Taiwan Enterprise: Acer — The Man Who Drew the Smiling Curve, Yet Struggled to Stand at Its Ends

30-Second Overview: In 1992, Acer founder Shih Ming-de drew an upward-opening "Smiling Curve," telling Taiwan’s manufacturing sector not to get stuck in the lowest value-added assembly middle, but to climb toward R&D and branding at both ends. This phrase became a strategic mantra for Taiwan’s industry for thirty years. Yet the man who drew the line fell three times on his path to the branding end—in 2000, a clash between brand and contract manufacturing forced Taiwan’s electronics industry’s first "Great Split"; in 2011, after reaching second place globally, European warehouses overflowed and stock prices halved; in 2013, a one-year loss of NT$20.5 billion marked Acer’s worst year in thirty-eight years, forcing the founder, who had retired for nearly a decade, to return and save the day. The most ironic ending was revealed twenty years later: Wistron, the contract manufacturing "little brother" he spun off and which everyone underestimated, climbed to the top of the Smiling Curve in the era of AI servers.

In 1992, Acer Chairman Shih Ming-de drew an upward-opening curve inside the company. He told his colleagues that assembly "had become the part with the lowest value-added in the computer industry" ¹. The middle of this line (manufacturing) was the lowest, while the two ends (R&D on the left, brand marketing on the right) were the highest. People should climb toward the two ends and not get trapped in the middle.

This diagram, later known as the "Smiling Curve," became a phrase Taiwan’s manufacturing sector listened to for thirty years. It taught an entire generation of bosses: don’t just do contract manufacturing; move upward.

He never expected that in the next thirty years, this line would act like a mirror, reflecting three falls of the company he built while chasing the brand.

The First "Little Professor" Grown by the "Gardener of Microprocessors"

Acer’s starting point had little to do with branding, or even with making money. Its initial positioning was to teach people to use something that was still very unfamiliar to Taiwan at the time.

In 1976, Shih Ming-de and five others pooled NT$1 million in Taipei to open a small company called "Multitech" ². Among these five people, besides Shih Ming-de, was his wife, Yeh Tzu-hua. She managed finance and internal operations, being the key figure who kept the company from running out of food in its first few years of extremely thin capital, though later narratives of "Shih Ming-de’s solo entrepreneurship" often omitted her ³. The other three were Tai Chung-chung, Lin Chia-hsia, and Huang Shao-hua. Huang Shao-hua had followed Shih Ming-de since he led the R&D team at Rongtai Electronics and would later be a long-term executive in the Acer Group.

Little Professor No. 1 (MPF-I), Acer’s first product to carry its own brand for export in 1981, packaged to look like a book. Photo: Toytoy. CC BY-SA 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

The company’s self-positioning was quite literary: "Gardener of Microprocessors." At that time, microprocessors were like a foreign language to Taiwanese. Multitech aimed to introduce this technology and teach it out. In 1980, they launched the "Tianlong Chinese Computer," Taiwan’s and the world’s first self-designed Chinese terminal, winning the Premier’s Award, the highest honor in product design competitions ⁴. The following year, in 1981, the product that truly pushed the company toward branding appeared: Little Professor No. 1 (MPF-I), a teaching single-board computer packaged in the shape of a book, with a Z80 processor, selling for only $70. It was the first microcomputer Taiwanese exported under their own brand ⁵. The name was clever: Micro-Professor (Micro-Professor) differed from Micro-processor (Microprocessor) by only one letter, and even rhymed. In 1982, they launched Little Professor No. 2 (MPF-II), Taiwan’s and the world’s first Chinese home computer, and one of the earliest Apple II compatible machines ⁶.

_From single-board teaching machines to home computers: Little Professor No. 2 (MPF-II), 1982. Photo: MKFI/Ubcule. Public domain via Wikimedia Commons._

💡 Did You Know
Taiwan’s tech industry has an entire generation of companies ending in "碁" (qí) or "基" (jī)—Acer, BenQ (formerly Mingqi), Wistron (before its name change), and many others with the same root. "碁" is the ancient character for "棋" (qí), meaning chess (Go). Shih Ming-de was fascinated by Go, treating management as a layout, emphasizing "qi chang" (living long, waiting for the right moment) and "making living eyes" (creating sustainable structures). This Go philosophy is listed alongside the Smiling Curve in his later book, Rebuilding Acer. Acer’s English name, acer, is Latin, meaning "bright, lively, insightful, sharp, energetic"—in 1987, Shih Ming-de defied public opinion, abandoning the old Multitech brand, valued at $20 million, for this new name ⁷.

