Undersea Cables: The Silicon Shield Visible Above, The Lifeline Invisible Below

30-Second Overview: On February 2 and 8, 2023, the two undersea cables connecting Lienchiang County (Matsu) to Taiwan proper broke consecutively within six days¹. Chunghwa Telecom took approximately 50 days to repair one of them, while the second cable, Taimei No. 2, took a total of 4 months and 23 days to fully restore—Digital Development Department Deputy Minister Chueh Ho-ming stated that this was "exceeding the average international undersea cable repair time" because "interference from Chinese Coast Guard vessels" was involved². Taiwan relies on undersea cables for 99% of its international internet traffic. The current 14 international undersea cables³ are all concentrated in four landing stations on the main island: Danshui, Bali, Toucheung, and Fangshan⁴. In 2024, Chunghwa Telecom quietly activated a fifth landing station in Dawu, Taitung; local residents refer to it only by its street address, "Building 506"—insiders revealed this is a "secure network for external communication in the event of war between the two sides of the strait"⁵. TSMC's cleanrooms are the heroic shots atop the Silicon Shield, but these 14 lines buried 1,300 meters deep under the sea are the unseen lifeline below: they can disconnect 23 million people from the world without firing a single shot.

"Building 506" Has No Signage

Dawu Township, Taitung. Drive south on Provincial Highway 9, pass Dawu Station and then a fishing port, and there stands an utterly ordinary cement building on the roadside. No signage, no company logo, no "Welcome to Visit" sign. Locals call it "506"—that is its house number⁵.

This is Taiwan's 5th external undersea cable landing station, quietly completed by Chunghwa Telecom in June 2024. It connects to the TPU cable (Taiwan-Philippines-US), which is 13,470 kilometers long with a capacity of 260 Tbps, going online in October 2025, connecting Taiwan to the Philippines and then to the US West Coast⁶.

But on the day Chunghwa Telecom opened it, no local officials were invited, no central government leaders were invited. The United Daily News later quoted an insider saying this is a "secure network for external communication in the event of war between the two sides of the strait"—Taiwan's other 14 international undersea cables are all concentrated in three points on the west, north, and south coasts facing China. Dawu, Taitung is the first east-coast landing station facing the Pacific Ocean, offering higher stealth during wartime than any current location⁵.

📝 Curator's Note
In an interview with Rest of World, Digital Development Department Deputy Minister Chueh Ho-ming said: "if you have a cable that isn't on the map, in general it will be cut more often"⁷. The Dawu 506 Building is Taiwan's first geographically "hidden" external undersea cable; this statement has transformed from a technical recommendation into a concrete construction project. It tells us one thing: in the 2025 cross-strait situation, "being unseen" itself has become a design parameter for infrastructure.

Glass as Thin as Hair, Supporting the External Connectivity of 23 Million People

Which route does a message from Taipei to San Francisco take?

Not satellites. 95% of global international internet traffic relies on undersea cables for transmission⁸. 99% of Taiwan's external data transmission relies entirely on undersea cables, a dual-source conclusion from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's November 2025 report and the Global Taiwan Institute's June 2025 report⁹.

The term "undersea cable" sounds like a thick pipeline, but in reality, the optical fiber is only as thick as a human hair. The main body of a trans-Pacific optical cable consists of a few bundles of glass fibers wrapped in insulation layers, copper tubes, waterproof layers, and steel strands. They are plowed and buried 1.5 to 2 meters under the seabed, spanning tens of thousands of kilometers of Pacific Ocean trenches, reaching depths of up to 8,000 meters at their deepest points¹⁰.

Taiwan's current 14 international undersea cables: APG, NCP, FASTER, TPE, EAC-C2C, APCN-2, SJC, SJC2, Apricot, PLCN, China-US, FNAL/RNAL, Trans-Pacific series, and the newly online TPU—plus SeaMeWe-3, which was decommissioned on December 2, 2024¹¹.

