I Am a Local: The 'Fellow Townsman' Fanpage's Backend is a Neihu Company and a Forgotten AI Prompt

30-Second Overview: You have likely followed at least one local fanpage like "I Am a Kaohsiung Person" or "I Am a Taichung Person," which reposts night market news and weather updates, feeling like "us locals." In February 2026, someone caught an uncleaned AI instruction in a post on the "I Am a Taipei Person" fanpage. Following this thread back leads to a building on Neihu, a group of people surnamed Lin running a related enterprise, using AI to rewrite news from pro-China media into a "fellow townsman" tone, and then distributing it in bulk across fanpages disguised as locals from various counties and cities. The most ironic part is that it hardly fabricates news, so you cannot measure it with the ruler of "fact-checking."

In February 2026, a fanpage calling itself "I Am a Taipei Person" posted what looked like an ordinary local image-text post. The real problem was a line of text remaining below the post: "Remove sensitive words, strengthen Taiwanese local colloquialism" ¹.

This is an instruction written for AI. It should have been deleted after generation, just as an author erases pencil marks on a draft before submission. But this time, someone slipped up and posted the instruction along with the finished product. The fanpage "Kaohsiung Good Day" (@takaogoodday) captured this image on February 19 and made a summary; two days later, Liberty Times, Newtalk, and Formosa TV followed up on the same day ². A forgotten deletion revealed the entire backend operation.

"Kaohsiung Good Day's 2026 February exposure summary: Lists the operating structure of LIFE Lifestyle Network, content mostly from CTWANT, the residual AI instruction "Remove sensitive words, strengthen Taiwanese local colloquialism," and marks the office location at Jihu Road, Neihu. (Source: Kaohsiung Good Day Threads, reported and reviewed citations)"

📝 Curator's Note
Pay attention to what this instruction says. "Remove sensitive words" assumes the original draft contains words that Taiwanese readers should not see. "Strengthen Taiwanese local colloquialism" assumes the final product should pretend to be written by Taiwanese. In other words, this is not a fanpage editor polishing text; it is a production line doing two things: erasing the origin label and then attaching a "local" label. The entire technique is usually hidden behind the finished product; this time, the manufacturing process leaked the filling itself.

The Backend is at Jihu Road Lane 10, Neihu

Following the clue from "Kaohsiung Good Day" to check company registrations, the backends of these county/city fanpages converge to the same address: 5th Floor, No. 46, Jihu Road Lane 10, Neihu District, Taipei City ¹.

Under this address operates a content business outwardly using the names "LIFE Lifestyle Network" (life.tw) and "US-based All Access Group." However, breaking down the commercial registration reveals that while it hangs one signboard outwardly, behind it is a group of companies. Jishuo Technology Co., Ltd., Unified Business Number 89977832, established in 1995, Chairman Lin Xianming; Bosite Technology Marketing Co., Ltd., established in 2005, person in charge Lin Xiuzi; Nianjie Technology Co., Ltd., established in 2011, person in charge Xu Yunting ³. The three persons in charge are different, but they rely on Lin Xianming, Zhang Yujia, Lin Xiuzi, and Lin Zhaofeng, four people, rotating names in each other's board of directors and supervisors list, combined with the same address, weaving a cross-shareholding group of the Lin family. It is not a single figurehead named Lin Xianming; it is a family web.

Jishuo Technology (Unified Business Number 89977832) commercial registration: Representative Lin Xianming, registered address 5th Floor, No. 46, Jihu Road Lane 10, Neihu, board of directors and supervisors list consists of Lin Xianming, Zhang Yujia, Lin Zhaofeng, and Lin Xiuzi, four Lin family members rotating names. (Source: opengovtw, data from Ministry of Economic Affairs Commercial and Industrial Registration Public Disclosure)

The capability combination of this web is more noteworthy than its low profile. Bosite hangs the brand name POLLSTER outwardly, specializing in public opinion surveys ⁴. That is to say, this group produces "public opinion data" with one hand. The group's recruitment page also admits it is the "only unit in the country simultaneously operating social media websites, professional market research, news portal websites, blog broadcasting networks, SEO website optimization, and Facebook platform marketing" ¹, holding nearly a hundred fan pages as "distribution channels" with the other hand. And Nianjie Technology's recruitment text writes more plainly: "Use AI text, AI images, AI video tools to produce interesting content, assisting over 100 fanpages in posting and material creation" ¹. Producing data, mass-producing content, and batch distributing—all three things are in the hands of the same group at the same address.