Abandoning a brand worth $20 million and starting over, simply because the old name was too long and clashed with a US modem manufacturer’s trademark. This event itself foreshadowed the story to come: the obsession with branding began the moment the name was changed.

In 1988, Acer Computer listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, stock code 2306 ⁸. Here, we must preempt a common misunderstanding: Acer listed today with code "2353" is actually the code used by its subsidiary Acer Technology when it listed in 1996, not the original 1988 code. After several reorganizations in the group, the code ownership swapped places.

A Diagram Teaching All of Taiwan to Escape the Bottom of the Smile

By the early 1990s, Acer faced its first life-or-death crisis.

This was its "First Rebuilding." Starting in 1989, Shih Ming-de first reorganized the structure into independent profit centers, calling out visions like "Technology Island" and "Global Citizens." The core transformation came in 1992, with two concepts introduced together: one called the "Fast Food Store Model"—Taiwan acts as a central kitchen, centrally producing long-life standard parts like motherboards and monitors, then shipping them to business units worldwide for local assembly, selling computers like burgers, using the freshest ingredients locally, and saving on freight and tariffs; the other called the "Master-Slave Architecture," letting regional business groups stand on the front line as "masters," fighting local market battles, while headquarters retreated to the second line as "slaves" to provide support ⁹.

The Smiling Curve was drawn to persuade colleagues to accept this change. It was an internal communication diagram, more like a battle order than an academic theory: it aimed to persuade Acer people to abandon low-value assembly in Taiwan and concentrate efforts on R&D and branding at both ends. Shih Ming-de stated clearly: "R&D on the left side of the curve is global competition; marketing on the right is regional competition." ¹⁰ R&D must compete globally; branding can be deeply rooted locally: this is the second layer of meaning hidden in the Smiling Curve.

Source: Shih Ming-de, *Rebuilding Acer*, Commonweal Books, 1996; Chiunglin Foundation, "1992 Smiling Curve"

It is worth remembering that Shih Ming-de never said "don’t do manufacturing." He repeatedly emphasized "do not misunderstand the Smiling Curve as abandoning manufacturing," because although manufacturing has low unit value-added, its large scale means accumulation still yields benefits ¹¹. This nuance is crucial, because in the next thirty years, many simplified the Smiling Curve into "telling everyone to flee manufacturing," while the person who drew the picture did not think so: indeed, just a few years before proposing the Smiling Curve, in 1989, he bet NT$5 billion into Winbond Electronics, personally touching the lowest value-added manufacturing section right in the middle of the curve ¹². Knowing the ends are good, yet still being pulled by the middle—this contradiction grew into Acer from the start.

The results of the First Rebuilding were impressive. By 1995, Acer produced about four million computers a year, with sales reaching $5 billion, becoming the world’s seventh-largest PC company ¹³. That same year, it launched the "Aspire" home computer, with a slanted design, charcoal gray paired with deep green, positioning it as a multimedia appliance for the living room to watch TV and listen to music. This was Acer’s flagship attempt to bring computers into ordinary homes ¹⁴. In those years, Shih Ming-de was successively selected by World Manager Abstract and Business Week into the list of the world’s most outstanding entrepreneurs. Climbing toward the two ends seemed to work.

"Then, Let’s Split It Up"

The first fall was onto himself.

Entering 2000, Acer fell into losses, exposing a structural contradiction: it did both its own brand and contract manufacturing for other brands, while contract manufacturing clients were themselves brand manufacturers, increasingly unwilling to place orders with an Acer that was "also a competitor" ¹⁵. The brand had long been unprofitable, sustained by contract manufacturing profits; but the contract manufacturing business was losing orders precisely because of the brand’s existence. This was a dead knot tying itself.

The person who untied the knot was General Manager Lin Hsien-ming. He thought for a long time and proposed an unheard-of idea in the tech industry at the time to Shih Ming-de: split the brand and contract manufacturing into two different companies. The Industrial Technology Research Institute later recorded the scene: Lin Hsien-ming suddenly spoke in Taiwanese: "Then, let’s split it up." ¹⁶ Shih Ming-de breathed a sigh of relief, blurring out: "So you think the same way!" ¹⁷ This bold split was actually something he had thought about in his heart.

