30-second overview: Over 30 years, Taiwan has invested more than NTD 1 trillion in its MRT network — yet even the highest-ridership system, the Taipei Metro, needs advertising revenue to turn a profit. From the NTD 1.64 billion lawsuit against French firm Matra to the 209-tonne steel beam that killed four people in Taichung, this is a story of ambition, cost, and the long process of learning from mistakes.
At 4:58 p.m. on April 10, 2015, at the intersection of Beitung Road and Wenxin Road in Taichung, a MRT steel beam weighing 209 tonnes fell from 15 metres above ground. The beam crushed two vehicles. Four people died on the spot; four more were critically injured.
At the time, it was peak rush hour. The construction site was "protected" only by traffic cones — no road closures, no barriers. More absurd still: the contractor, Far Yang Engineering (遠揚工程), had originally committed to working "between 11:30 p.m. and 5:30 a.m.," yet began hoisting the beam at 3 p.m. and only sent a fax "notification" at 4 p.m. — not an application, just a notification.
The tragedy brought the entire Taichung MRT project to a halt, delaying its opening by six years. Like a mirror, it reflected the true face of Taiwan's MRT development: reckless ambition, astonishing costs, and the difficult process of learning from mistakes.
The Matra Battle: Taiwan's Expensive Tuition for Its First MRT Line
On March 28, 1996, the Muzha Line opened — Taiwan's MRT Year One. But this beginning came soaked in bitterness.
The feud between French company Matra and the Taipei City Government lasted exactly 12 years. Matra claimed Taipei had "delayed contract performance" and demanded enormous compensation; Taipei counter-claimed that Matra had created "continuous technical disputes and frequent workplace accidents." The international lawsuit ended in Taipei's defeat — a payout of NTD 1.64 billion.
Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, then furious, declared: "Matra won't pull us, we'll pull ourselves." But the damage was done. Even more painful: the Muzha Line's early operations were plagued with breakdowns. The public mockingly dubbed it "the line where there are fewer passengers than staff." In 1993, a fire in the dry-type drive cable trough plunged public confidence in the MRT to its nadir.
Curator's Note
Why did Taiwan's first MRT choose the French Matra VAL system? The official explanation was "the most advanced technology," but industry insiders have long rumored that it was linked to concurrent arms purchases of the La Fayette frigates and Mirage 2000 fighter jets. Politics and technology were entangled in Taiwan's MRT from its very first day.
Was the NTD 1.64 billion lesson worth paying? Looking back today, the Muzha Line (now the Wenhu Line) proved one crucial thing: Taiwan could build an MRT. Stumbling and lurching as it did, the system ran — and kept running for 30 years.
The Danshui Line Miracle: Where MRT Culture Was Born
In 1997, the Danshui Line opened, and the Taipei Metro truly took flight.
Unlike the Muzha Line's French technology, the Danshui Line was built by adapting the existing Taiwan Railways Danshui Branch, using existing right-of-way combined with Taiwanese engineers' accumulated learning. For the first time, Taiwanese riders experienced what a "world-class metro" felt like — air-conditioned cars, electronic display boards, punctual arrivals, barrier-free design.
More significantly, the Danshui Line established a uniquely Taiwanese "MRT civilization." No food or drink anywhere on the system, with fines up to NTD 7,500 for violations; stand to the right on all escalators; carriage interiors as quiet as a library. These rules, which seem obvious today, were revolutionary social experiments in the 1990s.
Did you know?
Taipei Metro's food and drink ban is one of the world's strictest subway regulations. A foreign tourist was once fined NTD 1,500 for chewing gum on a platform — and the incident made international news. Yet precisely this insistence has made the Taipei Metro's carriage cleanliness one of the deepest impressions international visitors carry away.
One key statistic drove the Danshui Line's success: it connected Taipei's densest residential areas — Beitou, Shilin, and Datong — directly to the city centre, generating enormous commuting demand. Daily ridership grew from an initial 40,000 to today's 600,000.
Geographic advantage + technical learning + cultural construction = the Danshui Line miracle. This formula has since been imitated by countless cities, but rarely replicated successfully.
The Bannan Line Cross Network: Taipei Metro's Strategic Turning Point
In 1999, the Bannan Line opened, giving Taipei its first cross-shaped MRT backbone.