As for the signboard "US-based All Access Group," no company named "All Access" can be found registered in Taiwan, and the "ALL ACCESS HOLDING GROUP LTD." hanging at the website footer cannot find a corresponding entity in US state registration records ¹. "US-based" is more like a sticker pasted on the door, essentially the same thing as the "local" characters on those county/city fanpages.

LIFE Lifestyle Network service page under Jishuo Technology lists platform advantages clearly: "Millions of monthly traffic," "Precise segmented marketing," and "Native advertising placement, natural and not obtrusive"—meaning it can stuff content into your feed for the sponsor. (Source: aams.tw)

✦ It produces public opinion with one hand, mass-produces content with AI with the other, and the third hand hangs the content on nearly a hundred fanpages disguised as fellow townspeople for bulk distribution.

CTWANT News, Dressed in a Fellow Townsman's Tone

When you click on the "news" reposted by "I Am a Kaohsiung Person," you think you are reading local Kaohsiung media. In reality, most of this content comes from the CTWANT Group and CTWANT ¹.

CTWANT's issuing unit is Wangdao Wangtai Media Co., Ltd., belonging to the Wang Wang Zhongshi Media Group along with CTWANT Television ⁵. The political color of this group is not a secret. CTWANT News Channel was found to have violated regulations 25 times by the NCC between 2014 and 2020, with cumulative fines exceeding NT$11.53 million, the highest fine amount for a TV station; in November 2020, the NCC's seven commissioners unanimously resolved not to renew the license, and CTWANT stopped broadcasting in December, shifting to YouTube and the internet ⁶. Earlier, a 2019 report by the UK's Financial Times quoted statements from Wang Zhong's journalists, stating that the Chinese State Council Taiwan Affairs Office once made phone calls to issue editorial instructions, demanding support for specific candidates ⁵.

📝 Curator's Note
There is a clever time lag hidden here. When CTWANT was a TV station, it was regulated by the NCC; violations resulted in fines, and eventually, the license was revoked. However, when its content is rewritten by LIFE into "local image-text" using AI and distributed on "I Am a Kaohsiung Person," readers see fellow townspeople, not CTWANT; the source is washed away. After CTWANT went offline and shifted to the internet in 2020, it had already left the jurisdiction of the NCC. A piece of content originally under regulatory supervision, bypassing the AI process, finally lands on a fanpage where no competent authority can manage it. Every step of this path moves it further away from "accountability."

CTWANT News Channel was fined over NT$11.53 million by the NCC between 2014 and 2020; after being taken offline due to non-renewal of license in 2020, it shifted to the internet, leaving the jurisdiction of the communications regulatory authority. Photo of NCC Yanping South Road Office. (Photo: Solomon203 / CC BY-SA 3.0)

Why use AI for this process instead of manual clipping? Scholar Wang Hong'en provided a key criterion. When studying similar techniques, he pointed out that deliberately "using AI to rewrite articles" is "using AI with the purpose of avoiding investigation and detection" ⁷. Because identical content repeatedly copied and pasted will be caught by platforms as homogeneous, leading to reduced reach. AI rewriting makes every piece look different, smoothing out the fingerprints of the origin. In this usage, AI is a weapon against detection: it automates and scales the "washing of origin," saving even the cost of manual copying.

Before Exposure, After Exposure

"Every now and then, the controversy of 'I Am OO Person' fanpages is mentioned," this is the opening sentence of "Kaohsiung Good Day's" exposure article ². This sentence is not rhetoric.

At the end of December 2025, the military issue fanpage "New 27th Brigade" had already named "I Am a Taipei Person" and "I Am a Kaohsiung Person," stating that their "content is almost entirely news written by AI based on current events, paired with AI-generated images," and "all openings and formats are almost identical," suspecting behind them "organized actions for upcoming election public opinion operations" ⁸. This was about two months before the systematic exposure in February 2026; at that time, no one had pulled the thread to that company in Neihu.