Communication Method	Magnitude	Matsu Example
Undersea Cable	TBps (Terabits / second)	Taimei No. 2: 560 Gbps + Taimei No. 3: 550 Gbps
Microwave Backup	GBps (Gigabits / second)	Matsu original 2.2 Gbps → Expanded to 12.6 Gbps
Low-Earth Orbit Satellite	MBps (Megabits / second)	OneWeb Download: 90-100 Mbps

The magnitude differs by three orders of magnitude¹². CNA summarized it this way: "Undersea cable bandwidth is measured in TB, microwave communication in GB, and satellites in MB."

Digital Development Department Resilience Construction Division Director Zheng Mingzong used an even more straightforward analogy: "Wired undersea cables are like highways, while wireless satellites are like country roads. If North Highway 1 and North Highway 2 were completely destroyed, relying on the West Coast Highway and country roads would hardly be able to substitute."¹³

Matsu's LINE Takes 15 Minutes

On February 2, 2023, the Taimei No. 2 undersea cable was suspected of being hooked and broken by a Chinese-flagged fishing vessel¹⁴.

On February 8, 2023, the Taimei No. 3 undersea cable was suspected of being cut by a Chinese-flagged cargo ship dropping anchor. Within six days, both of Matsu's main external cables were broken.

Matsu has cumulatively experienced at least 27 cable breaks over the past 5 years[^15]: this is no longer new news; it is the norm for local communications. But both breaking simultaneously was a scenario neither the NCC nor Chunghwa Telecom had handled before. Matsu's microwave backup capacity at the time was only 2.2 Gbps, while Matsu's peak demand was approximately 8 Gbps, far insufficient¹⁵.

Li Wen, Chairman of the DPP Lienchiang County Party Department, described in a PTS interview: "Just sending a single text message on Line took 15 to 20 minutes."¹⁶ That statement was a physical fact, not rhetoric. During those 50 days when Matsu's internet was throttled back to basic communication, tourists during the Blue Tears peak season encountered intermittent checkout systems, hospital remote consultations were interrupted, students could not access online courses, and elderly people's electronic health insurance cards could not be read.

Chunghwa Telecom urgently deployed microwave antennas from backup stations in Nantou and Pingtung, expanding Matsu's capacity to 3.8 Gbps (a 76% capacity increase). Fixed-line internet was opened on March 6. On March 31, the first Taimei No. 3 undersea cable repair was completed¹⁷, taking approximately 50 days in total¹⁸.

But the story does not end here.

Chueh Ho-ming later told The Reporter: "The Taimei No. 2 undersea cable took 4 months and 23 days to repair, exceeding the average international undersea cable repair time, one reason being 'interference from Chinese Coast Guard vessels.'"²

⚠️ From 50 Days to 4 Months and 23 Days
General media remembers the number "Matsu disconnected for 50 days." It is the time to "repair the first one," sufficient to cause shock but not complete. 4 months and 23 days is the true time for "both to be repaired"—nearly the sum of the repair timelines for both cables, returning to normal bandwidth from the break on February 8, 2023, to the end of June. Undersea cable repair is not "sending a ship to untie a knot"; it requires sonar positioning, seabed operations, lifting the two ends of the cable from the seabed hundreds of meters deep, splicing new optical fibers, thermal fusion insulation, and laying it back down—and the cable ship operating in the accident area encounters "interference" from Chinese Coast Guard vessels.

Togolese Flag, Hong Kong Shares, Fujian Crew, Taiwan Seabed

Two years after the Matsu cable break, 2025 became the explosion year for Taiwan's undersea cable incidents. Six incidents occurred in a single month, with the National Security Bureau statistics showing an average of 7 to 8 intentional cable breaks per year over the past 3 years¹⁹. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's November 2025 report even noted at least 27 undersea cable destructions in Taiwan from 2019 to 2023²⁰.

These "unknown vessels" share a common structural characteristic.