The Bannan Line's strategic significance exceeded its transportation function. It traversed Taipei's most valuable east-west axis — from Banqiao, Ximending, Taipei Main Station, and Zhongxiao Fuxing through to Nangang — linking the nerve centers of commerce, government, and transit. More importantly, it began to redefine Taipei's real estate map.
"MRT-adjacent" became the most powerful keyword in property advertising. Data showed that housing prices within 500 metres of a MRT station averaged 15-20% higher than surrounding areas. The city's development center of gravity began shifting toward MRT corridors.
By 2006, total Taipei Metro ridership surpassed 3 billion. The network expanded from 1 line to 5 operating lines, with daily ridership exceeding 1.5 million. The MRT was no longer a novelty — it was basic infrastructure for life in Taipei.
But the truly shocking numbers came later.
The Taipei Metro Paradox: Even Taiwan's Most Successful MRT Loses Money on Operations
The Taipei Metro is Taiwan's highest-ridership and most financially successful MRT system. With two million daily riders and annual revenue of NTD 18 billion, it is by any measure the leader. Yet there is a little-known fact: the Taipei Metro's core transportation business has consistently run at a loss.
According to financial data publicly disclosed by Taipei Metro CEO Huang Ching-hsin, in 2019 — the year the system reached peak ridership — fare box revenue totaled NTD 16.74 billion while operating costs reached NTD 18 billion, producing a core business loss of NTD 1.26 billion.
So how does the Taipei Metro profit? The answer is ancillary businesses. In 2019, station advertising revenue was approximately NTD 2.5 billion, and ATM and telecom site rental income added roughly NTD 500 million. In other words, the Taipei Metro is kept alive by the billboard advertising and bank ATMs inside its stations.
Counter-intuitive reality
Only 7 metro systems in the world turn a profit: Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore, Taipei, Moscow, Seoul, and Beijing. Yet even among these 7, most rely on real estate development or government subsidies. Systems that profit purely on transit operations essentially do not exist.
This "Taipei Metro Paradox" reveals a harsh reality: if even the Taipei Metro needs advertising income to survive, the MRT systems in other cities are destined to bleed money.
| Even the highest-ridership system loses money | MRT reality across Taiwan |
|---|---|
| Taipei Metro: 2 million daily riders | Core operations: NTD 1.26 billion deficit |
| Kaohsiung MRT: 180,000 daily riders | Cumulative deficit: NTD 750 million |
| Taoyuan Airport MRT: 40,000 daily riders | Cumulative deficit: NTD 2 billion |
| Taichung MRT: 26,000 daily riders | First-year deficit: NTD 600 million |
The Kaohsiung Lesson: Southern Taiwan's Difficult Experiment
In 2008, the Kaohsiung MRT Red and Orange Lines opened, making Kaohsiung Taiwan's second metro city. But Kaohsiung's fate diverged sharply from Taipei's.
The Kaohsiung MRT was designed for a daily ridership of 500,000. Before the pandemic, it peaked at 180,000 — only 36% of projections. The reasons are structural: lower population density in the Kaohsiung metro area, extremely high motorcycle ownership, and an underdeveloped bus feeder network. Most critically, Kaohsiung residents were already accustomed to riding motorcycles door-to-door. The "last mile" problem is especially acute in Kaohsiung.
The Kaohsiung Rapid Transit Corporation once faced the threat of bankruptcy. In 2013, the Kaohsiung City Government was forced to amend the BOT contract, taking over the electromechanical equipment ahead of schedule. It absorbed bank loan interest payments exceeding NTD 200 million per year and waived approximately NTD 1.8 billion in annual depreciation amortization previously owed by the KRTC. This amounted to a direct government lifeline.
But Kaohsiung did not give up. The light rail circular line opened in sections from 2015 and completed the full loop in 2024. At a much lower construction cost (light rail: approximately NTD 1 billion per km vs. heavy rail MRT: approximately NTD 5 billion per km), the city supplemented its network density and gradually formed a composite transport model — "MRT + light rail + bicycle" — through integration with the YouBike shared-bicycle system.
Data comparison
Kaohsiung motorcycle density: 741 per 1,000 people (highest in Taiwan)
Taipei motorcycle density: 337 per 1,000 peopleSource: Ministry of Transportation and Communications Statistical Query Service (2024)
Kaohsiung's experience proves: MRT is not a panacea. It requires complementary transformation across overall transportation policy, urban planning, and lifestyle habits.