And after being exposed in February, this production line did not stop. In March 2026, the same series of fanpages issued AI-generated fake images, spreading rumors that Taiwanese fans, after watching a game at Tokyo Dome, left "areas piled with bento boxes, beverage cups, plastic bags, and other garbage," and "female restrooms were a mess," which was exposed as coming from the same source ¹. A content production line already named by national media continued to operate normally within a month after exposure; this itself illustrates one thing: no mechanism can stop it.

Another "She" in the Same Ecosystem

In June 2026, another wave of seemingly completely different things emerged on Taiwan's social media: a large number of matchmaking accounts, with the self-introduction "In Taiwan, only marrying Taiwanese people."

A citizen account ctchart.lab using AI tools for data analysis compiled a set of numbers: 252 accounts, 458 posts, with 99.6% concentrated in just three days from June 2 to June 4; at 10:37:53 AM on June 4, nine accounts posted in the same second; "simultaneous posting in the same second" occurred 90 times within three days; 32 sets of self-introductions were identical; the accounts' "factory specifications" were highly consistent: 100% single females, 98% marked as having no children, age concentrated between 30 and 49 years old, 99.6% of BMI not exceeding 20.5, 90 with a height of 165 cm ⁹.

The most critical column is geographic location. Of the 252 accounts, only 25 had "account location" marked: 21 from China, 3 from Pakistan, 1 from the US—Taiwan, 0. The remaining 227 were all hidden ⁹.

📝 Curator's Note
Seeing the elements "China IP + Pretending to be Taiwanese + Only Marrying Taiwanese," the most natural reaction is to blurt out "Cognitive Warfare." But the evidence actually points to another direction. What these accounts are truly doing is guiding people to add LINE for "sincere dating," and directing targets off the platform is the fingerprint of "Pig Butchering Scam" (Sha Zhu Pan) fraud. Political trendsetting wants to keep people on the platform to wash comments and boost volume; it would never take people off-platform to LINE. Looking at geography: Pakistan is not a typical distribution of political net armies, but it is a known location of transnational scam parks: in 2026, Pakistani police raided a scam center in Faisalabad, arresting 149 people, 48 of whom were Chinese nationals ¹⁰. The same shell does not necessarily contain the same organism.

It needs to be clarified: The number of these 252 accounts was currently only produced by one citizen using AI via ctchart.lab, without third-party verification. It is a clue worth pursuing, not yet a conclusion.

Placing the matchmaking case in this article is not because it is the same group as "I Am OO Person"; they are likely two different things. It is placed here because it shares the same outer shell logic with "I Am OO Person": a pleasant, harmless, "local" labeled identity, followed by an invisible backend. The difference lies only in what the backend wants to take from you. Seeing China IP and shouting "Cognitive Warfare," or seeing fellow townsman tone and believing it is a fellow townsman, are actually the same kind of laziness.

"Coordinated Behavior" Does Not Equal "Cognitive Warfare"

The academic term that best fits "I Am OO Person" is "Coordinated Behavior."

The Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG) defines it as: "The behavior of repeatedly publishing identical or highly similar content, or the same links, within a short time on news media, social media, and instant messaging platforms" ¹¹. Note the restraint in this definition: it only describes "behavior," not assuming behind it is foreign forces, nor assuming malice. Nearly a hundred fanpages with consistent formats synchronously reposting the same content fits the characteristics of "Coordinated Behavior," but "Coordinated Behavior" itself is only a neutral behavioral marker.

📝 Curator's Note
The words most easily abused in Taiwan in recent years are "Cognitive Warfare" and "Net Army." IORG researcher Wang Xi said a heavy word: "The element constituting a 'Net Army' is the existence of a 'monetary consideration' relationship"; if "whenever you dislike a discourse you put on the 'Net Army' hat... it is very dangerous for Taiwan's public discussion," because "casually accusing cognitive warfare is exactly what information manipulators want to see," the more you stick labels randomly, the better it is for the real net army to hide ¹². Wearing out the word is equivalent to helping the enemy clear a larger camouflage area.