Shunxing 39 (Shunxing 39), a Cameroon-flagged cargo ship, owned by a Hong Kong company, with 7 Chinese crew members. From October 2024, it entered and exited Taiwan's territorial waters for 3 months, with AIS turning off multiple times. On January 3, 2025, it cut the TPE international undersea cable section in the northeast sea area. The Taiwan Coast Guard originally attempted to board the ship but failed due to rough seas. The ship departed the port, without entering judicial proceedings²¹.

Hong Tai 58 (Hong Tai 58), a Togolese-flagged cargo ship, with Chinese crew members, called by the KMT "China Black Ship." From February 22 to 25, 2025, it dropped anchor and circled back and forth over the Taipeng No. 3 undersea cable in a no-anchor zone, cutting it at 3:00 AM on February 25. The Coast Guard boarded the ship the same day and escorted it to Anping Port. On April 11, 2025, the Chinese captain Wang Yuliang was prosecuted. On June 12, 2025, the first instance sentenced him to 3 years and ordered compensation of NT$18.22 million to Chunghwa Telecom—this is the "first case of new internal waters judicial jurisdiction"²².

Togo, Cameroon, Hong Kong, China, Fujian, Taiwan—these six place names overlap on every suspicious ship in an apparently coincidental way. The ship's legal flag is Togolese or Cameroonian (because those are "flag of convenience" states, cheap to register, lax in verification), actual funding comes from Hong Kong companies, the captain is Chinese, the crew comes from Fujian, and the operational sea area is Taiwan. Legally, you cannot catch the People's Republic of China, because it is a Togolese-flagged ship.

Chueh Ho-ming later used a very specific English phrase in a Rest of World interview: "I say this is 'accidental,' and they also said it was 'accidental,' so 'accidentally' all this happened within a week."⁷ The nuance of the original rhetoric cannot be fully translated, but the irony of saying "accidentally" three times tells you more directly than any national security report how Taiwanese officials view these "accidents".

💡 Did You Know
The National Security Bureau report categorizes intentional destruction into four types: (1) Exposure and damage to cables due to large-scale sand mining, (2) Cables broken by fishing vessel trawling, (3) Cables damaged by large cargo ships dropping anchors, (4) Flag-of-convenience ships masking activities²³. Taiwan's 2025 published "Blacklist" includes 52 Chinese flag-of-convenience ships, with 15 high threat, 4 medium, and 10 certain threat²⁴. But the "Blacklist" is a Taiwanese administrative classification, not a judicial conviction—this is the physical meaning of the "gray zone": you can see it, but you cannot prove it.

China Wants to Bypass Taiwan, Finds It Cannot

On April 21, 2017. Google, Facebook, and a company called Pacific Light Data Communication (PLDC) applied to the US FCC to lay a trans-Pacific undersea cable called PLCN (Pacific Light Cable Network). The designed route was: USA - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Philippines²⁵.

PLDC's parent company is China's Dr. Peng Telecom.

At that time, Trump was not yet in office. China-Hong Kong cables were still considered routine engineering for the US side.

In June 2020, the US Team Telecom (a cross-departmental evaluation agency) recommended the FCC partially deny PLCN: refuse direct connection USA-HK, refuse Chinese shareholder participation—retain USA-Taiwan / USA-Philippines segments²⁶. Google and Facebook withdrew the original application and re-applied (without the Hong Kong segment, without Chinese shareholders). In January 2022, the FCC approved PLCN's USA-Taiwan / USA-Philippines segments for commercial operation.

From that moment on, "bypassing Hong Kong" became the new political principle for Pacific undersea cable construction. China's original plan to enter trans-Pacific undersea cables through Dr. Peng was interrupted, and subsequent China-Hong Kong cables like HKA, HK-G, and Bay-to-Bay Express were also continuously denied or rerouted²⁷.