✦ "Then, let’s split it up."

Thus came the first brand and contract manufacturing split in Taiwan’s electronics industry. On December 26, 2000, Acer announced externally; on May 30, 2001, the contract manufacturing business was spun off to establish Wistron Information, with Lin Hsien-ming taking about 8,400 employees ¹⁸. The remaining Acer entity focused solely on branding. After the split, the Pan-Acer Group was renamed the "ABW Family"—Acer (Shih Ming-de, Brand), BenQ (Kun-Yao Lee), Wistron (Lin Hsien-ming, Pure Contract Manufacturing). Shih Ming-de’s explanation was "Brothers climbing mountains, each striving on their own."

Source: Shih Ming-de Wikipedia; Commonweal Magazine, ITRI

The three brothers later faced three different fates. The one least expected was pure contract manufacturing Wistron: no brand, only doing others’ orders, looking the most hopeless. Instead, the one chasing branding most fiercely fell the hardest.

The one chasing most fiercely was BenQ. On November 5, 2001, BenQ held a press conference in Suzhou, taking off the green Acer uniform and putting on the purple BenQ new outfit, officially revealing its brand. The leader, Kun-Yao Lee, said proudly at the time: "I am doing the biggest adventure of my life." ¹⁹ This adventure peaked in 2005: BenQ took over Siemens’ mobile phone division for nearly zero cost, becoming the world’s fourth-largest mobile phone maker for a moment. But within less than a year, they abandoned it, burning about NT$35 billion in the past year, falling into one of Taiwan’s corporate history’s most tragic M&A failures ²⁰. This loss must be attributed clearly: it was burned by the independent "BenQ Corporation" (later the parent company renamed Qisda), led by Kun-Yao Lee, unrelated to Acer’s core entity or Shih Ming-de. ABW were from the same school, not the same company; the meaning of the split was precisely to let the three brothers go out and闯 (闯) on their own, bearing their own risks.

The split was considered a success at the time. In the following years, the combined revenue of the Pan-Acer three groups grew year by year, and Acer’s core entity joined the top five PC brands globally in 2004. This "Brand-Contract Manufacturing Split" model was later repeatedly emulated: D-Link spun off Mitac in 2003, ASUS spun off Quanta in 2008, and even Wistron itself later spun off Wistron Nebula, repeating the same logic of "splitting when client interests conflict" ²¹. That Taiwanese phrase "Then, let’s split it up" split out three companies, and also split out the path Taiwan’s electronics industry would walk repeatedly for the next twenty years.

The Sweetness of Second Place, The Poison of Stuffing Inventory

The second fall was at the peak of chasing the brand.

In late 2004, Shih Ming-de retired and passed the baton to Terry Gou (Wang Chen-tang). The following year, an Italian named Gianfranco Lanci succeeded as General Manager, Acer’s first foreign CEO. Lanci had a nickname: "Lenovo Killer"—early on, Lenovo tried to acquire Packard Bell to enter Europe; Lanci preemptively had Acer’s Gateway acquire Packard Bell, blocking Lenovo out of Europe ²². In 2007, Acer acquired the US’s fourth-largest PC brand, Gateway, for $710 million. Wang Chen-tang called this Acer’s "biggest acquisition in thirty years" ²³. Four brands (Acer, Gateway, Packard Bell, eMachines) fought together, and Acer once surged to second place globally, surpassing Dell, losing only to HP.

Lanci’s engine was called "Volume Rush." He pushed a new distributor model with profit sharing, actively acquired, and fought for market share, treating shipment volume as the highest guiding principle. A retired Acer senior executive described his style: "Don’t talk to him about long-term, vision; he wants now, immediately, profit." ²⁴ Revenue surged from $318 billion in 2005 to $629 billion in 2010, doubling in five years ²⁵. At the 2010 year-end party in February, Lanci made a bold vow: "After fourth place is third, after third is second, but after Acer takes second place, you only have one possibility left: becoming number one in the world." ²⁶

At the same time, Acer dominated with netbooks: Aspire One once captured about 45% of the global market share in this category in 2009, the biggest winner ²⁷.

Then came the iPad.