Even the person with the least reason to speak for this technique refuses simple attribution. In his 2021 TSSCI paper on Chinese cognitive warfare, Shen Bo-yang drew a "Diamond Model," laying out the initiators of information manipulation on a coordinate. In the "Economic Motivation" box, he clearly lists "commercial content farms, general YouTubers/streamers, fanpage administrators"; in the "Political Motivation" box, only then come the National Security Bureau, PLA, State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, Publicity Department, and CAC ¹³. He wrote clearly in the paper: "Initiators who confuse the public's cognitive system are not limited to foreign forces" ¹³. Motivation is a continuous spectrum from commercial to political, with various "helpless" roles standing in the middle.

Even Meta thinks so. In its 2020 official statement, it wrote that when handling "coordinated inauthentic behavior," the platform "looks at behavior, not content, regardless of who is behind it, what was posted, whether foreign or domestic" ¹⁴, and acknowledged that coordination and authenticity are two spectra, not black-and-white switches. From Taiwan's researchers to the world's largest social platform, the same admonition is reached: Look clearly first, then define.

Not Fake News Does Not Mean No Problem

If you use the ruler of "fact-checking" to measure "I Am OO Person," you will measure an awkward result: it basically measures nothing.

Because it mostly reposts real news. The content reported by CTWANT and CTWANT is not necessarily fake; after AI rewriting, the factual level often withstands checking. Chung Cheng University's Huang Junru distinguished two easily confused terms: disinformation is "malicious information," intentionally causing harm; misinformation is "incorrect information," an unintentional error; the biggest difference lies in intent ¹⁵. By this standard, "I Am OO Person" likely counts as neither, because it does not operate on "content being false."

Its problem lies in another layer. IORG splits information manipulation into three types; besides "fact manipulation," there is another called "source manipulation" [^6]: the source is hidden, disguised. "I Am OO Person" does exactly this: washing away the Wang Zhong series origin, attaching the identity of fellow townspeople. The content is real, but your judgment on "who this is, why you are shown it" is tampered with. IORG has an even colder metaphor: even if no one reads a single post, these contents are "accumulating local keyword inventory," serving as "fertilizer for future fake news" ¹¹.

And in all reports, the same reservation appears repeatedly: "Summarizing currently public information, it is impossible to understand where the clients and capital flow of this series of companies come from" ¹. This sentence is the safety valve this entire article must hold. There is no evidence showing Lin Xianming is Chinese capital or a CCP agent; all that has been investigated is "cannot be found," not "found." Existing evidence only supports a low-key Neihu local marketing group, a secondary distribution channel for pro-China media, an AI localization process, and an unclear capital flow. It claims it can "insert specific content" for sponsors ², but who that sponsor is, no one can find.

A Forgotten Prompt Editor, and a National-Level Content Farm

To see the position of "I Am OO Person" clearly, the best method is to place it alongside a true national-level operation.

In February 2026, Wang Hong'en exposed another case. A content farm called "Borderless Media," with a website hosted in Qinhuangdao, Hebei, "has direct connections to the Propaganda Department and the CAC." Its residual AI instruction was written like this: "For Taiwan users, use Traditional Chinese, re-edit this article, word count controlled at 500, retain the original article's opening part, do not change the original article's historical truth" ⁷. The "For Taiwan users," "do not change the original article's historical truth" in the instruction is a top-down, politically motivated production line speaking.

Placing this instruction side-by-side with "I Am OO Person's" "Remove sensitive words, strengthen Taiwanese local colloquialism," the difference is obvious at a glance. Wang Hong'en himself separates the two clearly; he specifically reminds that some cases "are not just a domestic打工小编 forgetting to delete the prompt" ⁷, implying that some cases are just that. One is a local business in a Neihu company greedy for traffic; one is a national-level operation connected to the CAC; one's prompt handles "local tone," one's prompt handles "historical truth." They can be compared on the same gray spectrum, but absolutely cannot be confused.