Chunghwa Telecom Chairman Jian Zhicheng summarized this shift to CNA: "US-led cables try to avoid landing in Hong Kong, and more cables land in Taiwan."²⁸ "For future international undersea cable deployment, areas that are politically sensitive and difficult to obtain permits will be avoided, and equipment demands will de-sinicize the supply chain."

This is a paradoxical dividend for Taiwan. Hyperscalers (Google, Meta, Microsoft, Amazon) might have originally bypassed Taiwan's cable plans, but now instead choose Taiwan as the Asia-Pacific hub:

• Google: FASTER (2016) + PLCN (2022) + TPU (2025) + Apricot co-investment + Topaz (2024)
• Meta: Apricot + Bifrost + Echo + Candle (announced October 2025, connecting to Taiwan, 2028 launch, largest Asia-Pacific capacity)²⁹
• Microsoft + AWS: Co-investing with Chunghwa Telecom AUG East (NT$2.9 billion, completion in 2029)³⁰
• Chunghwa Telecom also invests NT$4.6 billion in E2A (second half of 2028 launch)

The density of these cables will temporarily make Taiwan a cable hub. But the flip side of the same fact is: when you become an unavoidable point, you become a target.

If the Highway is Blown Up, the West Coast Highway and Industrial Roads Cannot Save You

After the Matsu cable break incident, the Digital Development Department accelerated the construction of backup systems.

Microwave backup expanded from 2.2 Gbps to 3.8 Gbps, and again to 12.6 Gbps in 2025¹⁵. Low-Earth Orbit satellite backup chose OneWeb (Eutelsat), not Starlink—by the end of June 2024, OneWeb signal coverage included Taiwan proper, Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu; by the end of 2024, 700 user terminals + 70 base station backhaul links were completed³¹.

Choosing OneWeb over Starlink is a political choice. Musk's restriction of Starlink services for Ukraine made Taiwan wary: the "political reliability" of satellite backup is as important as technical capacity. But OneWeb's capacity is far inferior to Starlink—this is the cost of "diversifying trust."

Medium-Earth Orbit satellites (SES) were introduced by Chunghwa Telecom for commercial service in the first quarter of 2025, serving as a third layer of backup alongside microwave and low-Earth orbit satellites³².

But the physical fact of a three-order-of-magnitude difference in magnitude has not changed. Zheng Mingzong's highway analogy means: if all 14 international undersea cables are cut, Taiwan will not become a "silent island," but will be throttled back to "basic communication"—LINE text can pass, but Netflix, cloud work, AI model calls, and cross-border financial settlements will all stall.

Professor Feng Kaiming of the Department of Electrical Engineering at National Tsing Hua University said a cold statement to PTS: "If the PLA wants to attack Taiwan, it only needs to attack our undersea cables, and it can very easily isolate Taiwan from the world."³³ Professor Ding Shufan, Emeritus Professor of the Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, added: "Using precision strike weapons to attack the 4 international undersea cable landing stations can destroy the entire network system at once."³⁴

📊 Data The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's November 2025 report estimates: If China completely cuts Taiwan's undersea cables, Taiwan's daily economic loss would be $55.6 million (approximately NT$1.73 billion)³⁵. This number is conservative, as it only calculates the direct loss of interrupted internet services, not the chain effects of suspended semiconductor exports, frozen cross-border financial transactions, and disconnection of multinational corporate headquarters and Taiwan branches.

One Ship Takes 22 Days, One Ship Rents for 800,000 Per Day

How long does it take to repair a broken undersea cable?

2025 January TPE International Undersea Cable Incident: Japan's KDDI's Ocean Link arrived in Taiwan on January 13 and was repaired by January 20, 7 days³⁶.

2023 Taimei No. 2 Undersea Cable: 4 months and 23 days.

Where is the difference? International undersea cables have higher priority than domestic undersea cables (due to shareholder structure and fleet consistency), and the repair of the 2023 Taimei No. 2 also encountered "interference" from Chinese Coast Guard vessels.

