Taiwan's Defense and Military Modernization

30-Second Overview: The 2022 Russia-Ukraine War changed Taiwan's defense logic. In 2024, military service was restored from four months to one year. In 2025, the Han Kuang 41 exercise lasted the longest in history—ten days and nine nights—mobilizing 20,000 reservists. In November of the same year, the Lai Ching-te administration proposed a NT$1.25 trillion special budget to procure 200,000 drones. Yet, on the same list, most of the money still goes toward expensive traditional equipment like tanks, fighter jets, and submarines. Former Chief of the General Staff Li Hsi-ming smiled wryly at this: "If tanks can be asymmetric weapons, what is not an asymmetric weapon?" Taiwan is walking two defense paths simultaneously, and these two paths contradict each other.

In late October 2025, at the Hukou National Review Ground, a row of M1A2T "Abrams" tanks sat on the concrete ground. Lai Ching-te stepped down from the rostrum to preside over the commissioning ceremony, announcing that the "world's strongest tank" had officially entered the Republic of China Armed Forces' combat sequence. The first batch of 38 units arrived in Taiwan in December 2024, the second batch of 42 units arrived in July 2025, and the final batch of 28 units completed delivery in the first quarter of 2026, totaling 108 units, deployed at the Hukou-based 584th Armored Brigade and the 269th Mechanized Brigade¹.

At the same time, former Chief of the General Staff Li Hsi-ming was signing books at a bookstore. His book, Taiwan's Winning Chance, argues that Taiwan should not buy expensive large-scale weapons but should invest in numerous cheap, mobile, and concealable small systems. When asked how he viewed the Ministry of National Defense's purchase of M1A2T tanks under the rationale of "beachhead decisive battle," he smiled wryly and said, "Seeing this, I can only smile wryly. If tanks can be asymmetric weapons, what is not an asymmetric weapon?"²

This sentence is the most honest key to understanding Taiwan's defense in 2026. The government speaks of the Porcupine Strategy while signing the most expensive weapons contracts with the United States; it claims defense autonomy while 90% of the budget goes to US suppliers; it extends military service while admitting that 200,000 drones are the future main combat force. These contradictions are not oversights; they represent an island pulling back and forth between two survival logics. It wants to become a porcupine, but its body still remembers it was originally a leopard.

Why a Porcupine

The term "Porcupine Strategy" was coined by William Murray, a professor at the US Naval War College, in a 2008 paper. His argument was simple: Taiwan cannot win against the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in conventional military power. Any warship costing billions or any expensive fighter jet may survive for only hours once war breaks out. The only reasonable approach is to buy large quantities of cheap land-based mobile missiles, mines, and air defense systems, turning Taiwan into a "not worth eating" porcupine³.

This concept was not immediately accepted in Taiwan. It was former Chief of the General Staff Li Hsi-ming who truly wrote it into military strategy. In 2017, while in office, Li completed an internal document known within the military as the "Overall Defense Concept" (ODC). The core question was only one: If the PLA really attacks, how can Taiwan make itself "not tasty"? Li's answer was mines, mobile missile vehicles, shoulder-fired missiles, and large numbers of drones: cheap, numerous, concealable, and hit-and-run⁴.

His logic was the same as Murray's: Taiwan does not need to win; it only needs to make the cost of invasion so high that the other side dares not gamble.

However, the ODC was cold-shouldered after Li retired in 2019. The Ministry of National Defense bought more fighter jets, more tanks, and continued to push the submarine domestic construction project. When reporters asked Li for his views, he said President Tsai Ing-wen was "the president who respects the military the most I have ever seen," but he added, "Whether she understands the ODC? I am not sure, because different people might make different interpretations."⁵

📝 Curator's Note
The counter-intuitive nature of the ODC lies in the fact that it challenges the entire self-identity of the military. For professional soldiers, "fighter jets, warships, tanks" are the pillars of service culture; buying drones is equivalent to admitting that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have all become "secondary" roles. The reason the ODC was cold-shouldered after Li's retirement was partly due to strategic differences and partly due to service survival instincts.

From Four Months to One Year

Taiwan's military service system is the thermometer of the island's security anxiety.