Control Group: Wang Hong'en exposed Qinhuangdao "Borderless Group" post residual AI instruction—"For Taiwan users, use Traditional Chinese, re-edit this article, word count controlled at 500, retain the original article's opening part, do not change the original article's historical truth." This is a national-level operation connected to the CAC, completely different from "I Am OO Person's" local profit-making prompt. (Source: Voice Tank / Wang Hong'en, reported and reviewed citations)

Do not connect the thread too quickly; this is the lesson most worth remembering in recent years. In 2022 during the pandemic, after celebrity Guo Hanyun relayed "many children just left," IORG found at least 25 fanpages posting identical "Many Children Left!" within 10 seconds, with the first comment all linking to the same content farm ¹⁶; that was a textbook-level coordinated operation. But even then, Storm Media's fact-check reminded that mainstream media reports were actually earlier than the clustering push of those fanpages; "many fanpages posting simultaneously" does not necessarily equal an information war ¹⁷. Moreover, those named fanpages (Ai Jingyan, BuzzHand, that string) were not equated with "I Am OO Person" by any public data. Kaohsiung Good Day said this series also posted similar content during the pandemic, but did not provide screenshots or direct links. Looking similar does not mean it is the same group.

It is worth mentioning that the matter of "fake local identity" has a purer political version in Taiwan. Taiwan Democracy Lab recorded during the 2024 election, a foreign group used hundreds of fake accounts to operate life fanpages like cameras, cooking, and art; fanpage names and categories were all life types, but post content only related to Taiwan politics and elections, and "all administrators' locations were located abroad" ¹⁸. That was "foreign fake accounts disguising as local." "I Am OO Person's" disguise layer is actually one step deeper: it is "real local entity + local media content + AI-enhanced local tone," using regional identity like "I Am a Kaohsiung Person" as turf, harder to dismantle than a fake cooking fanpage.

Everything Is Legal, That Is the Problem

The most unsettling thing about "I Am OO Person" is that almost every part of it is legal.

Registering a company is legal. Reposting news is legal. Using AI to generate image-text is legal. Accepting a sponsor's commission, doing native advertising placement, as long as the conflict of interest is disclosed, the Fair Trade Commission's testimonial advertising regulations cannot touch it ¹⁹. Assembling these legal parts results in a machine impersonating fellow townspeople, with unknown origin, that can be inserted by sponsors, but you cannot find which screw is illegal.

In the past, discussing this situation, the habitual saying was "governance vacuum." But in 2026, this saying needs correction, otherwise, law-abiding readers will catch the loophole. The vacuum has been filled with one piece. The Regulations on Prevention and Punishment of Fraud Crimes, passed by the Legislative Yuan in 2024, commonly known as the Anti-Fraud Special Law, Article 31 requires online advertising platforms to disclose "information of the commissioned broadcaster/sponsor," and mark whether AI-generated images are used; Article 32 requires platforms to take down fraudulent ads within a time limit, otherwise sharing joint liability for compensation with the sponsor ²⁰. The Ministry of Digital Affairs has already fined Meta three times according to this law, cumulatively NT$18.5 million ²⁰. The "fraudulent advertising" vacuum has been patched by teeth-bearing law.

The problem is, this law only binds "paid advertising." It can manage a paid fraudulent ad, but cannot manage a free-operating, fellow-township-impersonating "I Am a Kaohsiung Person," because that is free-operating "content," outside the jurisdiction of "advertising." And the horizontal law that can truly manage "platform accountability, operator disclosure," namely the Digital Intermediary Services Act of 2022, was shelved in 2022 due to concerns about "internet censorship" ²¹, and has not revived by 2026.

The Digital Intermediary Services Act, managing "platform accountability, operator disclosure," was shelved in the Legislative Yuan in 2022 due to controversy, and has not revived by 2026; patching the vacuum is the Anti-Fraud Special Law only binding "paid advertising," which cannot manage free-operating fellow-township-impersonating fanpages. Photo of Legislative Yuan Chamber. (Photo: Lin Gaozhi / CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

📝 Curator's Note
So the governance vacuum has not disappeared; it has just shrunk—from "comprehensive" to "non-paid political and emotional operation fanpages." A fanpage impersonating Taiwanese, not disclosing operators, not charging you money, only wanting to influence you, falls exactly in this shrunk hole: it is not advertising, so the Anti-Fraud Special Law cannot manage it; the law managing it lies in a place no one dares to touch. Reporter Liu Zhixin used a saying: This ecology turns "citizens in a society" into "mercenaries of the hidden hand behind the scenes," called "recruiting mercenaries" ²². Those recruited may not know they are recruited; you, liking and reposting, may also not know who you are working for.