The global undersea cable ship industry has only about 60 cable ships, about 50 with repair capabilities, and 22 dedicated to repair³⁷. Taiwan itself has no undersea cable repair ships, joining two repair ship zones: Yokohama (YOKOHAMA) and Southeast Asia Indian Ocean (SEAIOCMA), totaling 6 cable ships available to Taiwan for repairs³⁸. Ship owners are Japanese, South Korean, Singaporean, Chinese (Hua Hai Long); Taiwan has none of its own.

Single repair cost is 10 to 20 million NTD, cable ship daily rental is approximately NT$800,000³⁹.

Why doesn't Chunghwa Telecom build its own repair ships? Jian Zhicheng's answer is straightforward: "Building a self-owned repair ship team probably does not meet economic efficiency."⁴⁰ Chueh Ho-ming added another structural reason: "Now, backup microwaves and backup satellites are 100% government-funded. Undersea cables are inherently profitable; if the government funds them again, it might contradict the original privatization of Chunghwa Telecom."⁴¹

Professor Jian Liangui of the Department of River and Sea Engineering at National Taiwan Ocean University leaves some room for thought: "Perhaps accumulating some experience, the next step might allow us to start from near-shore and take responsibility for repairs ourselves." "Probably no more than 3 companies." (referring to companies with repair capabilities)⁴²

Half of the Silicon Shield, Or—The Achilles' Heel

When discussing Taiwan's digital sovereignty, foreign media loves the metaphor silicon shield: China attacking Taiwan would paralyze TSMC, causing the global supply chain to collapse, so the US would intervene.

But the cable logic is asymmetrical.

The Silicon Shield triggers US intervention; the cable gray zone does not. A Togolese-flagged cargo ship dropping anchor in a no-anchor zone in Taiwan and cutting a Taipeng No. 3 undersea cable does not constitute an "armed attack" under international law, does not trigger the mutual defense clause of the Taiwan Relations Act, and does not send the Seventh Fleet out to sea. The cumulative effect of Chinese flag-of-convenience ships destroying 7 to 8 Taiwan undersea cables annually can chronically strangle Taiwan's external communications without being recognized as an act of war.

UK Foreign Policy columnist Elisabeth Braw analyzed for PTS: "The Matsu internet blackout incident is highly likely China practicing a blockade of Taiwan's external communications, testing how the Taiwan government reacts; this is a form of harassment and a standard gray zone strategy" "China can certainly say those are just fishing boats and merchant ships, with no warships or military attacks on Taiwan."⁴³

Journalist Samanth Subramanian, author of The Web Beneath the Waves, summarized with a colder English sentence: "Were a foreign power to snap those fifteen international cables, Taiwan—the West's buffer against China, and the semiconductor factory to the planet—would be unmoored from the world it needs and the world that needs it."⁴⁴ (If a foreign power were to cut those 15 international undersea cables, Taiwan—the West's buffer against China, and the planet's semiconductor factory—would be disconnected from the world it needs and the world that needs it.)

The Silicon Shield metaphor holds, but only half. Cables are more like an Achilles' heel, not a shield.

The Seven Cable Laws, the Hong Tai 58 Judicial Precedent, and a 4-Month 23-Day Timeline

But Taiwan has done some things in the past 24 months.

April 28, 2025, the Pingtung District Prosecutors Office established the national first "Undersea Cable Security Joint Defense Regional Emergency Platform"⁴⁵. September 8, 2025, the Executive Yuan passed the "Seven Cable Laws" amendment draft. December 16, 2025, the Legislative Yuan passed it in third reading[^47]:

• Intentional destruction of undersea cables: Maximum 7 years imprisonment + NT$10 million fine
• Negligence is also punishable
• Illegal vessels can be confiscated
• Violations of vessel identification carry a maximum fine of NT$10 million

In the Hong Tai 58 case, Chinese captain Wang Yuliang was sentenced to 3 years and ordered to pay NT$18.22 million in the first instance in June 2025; the second instance upheld the 3-year sentence. This is the "first case of new internal waters judicial jurisdiction"—Taiwan's first clear judgment record on the boundary between "gray zone vs. law"⁴⁶.