⚠️ The Arithmetic of Volume Rush
In January 2010, Apple launched the iPad, selling 4.5 million units in 80 days. Jobs declared the "Post-PC Era" had arrived. Consumers shifted from cheap netbooks to tablets, and Acer’s strongest growth engine suddenly stalled. The volume rush strategy hid a fatal arithmetic: IDC analyst Eszter Morvay pointed out that Acer needed at least 20% quarterly shipment growth to be profitable ²⁸. When shipments stopped growing, inventory stuffed into channels became unexploded ordnance: to push shipment numbers, goods were massively stuffed to distributors, and export revenue was recognized immediately, with over 80% of annual sales being related-party transactions ²⁹. The surface second place hid an inventory mountain ready to collapse.

The "Post-PC Era" ignited by the iPad tore open a rift in the route. Lanci wanted to continue rushing netbook volume, while Wang Chen-tang believed the company should turn toward phones and tablets. The two could not agree. On March 28, 2011, the two talked in a hotel for two hours, ending in a breakdown ³⁰. Three days later, on March 31, 2011, the board voted 5-2 to remove Lanci as CEO, with Wang Chen-tang taking over personally. The cost of the breakup was high: Lanci received NT$1.284 billion in severance, setting a record for senior executives in the PC industry ³¹. When replaced, Acer’s gross margin had already dropped to about 10%, losing to ASUS’s 15% ³⁰. More embarrassing was the truth laid bare in the sunlight: Acer recognized a $150 million loss at once to clear old netbooks, about three million units, stuck in Europe; using another accounting cut, this year also wrote off NT$4.3 billion in accounts receivable and inventory write-downs ³².

That inventory mountain, piled up under the halo of second place globally, finally collapsed.

The 68-Year-Old Man Enters the Fire for the Second Time

The third fall hit the valley bottom.

Acer after Lanci left was like a stalled car. Between 2011 and 2013, revenue nearly halved, lost money for three consecutive years, and market share dropped from second globally to fourth. Commonweal Magazine calculated the time from removing Lanci to Wang Chen-tang stepping down as "The Fatal 1,000 Days"—precisely 944 days ³³.

2013 was the most painful year. An annual loss of NT$20.5 billion, a loss of NT$7.56 per share, was Acer’s worst year in thirty-eight years since its founding in 1976 ³⁴. In the third quarter, it recognized nearly NT$10 billion in intangible asset impairment, mainly the value of the Gateway brand bought back with huge sums that year ³⁵. On November 21, Wang Chen-tang, who had been at Acer for thirty-two years, and Weng Chien-jen both resigned.

Filling this hole was an old man who had retired for nearly a decade. Shih Ming-de handed over the baton and retired in 2004, when he was sixty. Nine years later, at sixty-eight, he returned to succeed as Chairman and convenor of the Transformation Committee, launching the Third Rebuilding. He自嘲 (self-deprecated) to reporters: "I’ve been retired for almost 10 years, now I only focus on social welfare." ³⁶ There was helplessness in the words, and a sense of resignation: this company had nearly died three times, and twice required him to personally return and take over.

📝 Curator’s Note
The sharpest contrast in 2013 was not inside Acer, but at the other end of the same year. Lanci, whom Acer hired away, went to Lenovo after leaving. In the year Acer hit rock bottom and Shih Ming-de returned to save the fire, Lanci realized his vow made at Acer’s year-end party at Lenovo—putting Lenovo on the throne as the world’s largest PC maker. The same volume-rush tactic exploded in one company and peaked in another. This was the same bet, yielding completely opposite results on different timelines and balance sheets. Acer’s fall was not of the strategy itself, but of the侥幸 (luck/chance) of betting the whole company on a single person and a single growth method.

Shih Ming-de did not let his son succeed him. In his forties, he declared "Merit over Bloodline," wanting to make succession a system ³⁷. This time, he made a call to someone on leave from TSMC, asking if he wanted to come to Acer to "jump into the fire pit."

Turning a Side Business into a Little Golden Chicken

That person on the phone was Chen Chun-sheng, from TSMC, who had served as Senior Vice President of Global Business and Marketing. In December 2013, Acer announced he would succeed as CEO; he took office in January 2014, turning Acer from loss to profit that year ³⁸.

Chen Chun-sheng understood one thing: the label Acer stuck to in the market was "Acer? Lowest Price in Store"—high awareness, but no high value ³⁹. Chasing branding for thirty years, only to arrive at the word "cheap," was the hardest image to reverse upon his arrival. His first arrow was Esports: in 2015, he rebuilt the Predator Esports brand, using high-end, high-margin products to prop up Acer’s brand value, breaking the lowest-price impression ⁴⁰.