So, Do You Still Know Who You Are Reading?

Back to that "I Am a Taipei Person" post, and the forgotten instruction: "Remove sensitive words, strengthen Taiwanese local colloquialism."

What this sentence truly leaked is not that a certain article fabricated falsehoods, but that a whole set of "identity manufacturing" techniques was exposed to the sunlight: first erase the origin, then attach local. After AI makes this process almost zero-cost and automatically avoids detection, recognizing the truth of a news item is no longer the hardest thing; it mostly reposts real news. The hardest part is recognizing its origin and capital flow: Who wrote this? Why do you want to see it? Has anyone paid money?

And what truly protects you is never a stance—whether it is the CCP? Whether it is cognitive warfare?—because even Taiwan's most adept experts in cognitive warfare are shouting to be cautious about sticking labels. What protects you is the ability to trace the source: Ask one more question "Who is this? Where is the origin? Who paid for it?"

That forgotten instruction was caught this time. Next time, it will not forget to delete.

---

Further Reading

• Cognitive Warfare — The framework, boundaries, and "complexity over accuracy" reading principles of cognitive warfare
• Poisonous Potato Cognitive Warfare — How a narrative war "steps on the foundation of truth," and this piece belongs to the paradigm of rejecting binaries
• Taiwan Artificial Intelligence Laboratory — Local technology using AI to detect coordinated cognitive operations
• Taiwan Media and Press Freedom — The larger context of Wang Zhong controversies and media group structures

References

Image Sources

Most images in this article are screenshots of public pages, cited under Article 52 of the Copyright Law "Fair Use for Reporting and Review," with sources marked:

• Cover Image / Fanpage Side-by-Side: "I Am a Kaohsiung Person" "I Am a Taipei Person" Facebook fanpages (@Kaohsiung.Info, @Taipei.Info) screenshots.
• Exposure Summary: Fanpage "Kaohsiung Good Day" (@takaogoodday) Threads post screenshot.
• Jishuo Technology Commercial Registration: opengovtw, data from Ministry of Economic Affairs Commercial and Industrial Registration Public Disclosure.
• LIFE Lifestyle Network Service Page: aams.tw (Jishuo Technology) screenshot.
• Qinhuangdao Content Farm AI Instruction: Screenshot from Voice Tank / Wang Hong'en article.
• NCC Yanping South Road Office: Photo by Solomon203, CC BY-SA 3.0 (Wikimedia Commons).
• Legislative Yuan Chamber: Photo by Lin Gaozhi, CC BY-SA 4.0 (Wikimedia Commons).
• Matchmaking account screenshots involve real photos possibly stolen; this article does not reproduce them based on privacy, presenting only with data and text descriptions.