The Control Yuan passed an investigation report in 2025 (investigated by Yeh I-chin and Lai Ding-ming) affirming the Seven Cable Laws but requesting improvements⁴⁷. Chunghwa Telecom added the Taipeng-Jin-Matsu undersea cable and Taimei No. 4 (200 Gbps, completion in June 2026) in 2025. Microwave backup expanded to 12.6 Gbps, OneWeb user terminals completed.

But these construction changes do not alter one physical fact: there are only 60 undersea cable ships globally, Taiwan can only dispatch 6 of them, repairing a broken cable takes an average of 7 to 30 days, and rough seas or "interference" can stretch it to 4 months and 23 days. Taiwan's 23 million people's external communication lifeline hangs on those 14 lines buried 1.5 meters under the seabed, glass fibers as thin as hair.

✦ "if you have a cable that isn't on the map, in general it will be cut more often." — Chueh Ho-ming⁷

This is why Building 506 has no signage.

Further Reading

• The Reporter: Saving Investigative Journalism from a Business Item to a Public Good for Ten Years — Another case focusing on Taiwan's civil society and infrastructure credibility post-2015, similar to this article
• Taiwan New Media Art — Digital cultural infrastructure also supported by the internet under the undersea cables
• Social Movements and Civic Participation — The larger context related to the legislative pressure of the Seven Cable Laws and local emergency platforms
• justfont and the Development of Taiwan Fonts — Another axis demonstrating the "cultural infrastructure" dimension