Predator Helios Esports Laptop (image is Helios 300). Using high-end, high-margin products to pull Acer out of the "Lowest Price in Store" impression. Photo: Vjdeep. CC BY 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

But what he truly touched the core of the Smiling Curve with was another move.

Acer Group had naturally grown a pile of software, security, and IT service businesses. These had much higher margins than hardware, but were trapped inside a hardware company. Chen Chun-sheng explained his logic to Commonweal Magazine: "Netbook margins are at most ten-something percent; in comparison, software and security businesses mostly have high margins. Doing software inside a hardware brand company is easily seen as a side business, getting no resources." ⁴¹ So he spun these "side businesses" out one by one to list independently. By the end of 2023, Acer had twelve listed subsidiaries in Taiwan ⁴².

The financial abacus of the spin-offs laid out is straightforward. Acer’s core, being a low-margin hardware company, had a P/E ratio of only about eight times for a long time; while the spun-off security subsidiary, Acer Security, had a P/E of about twenty-three times, and the IT service subsidiary, Acer Information, about twenty-six times ⁴³. The same profit, listed under the hardware parent, the market only valued at eight times; spun out and listed separately, it could get twenty-something times. This was a financial engineering to "unlock" undervalued high-value businesses.

Source: Commonweal Magazine, Acer Group Subsidiary P/E Comparison

The right end of the Smiling Curve: software, services, these high value-added positions: Acer finally stood on them using "spin-offs." But what stood up was the subsidiary, not the core.

And this spin-off was not a total victory. TechNews found in late 2024 that this was already Acer’s eleventh listed subsidiary in Taiwan; in less than five years after 2020, nine listed, but among these subsidiaries, only Acer Security and Acer Smart Health had outstanding margins; the rest were similar to the parent company’s. Volume was even worse: the nine subsidiaries’ average daily volume was less than one hundred shares, with six under twenty ⁴⁴. This report directly questioned: "If value becomes 1+1>2 after splitting, and enjoying high P/E in the stock market benefits shareholders, then reviewing all Acer Group subsidiaries, two obvious problems appear: the parent’s spin-off game may not benefit shareholders." By August 2025, Acer even reversed, simplifying its structure and merging several cloud subsidiaries ⁴⁵. After the spin-off frenzy came contraction, indicating this was an ongoing turnaround, not a completed one.

The Dropped Section Climbed to the Top

Acer Chromebook: In 2022, it took first place in the global education market share, one of the few "firsts" Acer sat on. Photo: Jim.henderson. CC0 via Wikimedia Commons.

As for Acer’s core, it stood firm, but did not return to the peak. In 2024, Acer’s consolidated revenue was NT$264.6 billion, up 9.7% YoY, earning NT$1.84 per share, an improvement over the previous year ⁴⁶. It nurtured new businesses beyond computers and displays; these businesses contributed 42.8% of the group’s "operating income" in 2023—this is profit share, not revenue share (converted to revenue share, it was 28.3% in 2024) ⁴⁷. Chromebook took first place in the global education market share in 2022; new businesses also crossed into AI electric bicycles ebii ⁴⁸. But in the global PC ranking, Acer floated between fifth and sixth; in Q1 2026, it was even overtaken by its own Taiwanese brother ASUS, falling to sixth ⁴⁹. As of June 2026, ASUS’s market cap was about 4.4 times that of Acer ⁵⁰. Chasing the branding end for thirty years, falling three times, Acer survived, but never stood at the peak of the curve it drew.

📝 Curator’s Note
ASUS split seven years later than Acer. Acer spun off contract manufacturing to Wistron in 2000; ASUS did not split contract manufacturing into Quanta until 2008. Looking back at ASUS’s market cap surpassing, it’s easy to conclude "early split loses, late split wins"—but this conclusion is too smooth. ASUS Chairman Shih Chung-tang first publicly revealed the split内幕 (insider details) in 2015, saying he handed Quanta to Tong Tsu-hsien was "not a broken boat," but a company with NT$470 billion revenue and NT$4-5 billion pre-tax profit; the cost was ASUS sending out 2,200 of its 4,000 R&D engineers, dropping net assets from NT$140 billion to NT$58 billion ⁵¹. Acer split early, ASUS split late, DLink split but didn’t achieve benefits; placing these three cases together, what truly decided high or low was whether that contract manufacturing "little brother" after the split could catch up, and whether the successor could bring it to a new wave. Wistron caught the AI server; Quanta turned to iPhone. The fate-deciding factor was not the cut, but the twenty years after the cut.