In the 1950s, conscription was three years. During the height of the Cold War, Taiwan maintained a standing army of 600,000, with males enlisting upon reaching adulthood. Conscription was shortened starting in the 1990s after the Cold War ended. In the 2000s, "volunteer and conscript combined" was promoted, and in 2013, conscription was shortened to four months. Military commentators jokingly called this a "summer camp"⁶.

The turning point was the Russia-Ukraine War in February 2022. A country once thought to surrender within three days held out using drones, portable Stinger missiles, and total mobilization, and drove the Russian army out of Kyiv within half a year. The resonance this war caused in Taiwanese society was indescribable. Suddenly, everyone was asking a question they had previously dared not ask: What if it were us?

On December 27, 2022, Tsai Ing-wen stood at a press conference to announce the restoration of conscription to one year, effective from January 2024. She said this was a "difficult but necessary decision." The monthly salary for conscripts was raised from approximately NT$6,500 to NT$26,307⁷.

The training content for the new one-year service was also renewed: 8 weeks of basic enlistment training, 18 weeks of garrison training, 7 weeks of specialized training, 13 weeks of base training, and 6 weeks of joint exercises. Rifleman live-fire shooting is not less than 800 rounds. Compared to the stereotypical impression of the old four-month system of "standing guard and sweeping floors," this was a backbone reconstruction.

⚠️ Controversial Viewpoint
Poll support for restoring one-year military service exceeds 70%, but the response of the young generation facing enlistment is complex. VOA interviewed several eligible conscripts; some admitted to "combat fear," some questioned whether one year of training could truly possess combat capability, and some directly stated, "I do not want to pay with my life for the mistakes of political figures." Supporters believe this is the minimum national defense obligation, while critics argue that one year is still not enough. One-year military service is both a consensus and a compromise; no one is truly satisfied, but most accept that this is the furthest they can go currently⁸.

The 147 Days of Hai-Shun

Taiwan has long relied on US arms sales. F-16 fighter jets, Patriot missiles, M1A2 tanks, Harpoon missiles—almost all heavy equipment comes from Washington. This ties Taiwan's defense to US political will: if the White House changes hands, the speed of arms sales may change.

"Defense Autonomy" has therefore become a long-term goal, with submarine domestic construction as the flagship project. On September 28, 2023, the first self-built submarine, "Hai-Shun" (Hull No. 711), was launched at the CSBC Kaohsiung Shipyard. The ship is 70 meters long with a displacement of approximately 2,500 tons, adopting an X-tail rudder design. Tsai Ing-wen said that day: "History will remember this day." The plan calls for the subsequent construction of seven more ships of the same class⁹.

But history may not remember the launch ceremony of 2023, but the delays of the following two years. The delivery schedule originally set for 2024 was delayed; on June 17, 2025, Hai-Shun officially entered sea trials, first conducting surface floating tests, then shallow-water diving, and finally deep-water diving. By November 28, 2025, Hai-Shun ended a 147-day mooring period without going to sea and went to sea again for surface floating verification, with several key steps remaining before completing diving tests¹⁰.

When asked about Hai-Shun's schedule, Defense Minister Kuo Li-hsiung gave an answer rarely spoken by military high-ups: "Other countries' self-built new submarines usually take more than 7 years, with examples of 16 years. Our country originally set a 5-year schedule, which was overly optimistic, lacking understanding of reality, especially failing to consider national conditions."¹¹

Kuo Li-hsiung did not set a delivery timeline. He only said: "Only when testing is complete and safe without any issues will the subsequent delivery procedures enter."

✦ "History will remember this day." These were Tsai Ing-wen's exact words at the Hai-Shun launch ceremony on September 28, 2023. Two years later, Hai-Shun has not yet completed diving tests. History will remember this day, but not necessarily in the way the person who said it that day intended.

Between the "Strongest Tank" and the "Cheapest Drone"

In November 2025, the Lai Ching-te administration proposed the Special Regulations on Strengthening National Defense Resilience and Procuring Asymmetric Combat Power, planning a special defense budget of NT$1.25 trillion (approximately $40 billion USD) over 8 years. If passed, Taiwan's defense spending would rise from the current 2.5% of GDP to 3.3%. Of this, approximately NT$950 billion (76%) would flow to US arms dealers to purchase traditional weapon platforms¹².