References

1. The Reporter — Undersea Cable Break Crisis: Taiwan Maintains Digital Lifeline — The Reporter's in-depth tracking of the 2023 Matsu double cable break incident, repair timeline, and the full explosion of subsequent 2025 events.↩
2. The Reporter — Chueh Ho-ming Discusses Taimei No. 2 Repair Timeline — Source of Digital Development Department Deputy Minister Chueh Ho-ming's original quotes "took 4 months and 23 days" and "interference from Chinese Coast Guard vessels."↩
3. Global Taiwan Institute 2025-06 Report — Official think tank data stating Taiwan's 99% international data transmission relies on undersea cables.↩
4. Digital Development Department — Undersea Cable Business Page — MODA official undersea cable page, official statistics of Taiwan's 14-15 international communication undersea cables + 10 domestic communication undersea cables (14 active after SeaMeWe-3 decommissioned on 2024-12-02).↩
5. Rest of World — In-Depth Report on Building 506 — Local nickname and quiet completion ceremony report for the Dawu, Taitung TPU landing station "Building 506"; insiders revealed it is a "secure network for external communication in the event of war between the two sides of the strait."↩
6. Submarine Networks — TPU Cable Page — Taiwan-Philippines-US cable record: 13,470 km length / 260 Tbps capacity / completed 2025-05 / launched 2025-10.↩
7. Rest of World — Web Beneath Waves Taiwan — Source of Chueh Ho-ming's original English quotes "I say this is 'accidental,' and they also said it was 'accidental,' so 'accidentally' all this happened within a week" and "if you have a cable that isn't on the map, in general it will be cut more often."↩
8. TeleGeography Submarine Cable Map — TeleGeography global undersea cable map Taiwan page, including industry consensus data that 95% of global international internet traffic relies on undersea cables.↩
9. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2025-11 Report — USCC annual report Taiwan undersea cable section, including Taiwan's 99% international data transmission and daily loss estimates.↩
10. Submarine Networks — Cable Structure — Submarine Networks cable technology page, including physical specifications such as fiber diameter, seabed burial depth, and deepest point of the trans-Pacific trench.↩
11. Submarine Networks — SMW3 Retire — SeaMeWe-3 cable decommission announcement on 2024-12-02, serving for 25 years.↩
12. CNA 2025-01-10 — Jian Zhicheng Discusses Cable Magnitude — CNA quotes the official analogy "undersea cable bandwidth in TB, microwave in GB, satellites in MB" differing by three orders of magnitude.↩
13. Watchout — Zheng Mingzong In-Depth Interview — Context of Digital Development Department Resilience Construction Division Director Zheng Mingzong's original "highway / country road" quote.↩
14. PTS News Network — Undersea Cable Special — PTS 2025 digital special full record of Matsu 2023-02-02 + 2023-02-08 double break timeline and interviews with Li Wen, Feng Kaiming, Elisabeth Braw.↩
15. The Reporter — Matsu Microwave Backup Expansion — Matsu microwave backup expansion record: from 2.2 Gbps → 3.8 Gbps (2023-03 expanded 76%) → 12.6 Gbps (2025).↩
16. PTS — Li Wen Interview — Source of DPP Lienchiang County Party Chairman Li Wen's original quote "Just sending a single text message on Line took 15 to 20 minutes."↩
17. Chunghwa Telecom 2025-03-02 Repair Announcement — Chunghwa Telecom official undersea cable repair announcement, including 2023 Matsu incident repair timeline record.↩
18. The Reporter — 50 Days of Digital Darkness — Source of The Reporter's phrasing "Matsu plunged into approximately 50 days of digital darkness."↩
19. CNA 2025-01-14 — National Security Bureau Gray Zone Threat Report — National Security Bureau statistics official record of average 7-8 intentional cable breaks per year in Taiwan's surrounding waters over the past 3 years, 6 incidents in a single month in 2025.↩
20. Legislative Yuan Gazette 2025-01-10 National Security Bureau Report — Legislative Yuan Gazette National Security Bureau inquiry report PDF, including at least 27 undersea cable destruction records in Taiwan from 2019-2023.↩
21. CNN — Shunxing 39 Report — CNN 2025 Shunxing 39 full report, including Cameroon flag / Hong Kong company / Chinese crew / AIS anomaly records.↩
22. Focus Taiwan — Hong Tai 58 Sentencing — Focus Taiwan report on 2025-06-12 first instance sentencing of Chinese captain Wang Yuliang to 3 years, compensation of NT$18.22 million to Chunghwa Telecom, "first case of new internal waters judicial jurisdiction."↩
23. National Security Bureau — 4 Types of Intentional Destruction — National Security Bureau report summarizes 4 types of intentional destruction: sand mining / fishing vessel trawling / cargo ship anchoring / flag-of-convenience ship masking.↩