1. Controversy Over Forgotten AI Instruction! Fanpage "I Am OO Person" Exposed with Unknown Capital Flow, Content from Pro-China Media — Newtalk 2026-02-21 main report, including operators, AI instruction, content sources, unknown capital flow, Nianjie "assisting over 100 fanpages" recruitment text, Tokyo Dome fake images.↩
2. Exposed for Cognitive Warfare? "I Am OO Person" Fanpage Exposed, Claims Capable of Inserting Specific Content — Liberty Times 2026-02-21, relaying Kaohsiung Good Day's exposure, including "available for sponsors to insert specific content" and "every now and then" opening sentence.↩
3. Jishuo Technology Co., Ltd. Company Registration — Commercial registration, Unified Business Number 89977832, including Bosite person in charge Lin Xiuzi, Nianjie Xu Yunting, and Lin family overlapping board of directors structure (verified directly by article author 2026-06-05).↩
4. About Bosite POLLSTER — Bosite online survey network official website self-description, established in 2005, polling brand belonging to All Access Media Group.↩
5. The Indestructible Content Farm — Uncovering the Manipulators Behind "Mission" and China Factors — The Reporter, including Wang Zhong Group background and Financial Times 2019 "Editor-in-Chief Received Direct Instructions from State Council Taiwan Affairs Office" reporting context.↩
6. NCC Fined CTWANT Over Ten Million for Six Years — Watchout compiled CTWANT News Channel 2014–2020 violations 25 times, fines over NT$11.53 million, 2020 non-renewal of license taken offline.↩
7. Finding Evidence of Chinese Content Farms Specifically "Targeting Taiwanese" Using AI for Patriotic Propaganda — Wang Hong'en Voice Tank, Qinhuangdao "Borderless Group" AI instruction full text and "using AI with purpose to avoid investigation and detection" criterion.↩
8. "I Am XX Person" Fanpages Suspected to Prepare for Election Public Opinion Operations — Epoch Times 2025-12-28, military fanpage "New 27th Brigade" named the series "written by AI, consistent format" two months before exposure.↩
9. "In Taiwan, Only Marrying Taiwanese" Matchmaking Account Chart Analysis — ctchart.lab (One Plus One's Grain) using AI to organize Threads public posts (2026.6.2–6.4), 252 accounts/458 posts/simultaneous posting in same second. Single citizen analysis, no third-party verification yet.↩
10. Pakistan arrests 149, including 48 Chinese nationals, in Faisalabad scam centre raid — South China Morning Post 2026, Pakistan as one of the bases for Chinese capital transnational scam parks, corroborating matchmaking account geographic distribution leaning towards scam industry.↩
11. IORG Exposes Information Manipulation Techniques: Content Farm Articles Are "Fertilizer" for Future Fake News — INSIDE relaying IORG "Coordinated Behavior," "Source Manipulation" definitions and "Fertilizer" metaphor.↩
12. Interview with IORG: Don't Let "Net Army" Become a Hat Stuck on Randomly — Watchout, Wang Xi "Monetary Consideration is the Constituent Element of Net Army" and "Randomly Sticking Labels Actually Helps Real Net Armies" discourse.↩
13. Exploration of Chinese Cognitive Domain Warfare Model: Taking the 2020 Taiwan Election as an Example (Shen Bo-yang, Vision Foundation Quarterly Vol. 22 No. 1, 2021, pp. 1-65) — TSSCI paper, Diamond Model places "Commercial Content Farms/General YouTubers" in Economic Motivation quadrant, explicitly stating initiators are not limited to foreign forces.↩
14. Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior — Meta Official, CIB "looks at behavior not content, regardless of domestic or foreign," and acknowledges coordination and authenticity are spectra.↩
15. Fighting Fake News Must First Clarify Names: Malicious Information vs. Incorrect Information — Huang Junru MINGREN Hall, disinformation (malicious information, intentional) and misinformation (incorrect information, unintentional) distinguished by intent.↩
16. Civil Group Uncovers "Many Children Left" Fake News Operation, At Least 25 Fanpages Published Same Post — Liberty Times 2022, another batch of content farm fanpage clustering cases checked by IORG, no public connection with "I Am OO Person."↩
17. Is "Many Children Left" Really an Information War? Posting Timeline Exposed — Storm Media Fact Check 2022, counter-evidence of timeline for "whether coordinated posting is necessarily an information war."↩
18. Imported Products Faking Local Public Opinion: Analysis of Foreign Fanpage Intervention in Taiwan Elections — Taiwan Democracy Lab, 2024 election pre-period foreign group using life-type fanpages to disguise as local, all administrators abroad coordinated operation analysis.↩
19. Fair Trade Commission Guidelines on Testimonial Advertising — Native advertising/testimonial must fully disclose conflict of interest; only involving illegality if not disclosed and sufficient to affect transaction order.↩
20. Digital Development Ministry Fines Meta Heavily According to Anti-Fraud Regulations — Ministry of Digital Affairs, Regulations on Prevention and Punishment of Fraud Crimes Article 31 (disclose commissioned broadcaster/sponsor), Article 32 (24-hour takedown and joint liability), has fined Meta three times cumulatively NT$18.5 million.↩
21. Digital Intermediary Services Act Controversial Events — Wikipedia, 2022 draft shelved due to free speech censorship concerns, has not revived by 2026.↩
22. Before Democracy Paralysis: Looking at Taiwan's Need to Strengthen Cyber Literacy from the Fanpage Buying Incident — Liu Zhixin Reporter commentary, "Recruiting Mercenaries" framework.↩