The Airport MRT and Taoyuan: A Dual Test of Gateway and Commuter Functions
In 2017, the Taoyuan Airport MRT opened, finally giving Taiwan a rail link worthy of a national gateway. From Taipei Main Station to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport in 35 minutes — a problem that had long drawn criticism was solved.
The Airport MRT's "pre-check-in" service was a Taiwanese innovation: passengers could complete baggage drop and check-in at Taipei Main Station, then travel to the airport with only carry-on and proceed directly to departures. Though usage was not high (roughly 5% pre-pandemic), it represented an important experiment in Taiwan's public transit digitalization.
But the Airport MRT also exposed another problem: the risk of over-dependence on a specific passenger segment. Before the pandemic, international travelers accounted for 60% of the Airport MRT's revenue. When the pandemic hit, daily ridership dropped from 70,000 to 30,000, accumulating a NTD 2 billion deficit. Taoyuan Airport MRT CEO Cheng Te-fa noted: "Every month the gateway is closed costs us at least NTD 100 million in lost revenue."
Equally awkward is the presence of several "ghost stations" along the line. In the first half of 2022, Hengshan Station recorded only about 300 daily boardings and alightings. In the span of half an hour, three trains would pass without a single passenger getting on or off. The bus shelter outside displayed "last bus has departed," surrounded by weed-covered vacant lots.
These scenes raise a brutal question: Are we building metro stations, or mosquito halls (蚊子館)? — the Taiwanese term for government-funded infrastructure that sits permanently empty.
The Taichung Tragedy: A 209-Tonne Beam and Six Years of Delay
Return to the tragedy that opened this article.
The investigation report on the Taichung MRT Green Line steel beam collapse reads like a textbook of occupational safety disasters:
- Crane hydraulic outriggers were not fitted with planks to distribute pressure; the asphalt road surface could not bear the load and buckled
- The curved beam's center of gravity was off-center; excessive "eccentric torque" caused rotational tip-over
- The construction site was protected only by traffic cones, with no road closure or traffic control
- Night-only construction had been specified, yet work proceeded during the daytime peak hours
- Workers had requested additional support frames; the contractor refused
The four victims: Su Chia-chen (age 42), Hsieh Kuang-hui (age 57), Du Ya-yu (age 60), Liang Hsiao-kai (age 26). The youngest, Liang Hsiao-kai, was 26 — in the prime of life.
The legal consequences: Taipei Metro civil engineering deputy engineer Wang Chi-sen was sentenced to 8 months; Far Yang Company's Chen Song-yan and 6 others received sentences of 10 months to 1 year and 6 months, all suspended. Chin Yi Engineering Company was fined NTD 200,000.
Four lives — for which the penalty was suspended sentences and a NTD 200,000 fine.
The Taichung MRT finally opened in April 2021, six years behind schedule. Current daily ridership is approximately 26,000 — still well short of the projected 80,000.
Curator's Note
When the Taichung beam collapse occurred, the New Taipei Ring Line was conducting similar steel box girder hoisting operations in the north. The difference: the Ring Line was strictly implementing "nighttime construction + road closure." The same technology, different management — and that difference decided life or death.
The Punctuality Secret: A Quality Revolution Spanning 13.92 Million Kilometres
After all those painful lessons, Taiwan's MRT sector underwent a "quality revolution" that went largely unnoticed.
Data from 2024 shows that the Taipei Metro averages 13.92 million kilometres of operation before experiencing a delay exceeding 5 minutes. How extraordinary is that figure?
For comparison:
- Singapore MRT: 2.09 million km
- Hong Kong MTR: 520,000 km
- Singapore MRT in 2016: 160,000 km
The Taipei Metro's on-time rate has long remained above 99.5%, ranking among the top-performing mass transit systems globally. This "punctuality culture" changed Taiwanese riders' sense of time — "the next train arrives in 3 minutes" transformed from an aspiration into a reliable fact.
How was this quality revolution achieved? Channel NewsAsia's 2018 report identified 5 key factors:
- Weekly technical meetings: Over 7,000 standard operating procedures compiled to address identified issues
- Regular simulation drills: Crisis response capability
- Solid regular maintenance: Management review to ensure quality
- Long-tenured employees: Taipei Metro's 5,700 employees average 10 years of service — double that of Singapore's SMRT
- Civic identification: Under high-quality service, passengers extend greater courtesy and civic respect to the system
✦ "Every train that arrives on time is silently saying: this island takes public life seriously."