24. Liberty Times Net — Blacklist 52 Flag-of-Convenience Ships — Foreign media exposure record of Taiwan listing 52 Chinese flag-of-convenience ships on the blacklist (15 high threat / 4 medium / 10 certain threat).↩
25. Submarine Networks — PLCN — Pacific Light Cable Network full record, including 2017-04-21 application, 2020-06 US Team Telecom denial of China-HK segment, 2022-01 FCC approval of USA-Taiwan-Philippines segment timeline.↩
26. Submarine Networks — PLCN Team Telecom Shift — Submarine Networks PLCN main entry, including US Team Telecom 2020-06 denial of China-HK segment, 2022-01 FCC approval of USA-Taiwan-Philippines segment timeline and subsequent policy impacts.↩
27. Submarine Networks — China-HK Cables Denied — Submarine Networks records subsequent impacts of HKA, HK-G, Bay-to-Bay Express and other China-HK cables being denied or rerouted.↩
28. CNA 2025-01-10 — Jian Zhicheng Exclusive Interview — Source of Chunghwa Telecom Chairman Jian Zhicheng's original quote "US-led cables try to avoid landing in Hong Kong, and more cables land in Taiwan."↩
29. Meta Engineering — Candle Cable Announcement — Meta 2025-10-05 announcement of new cable "Candle" connecting to Taiwan, 2028 launch, largest Asia-Pacific capacity.↩
30. Chunghwa Telecom — AUG East Investment Announcement — Chunghwa Telecom + Microsoft + AWS co-investment AUG East cable investment NT$2.9 billion 2029 completion announcement.↩
31. Digital Development Department — OneWeb Progress — Digital Development Department OneWeb low-Earth orbit satellite 2024-06 signal coverage Taiwan / 2024 end completed 700 user terminals + 70 base station backhaul link records.↩
32. Chunghwa Telecom — SES Medium-Earth Orbit Satellite Commercial — Chunghwa Telecom 2025-Q1 introduced SES medium-Earth orbit satellite commercial service as third layer backup.↩
33. PTS — Feng Kaiming Interview — Source of National Tsing Hua University Electrical Engineering Professor Feng Kaiming's original quote "If the PLA wants to attack Taiwan, it only needs to attack our undersea cables, and it can very easily isolate Taiwan from the world."↩
34. PTS — Ding Shufan Interview — Source of National Chengchi University East Asian Studies Emeritus Professor Ding Shufan's original quote "Using precision strike weapons to attack the 4 international undersea cable landing stations can destroy the entire network system at once."↩
35. Liberty Times Net 2025-11 — US-China Committee Report — US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2025-11-18 report, Taiwan full cable cut daily loss estimate $55.6 million (approximately NT$1.73 billion).↩
36. The Reporter — KDDI Ocean Link Repair Timeline — 2025-01 TPE International Undersea Cable Incident KDDI Ocean Link ship 1/13 arrival → 1/20 repair completion 7-day record.↩
37. The Reporter — Global 60 Cable Ships — The Reporter cites International Cable Protection Committee ICPC 2024-09 data, global 60 cable ships / 50 with repair capabilities / 22 dedicated to repair.↩
38. The Reporter — Taiwan Repair Ship Zones — The Reporter record of Taiwan joining Yokohama (YOKOHAMA) + Southeast Asia Indian Ocean (SEAIOCMA) two repair ship zones, 6 cable ships available to Taiwan for repairs.↩
39. The Reporter — Repair Costs — The Reporter cites industry data, single repair cost 10-20 million NTD / cable ship daily rental NT$800,000.↩
40. The Reporter — Jian Zhicheng Discusses Self-Built Repair Ships — Source of Chunghwa Telecom Chairman Jian Zhicheng's original quote "Building a self-owned repair ship team probably does not meet economic efficiency."↩
41. The Reporter — Chueh Ho-ming Discusses Privatization Tension — Chueh Ho-ming discusses undersea cables being inherently profitable; if the government funds them again, it contradicts the original privatization of Chunghwa Telecom policy tension.↩
42. The Reporter — Jian Liangui Interview — National Taiwan Ocean University River and Sea Engineering Professor Jian Liangui's observation leaving room for self-built repair capabilities.↩
43. PTS — Elisabeth Braw Interview — Source of UK Foreign Policy columnist Elisabeth Braw's original analysis of the Matsu internet blackout as "gray zone strategy."↩
44. Rest of World — Web Beneath Waves Book Excerpt — Source of Samanth Subramanian The Web Beneath the Waves book excerpt original quote.↩
45. Ocean Commission — Pingtung Joint Defense Platform Announcement — Pingtung District Prosecutors Office 2025-04-28 establishment of national first "Undersea Cable Security Joint Defense Regional Emergency Platform" announcement.↩
46. Focus Taiwan — Hong Tai 58 Second Instance — Focus Taiwan Hong Tai 58 case Chinese captain Wang Yuliang first instance + second instance judgment record, "first case of new internal waters judicial jurisdiction."↩
47. Control Yuan — Undersea Cable Investigation Report — Control Yuan passed Ye I-chin, Lai Ding-ming investigation affirming Seven Cable Laws but requesting improvements official announcement.↩