The true turnaround was on another person.

In late 2004, during the Great Split, Lin Hsien-ming, assigned to the "least expected Wistron," held a pure contract manufacturing company with a market cap of less than NT$15 billion: less than one-seventh of Acer’s core (over NT$100 billion) ⁵². Shih Ming-de himself felt Wistron was "harder" at the time.

Twenty years later, this dropped contract manufacturing "little brother," plus Wistron Nebula it later spun off, exploded in the AI server wave. As of December 2025, Wistron plus Wistron Nebula’s combined market cap broke NT$1.2543 trillion; Wistron Nebula alone squeezed into Taiwan’s top eleven largest market caps ⁵³. Financial writer Hsieh Chin-ho calculated a harsher bill: Acer’s first eleven months’ revenue was NT$247.1 billion, Qisda NT$189.2 billion, while Wistron alone in November had NT$280.6 billion: Qisda and Acer struggled for a full year’s revenue, yet不及 (could not match) Wistron’s one month ⁵⁴.

Hsieh Chin-ho’s comment was: "This is probably what Shih Ming-de did not expect back then." ⁵⁴ According to Liberty Times Net, Shih Ming-de once said: Acer’s DNA is deepest in Wistron ⁵⁵.

The low-value middle section, judged by the Smiling Curve as "should flee," in the AI era, climbed to the top. This does not mean Shih Ming-de was wrong in 1992—that line was drawn for the PC industry; encountering the 2023 AI server variable, the middle section’s value was redefined. In fact, Shih Ming-de himself personally changed the original to the "New Smiling Curve" in 2017, admitting the 1992 version was too simplified ⁵⁶. An idea influencing Taiwan for thirty years, the inventor himself walked the hardest path and corrected it most honestly and repeatedly.

In late 2004, Wistron’s spun-off market cap was less than one-seventh of Acer’s. Twenty years later, Wistron plus Wistron Nebula’s market cap exceeded NT$1.25 trillion. The "low-value middle section" Shih Ming-de drew in 1992, telling everyone to flee, climbed to the top of the smile in the AI era. The two ends of the Smiling Curve, the person who drew them could hardly stand on; while the section he let go and dropped out arrived first.

TEDxTaipei Official Channel, 2012: Shih Ming-de "On Kingly Way and Co-creation." Acer, which could survive after nearly dying three times, relied not on being always right, but on this founder’s lifelong practice of "Kingly Way"—losing gracefully, climbing back up, passing it on.

Further Reading:

• Shih Ming-de — The Acer founder who drew the Smiling Curve and returned twice to save the fire, from tech godfather to focusing solely on social welfare
• Taiwan Enterprise: Wistron Information — The contract manufacturing "little brother" least expected during the Great Split, the one that climbed to the top of the Smiling Curve in the AI era
• Taiwan Enterprise: ASUS — Spun off Quanta in 2008, a control group on another split path, now with market cap surpassing Acer
• Computex: Three Major International Computer Shows Closed Two, The Remaining One Grew in Taipei — The same stage of Acer’s thirty-year ups and downs, and Taiwan manufacturing’s annual main field
• Taiwan Industrial Transformation and Upgrading — Climbing from the contract manufacturing middle to the two ends, is it the only path? The entire grand proposition after the Smiling Curve

Image Sources

This article uses 5 CC / Public Domain licensed images, all cached in public/article-images/economy/ to avoid hotlinking source servers:

• Shih Ming-de 2014 Taipei Info Tech Expo Portrait — Photo: Tony Tseng, 2014-12-05, CC BY 2.0
• Little Professor No. 1 MPF-I Computer — Photo: Toytoy, photographed at National Chiao Tung University, CC BY-SA 2.0
• Little Professor No. 2 MPF-II Computer — Photo: MKFI/Ubcule, photographed at Helsinki Computer Museum, Public domain
• Predator Helios 300 Esports Laptop — Photo: Vjdeep, CC BY 3.0
• Acer Chromebook CB3-111 — Photo: Jim.henderson, CC0

References