Taiwan's Great MRT Leap: A NTD 2.4 Trillion Gamble
Taiwan today is in the middle of a "Great MRT Era."
According to a NewsWeek (新新聞) investigation, the already-open MRT systems across Taiwan cost NTD 1 trillion in total. Another 20-plus lines are under construction or under evaluation, representing a projected additional NTD 1.1 trillion investment, across a total length of approximately 500 kilometres — equivalent to building another three times the total length of the current Taipei Metro network.
| Staggering investment | Brutal operating reality |
|---|---|
| Total Taiwan MRT investment: NTD 2.4 trillion | Only Taipei approaches break-even |
| 20+ lines under construction | Kaohsiung: annual NTD 750 million deficit |
| Average construction cost: NTD 5 billion per km | Taoyuan: cumulative NTD 2 billion deficit |
MRT and light rail projects are perennial top items in city mayoral election platforms. One veteran political observer remarked: "Anywhere in the country, calling for MRT construction only adds to vote counts — it never subtracts."
The question is: Do these new lines actually have the demand to justify them?
Take the Danhai Light Rail in New Taipei as an example. Initial ridership estimates were 44,000 per day; actual ridership is around 19,000 — only 43% of projections. The cause: the Danhai New Town's population growth fell dramatically short of forecasts. When planning began in 1992, the projection was 300,000 residents by 2014; the actual figure was just over 40,000.
Expert warning
Li Yu-hsin, director of National Cheng Kung University's Rail Transportation Center, directly pinpoints the issue: "Local governments typically commission feasibility studies with a mindset of 'we want to build a MRT.' Consulting firms, unwilling to contradict the 'client's' vision, always find conditions that qualify as 'feasible.' But during construction, those qualifying assumptions are ignored — which is why ridership figures are later seen as inflated."
Resistance of the Scooter Kingdom: Why Can't MRT Systems Change Transportation Habits?
There is a puzzling phenomenon: Taiwan has spent NTD 1 trillion on MRT infrastructure, yet the number of private cars and motorcycles continues to grow.
Despite the density of the Taipei Metro network, the overall public transit mode share rose only from 39.5% in 2009 to 40.4% in 2020 — essentially unchanged. Former Minister of Transportation and Communications Ho Chen-tan analyzed it this way: "Even in Greater Taipei, what happened is that some of those who previously rode buses shifted to the MRT. Overall public transit mode share remains stuck at around 40%."
The situation in Kaohsiung is more severe. After the Kaohsiung MRT opened, the public transit mode share rose only from 9.1% in 2009 to 9.3% in 2016 — still below the national average of 16%. In the same period, the number of private cars in Kaohsiung grew from 790,000 to 930,000 — an increase of 140,000 vehicles.
Public transit mode shares in Taichung and Taoyuan have similarly remained persistently below the national average.
Why? Chung Hui-yu, deputy director of Feng Chia University's Intelligent Transportation Center, put it plainly: "It's the absence of motor vehicle management policy."
After building MRT systems, Taiwanese cities have uniformly failed to introduce appropriate vehicle management measures. Parking fees are too cheap, on-street parking spaces too plentiful, and the cost of motorcycle ownership too low. The MRT provides a new option — but the old options remain far too convenient.
Motorcycle density comparison
- Kaohsiung: 741 per 1,000 people
- Taichung: 688 per 1,000 people
- Taoyuan: 612 per 1,000 people
- Taipei: 337 per 1,000 people
Source: Ministry of Transportation and Communications Statistical Query Service (2024)
Building MRT alone cannot change transportation habits. What's needed is "carrot and stick": MRT is the carrot, motor vehicle restrictions are the stick. Taiwan has the carrot but not the stick.
The Loss-Making Destiny: Who Pays the NTD 2.4 Trillion Bill?
If even the Taipei Metro must rely on advertising income to survive, and other cities' MRT systems are structurally unprofitable — who pays the bill?
The answer is: everyone does.
If a MRT's losses exceed its registered capital, the local government must inject additional capital — borne by the public. The Taoyuan Airport MRT is a particularly complex case: it spans Taipei, New Taipei, and Taoyuan, and any future capital injections require approval from three city councils — a process involving complicated political bargaining.
One MRT industry insider observed: "If the majority parties in the Taipei and New Taipei city councils differ from the ruling party in Taoyuan, they are quite likely to refuse to contribute money for Taoyuan MRT. At that point, Taoyuan MRT will face a crisis."
