the independence platform “effectively opposes the Republic of China and pursues a change of status, increasing international misunderstanding.”²⁰ Party chairwoman Tsai Ing‑wen sent the proposal to the Central Executive Committee for discussion, and it never progressed.

Forward movement was blocked; backward retreat was impossible. The future resolution remained in place, becoming the sole standing position.

In February 2024, DPP China Affairs Director Wu Jun‑zhi revealed in an online lecture a party‑wide secret: the independence platform “is now a historical document,” effectively replaced by the future resolution.²¹ At the end of 2023, then‑campaign chair of Lai Ching‑te’s presidential headquarters, Zhuo Rong‑tai, stated bluntly: “The Resolution on Taiwan’s Future clearly tells the world that Taiwan is a sovereign independent country, its name is the Republic of China, and this is the DPP’s only pragmatic stance now; there is no issue of freezing the independence platform.”²²

During her eight‑year presidency, Tsai built on the future resolution to develop the “Four‑Stays”: staying that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other; staying that sovereignty must not be invaded or annexed; staying that the future of the Republic of China Taiwan is decided by its 23 million people; staying that a democratic constitutional system must be upheld.²³ Ahead of the 2024 election, Lai Ching‑te reiterated more directly: “Chen Shui‑bian was elected president based on the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future and did not declare independence while in office; Tsai Ing‑wen also did not declare independence. I will not declare independence if elected president.”²⁴ A 1999 document thus became the common foundation cited by three successive DPP presidents.

The independence platform was never frozen because freezing it would require a formal vote, and such a vote would force the party to answer an unanswerable question: does the DPP still advocate Taiwan independence? The future resolution was never formally declared a replacement for the platform because “replacement” itself is a concrete act, tantamount to admitting that the previous thirty years of nation‑building line were wrong. The party chose to do nothing, allowing the ambiguity to continue operating.

After twenty‑seven years, the three drafters have taken different paths. Guo Zhengliang left the DPP in 2023, becoming a political commentator who now criticizes his former party on television, a reversal that shocked former comrades.²⁵ Lin Zhuoshui resigned from the legislature in 2006 over the Chen Shui‑bian corruption case but remained in the party, continuously using the precise wording of the future resolution to critique current politics, becoming the party’s most ruthless internal critic.²⁶ Chen Zhongxin stepped down from the National Security Council’s deputy secretary‑general post and quietly withdrew from frontline politics. The three wrote the same document at the same table in 1999; twenty‑seven years later, the documents they authored still form the foundation of Taiwan’s cross‑strait discourse.

1. October 1991 — DPP adopts the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, advocating “the establishment of a Taiwan Republic,” drafted by Lin Zhuoshui
2. September 1995 — Shih Ming‑te declares in Washington “no need and no will to announce Taiwan independence”
3. March 1996 — Peng Ming‑min’s 21.13 % presidential vote loss sharply raises pressure for a policy shift
4. May 1999 — Future resolution passes in Kaohsiung; “currently called the Republic of China” becomes the new consensus
5. March 2000 — Chen Shui‑bian elected president, first party‑rotation
6. September 2007 — Normal State Resolution passes, attempts to push toward de jure independence; shelved after the 2008 election defeat
7. May 2026 — Lai Ching‑te frames “two major meanings of Taiwan independence” using the future resolution; Lin calls it “very appropriate”

“Very Appropriate”

17 May 2026. The backdrop was international pressure after the recent U.S.–China summit: former President Trump expressed that he did not want Taiwan to move toward independence, while Beijing reiterated the “One China” stance. Lai Ching‑te’s response strategy was to use the language of the future resolution to redefine “Taiwan independence”: independence is not about announcing anything; independence is the status quo—Taiwan does not belong to the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. This logic can be traced back to Shih Ming‑te’s 1995 Washington statement. Lai cited the 1999 future resolution and Tsai’s 2021 “Four‑Stays” as the basis, emphasizing that these “are the national policies currently promoted by the DPP government.”²⁷

KMT legislator Jiang Wan‑an asked: “Is the DPP planning to delete the independence platform?” DPP legislator Shen Bo‑yang replied: “Now it is the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future; Taiwan’s future is decided by all 23 million Taiwanese people… aren’t you a lawyer?”²⁸

The same day, the Presidential Office re‑issued a statement returning to the phrasing “the Republic of China is a sovereign independent democratic country.” Lin Zhuoshui wrote three words on Facebook: “Very appropriate.” He said it gave people “a sigh of relief,” believing the government had finally “abandoned the mistakes since 2020.”²⁹

Twenty‑seven years ago, Lin added the two characters “currently” before the state name. Twenty‑seven years later, he still uses the precision of those two characters to evaluate every government statement.

Taiwan’s twenty‑year‑old youth consider “Taiwan has always been independent” common sense. The future resolution does not appear in their textbooks. They receive a packaged conclusion; the struggle, compromise, and two‑character battle behind it have been flattened by twenty‑seven years of time. They do not know that this common sense originates from a 1999 Kaohsiung party‑member congress, from three people repeatedly refining wording at the same table, and from a single added word: “currently.” The greatest success of the future resolution is that it has become something that does not need to be remembered.

References

Further Reading

• Taiwan’s Democratic Transition — From martial law to democratization, the broader context of the future resolution’s birth.
• Taiwanese Elections and Party Politics — How the DPP’s policy shift affected Taiwan’s electoral politics.
• Formosa Incident — The starting point of Shih Ming‑te’s 25‑year political imprisonment, essential for understanding the outside‑party movement.
• Cross‑Strait Crises and Relations Development — How the 1996 cross‑strait crisis accelerated the DPP’s pragmatism.