The other half of the picture of the same budget: The plan calls for the procurement of over 200,000 drones of various types and over a thousand unmanned surface vessels, covering multi-rotor reconnaissance drones, fixed-wing attack drones, loitering munitions, etc. Approximately NT$300 billion will be manufactured locally in Taiwan, creating a so-called "non-red supply chain," an defense industrial system excluding Chinese components¹³.

Placing these two halves together reveals the contradiction of Li Hsi-ming's wry smile: The Porcupine Strategy is accepted in words, but the budget still favors traditional large-scale weapons.

At the same time, three names appear in the National Science and Technology Center (NSTC)'s domestic drone program, representing Taiwan's attempt to localize the "Ukraine experience":

• Chien Hsiang: Anti-radiation loitering munition, mass-produced starting in 2023, producing 104 units for the Air Force within six years. It has radar electronic parameter analysis capabilities, capable of detecting enemy air defense radar signals and then conducting high-speed "suicide attacks," similar to the concept of the Israeli Harpy¹⁴.
• Rui Yuan Type II: Medium-to-long range reconnaissance drone, with a wingspan of 12 meters, control distance of 300 kilometers, and maximum range of 2,000 kilometers; a derived "armed attack type" is under development.
• Teng Yun Type II: MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) large drone, using the same engine as the US military's MQ-9B, staying airborne for over 20 hours, not yet mass-produced.

None of the three are cheap, nor are they considered "mass-produced." The true 200,000 units will likely be smaller, cheaper, possibly even 3D-printed tactical drones. On the Ukraine battlefield, an FPV drone costing tens of thousands of yuan can destroy a tank worth hundreds of millions. This calculation has changed the way all modern armies compute.

But the fate of the NT$1.25 trillion budget is not a strategic issue, but a political one. Since December 2, 2025, the opposition-dominated Legislative Yuan has blocked the special budget bill at least eight times. The opposition questions the budget compilation method and supervision mechanism, while the ruling party accuses blocking the budget as blocking national defense. A US Congressional delegation visiting Taiwan publicly called on the Legislative Yuan to pass the budget, and the Taiwan Representative to the US spoke in support directly¹⁵.

This Legislative Yuan offensive and defensive battle is actually the third layer of contradiction in Taiwan's defense: Whether to spend this money and how to spend it is itself the most sensitive issue in cross-strait relations.

📝 Curator's Note
National defense budgets are a mirror, reflecting not military power but political will. Many countries have money to buy weapons; few are willing to bear political costs to buy weapons. Taiwan is both of these countries, both wealthy and divided. The true bet of the NT$1.25 trillion is not what is procured, but "whether it can pass politically" itself.

Black Bear Academy: Chen Shui-bian's Open Letter

The deepest transformation in Taiwan's defense is not in the weapon list, but in the conversations in living rooms and coffee shops.

"Black Bear Academy" is a civilian organization founded in 2021 by Shen Po-yang, a professor of criminology at National Taipei University, and Ho Cheng-hui, a senior civil defense researcher. It focuses on "Total Defense" education. Its basic camp has four classes: modern military science popularization to break military rumors, information identification and cognitive warfare to break fake news, wartime first aid止血 and casualty transport, and evacuation preparation planning¹⁶.

In 2022, semiconductor entrepreneur Tsao Hsing-cheng announced a donation of NT$600 million to fund Black Bear Academy. On January 7, 2025, former President Chen Shui-bian publicly disclosed on the internet that Tsao Hsing-cheng had fulfilled this commitment, revealing that the goal set between the two was to "train 3 million Black Bear Warriors within 3 years," accounting for about one-third of Taiwan's 9 million households, hoping that at least one person in each household would possess basic defense knowledge¹⁷.

Black Bear Academy's classes were full from the start. A female student said in a Vision magazine interview: "I don't want to fight a war; I just don't want to be unable to protect my children when war comes." This sentence later became Black Bear Academy's own promotional copy¹⁸.

✦ "I don't want to fight a war; I just don't want to be unable to protect my children when war comes." This is the most honest sentence in Taiwan's defense consciousness in 2026. It is not patriotism; it is the most primitive family instinct.