NCKU's Rail Transportation Center Director Cheng Yung-hsiang put it bluntly: "The fundamental problem is insufficient people. Transportation infrastructure must incorporate urban planning from the outset. There must be economic activity around MRT stations to generate enough foot traffic; otherwise, the debt all gets passed down to future generations."
Taiwan is gambling 30 years of future tax revenues on an uncertain urban vision.
Formosa Boulevard Station's Light Canopy: MRT as Cultural Landmark
But MRT systems are more than transportation. They have also become cultural coordinates of their cities.
Kaohsiung's Formosa Boulevard Station features the "Light Canopy" (光之穹頂), created by Italian artist Narcissus Quagliata — the world's largest stained-glass public building. CNN named it one of the "most beautiful metro stations in the world," attracting an enormous number of visitors every year.
Taipei's Danshui Station is synonymous with weekend tourism. The area around Zhongshan Station has organically developed into a distinctive street of bookshops and arts spaces. These stations are not merely transit nodes — they are symbols of urban identity.
Viewed from another angle, Taiwan's MRT system is also a successful case study in "civilizational experiment." The quiet orderliness in carriages, the strict no-eating-or-drinking policy, the cultivation of punctuality culture — all these have become international showcases for Taiwan's soft power.
International perspective
During Singapore's MRT troubled years (2015-2017), a senior management team traveled to Taipei specifically to study operations experience. The Taipei Metro went from being a "student" of other systems in the 1990s to a "teacher" for other cities in the 2010s. This role reversal marks Taiwan's maturation in public infrastructure.
Looking Ahead: An Expanding Network and Future Challenges
As of 2026, Taiwan's MRT systems continue to expand:
- Targeted for 2026 opening: Taoyuan Green Line
- Under construction: Taipei Ring Line northern and southern segments, New Taipei Wanda Line, Kaohsiung Yellow Line
- Under planning: Taichung Blue Line, New Taipei Sanying Line, Keelung MRT, Hsinchu Light Rail, Tainan MRT
One interesting trend: new lines increasingly adopt driverless systems. From the Muzha Line's VAL system to the Ring Line's fully automated operation, Taiwan is moving from "adopting foreign technology" toward "developing domestic integration capability."
But the deeper challenge is this: as Taiwan enters a super-aged society, how must MRT systems adapt? Can barrier-free facilities keep pace with demand? Is the fare adjustment mechanism equitable? And the most fundamental question — in a trend of declining population, for how long can these lines' ridership be sustained?
Curator's Note
Thirty years ago, Taiwan did not have a single kilometre of MRT. Today, the MRT is the most persuasive calling card of Taiwan's urban civilization. Every quiet, orderly carriage, every clean and well-lit platform, testifies to how this island learned the meaning of "public life."The cost was NTD 2.4 trillion and several human lives. Was it worth it? There is no standard answer to that question. But at the very least, we have honestly faced the cost.
From the NTD 1.64 billion tuition paid to French Matra, to the four lives lost in the Taichung beam collapse, to today's world's most reliable metro system — the history of Taiwan's MRT development is an urban evolution written in blood and money.
It proves one thing: a society can learn from its mistakes, and from painful costs can build better institutions. The prerequisite, however, is that we honestly face those costs rather than let them slide into forgetting.
Further Reading
- Taiwan Scooter Culture (zh only: 台灣機車文化) — How the MRT's greatest competitor has shaped city life
References
- Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation Annual Report (2024)
- Kaohsiung Rapid Transit Corporation Operating Statistics
- Ministry of Transportation and Communications Statistical Query: Monthly MRT Passenger Volume by System
- Taichung MRT Green Line Steel Beam Collapse — Wikipedia
- 13.92 Million Kilometres Before a Delay Exceeding 5 Minutes — The News Lens
- MRT Money Pit 1: Taiwan's MRT Craze — Why Has Over NTD 2 Trillion Produced So Many Loss-Makers? — The Storm Media
- Muzha MRT Line — Matra Wins, Taipei Must Pay NTD 1.64 Billion — Epoch Times
- How Did the Taipei Metro Become an "Assembled Metro"? — Street Corner Sociology
- Legislative Yuan: Kaohsiung MRT Contract Amendment — Early Transfer of Electromechanical Assets Plan
- Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation: Regulations Prohibiting Food and Beverage in MRT Systems