The Total Defense Mobilization Preparation Act simultaneously established a reserve mobilization system. After 2022, reserve training expanded from 5 days to 14 days, significantly increasing training intensity. Official estimates suggest that over 2 million reservists can be mobilized. This number, added to the 180,000 standing army, means that in wartime, the theoretically mobilizable armed manpower approaches one-tenth of Taiwan's labor force.

Han Kuang 41: Ten Days and Nine Nights of Depth Defense

At dawn on July 9, 2025, the Han Kuang 41 exercise unfolded simultaneously across Taiwan. Lasting 10 days and 9 nights, it was the longest in the history of the Han Kuang exercises since their inception in 1984, mobilizing 20,000 reservists, also the largest number¹⁹.

The biggest difference between Han Kuang 41 and the past is the mood of the script. Past Han Kuang exercises tended to display military might: tank formations, fighter jets skimming the sky, naval ship formations. The core assumption of Han Kuang 41 is cruel: The ROC Armed Forces will only possess partial air superiority in wartime and must fight a protracted war.

The exercise is divided into six stages:

1. Days 1-3: Chinese gray zone harassment, Taiwan enters "normal crisis handling." This is a lesson from the Russia-Ukraine War for Taiwan; war does not start with tanks crossing the border, but with fishing boat harassment, communication jamming, and floods of fake news.
2. Day 4: Combat preparation deployment, moving troops and setting up positions.
3. Days 5-10: Formal outbreak of war, divided into four sub-stages: "Anti-landing, Coastal Battle, Depth Defense, Protracted War."

The last three sub-stages—Coastal Battle, Depth Defense, Protracted War—are the true new things in Han Kuang 41. It explicitly acknowledges: The standing army cannot defend the entire depth; reservists must go to the second line, using conscripts and reserve units to drag down the invading enemy, allowing volunteer-formed main combat units to find gaps to counterattack.

This is the shadow of the ODC. Li Hsi-ming's idea was to turn Taiwan into a "net"; if the front cannot be held, retreat to the depth, making the enemy pay a price wherever they retreat. Han Kuang 41 is the first time this concept is systematically adopted in the exercise script²⁰.

160 Kilometers and a Bet

The narrowest point of the Taiwan Strait is approximately 130 kilometers, and the widest is approximately 400 kilometers. This body of water is referred to in military academia as a natural barrier of "Anti-Access/Area Denial" (A2/AD). For the PLA to cross the Taiwan Strait, it needs not just ships and aircraft, but continuous weeks of air and sea superiority and amphibious landing capability. This is something only two or three existing armies in the world can do²¹.

Taiwan's defense strategy is built on a cold calculation: No need to win, only need to hold out until international intervention intervenes. A porcupine does not need to defeat the hunter; it only needs to make the hunter feel "eating this is not worth it." M1A2T tanks, F-16V fighter jets, Hai-Shun submarines—their mission is not to defeat the PLA, but to buy time. 200,000 drones, 20,000 reservists, 3 million Black Bear Warriors are doing the same thing.

But the premise of this calculation is: The international community will intervene.

The F-16V Block 70 was originally scheduled for delivery in 2024, but due to US supply chain and software issues, it was delayed until 2027²². Hai-Shun's delay from launch to expected delivery exceeded two years. The NT$1.25 trillion special budget was blocked eight times in the Legislative Yuan. M1A2T tanks arrived in Taiwan as scheduled, but it is the kind of weapon Li Hsi-ming sees as "how can a tank be an asymmetric weapon." Every schedule, every budget, every type of equipment reminds us of the same thing: Taiwan's defense is not a plan for Taiwan alone.

Further Reading:

• Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Development of Cross-Strait Relations — How three Taiwan Strait crises shaped the structural logic of today's cross-strait military confrontation
• Taiwan's Diplomatic Allies and International Diplomacy — Another path beyond military self-preservation: Taiwan's diplomatic breakthrough in finding presence in the international system
• Taiwan's Political Environment and Electoral System — Why the NT$1.25 trillion special budget was blocked eight times in the Legislative Yuan; national defense is not decided by a single government
• Taiwan's Cybersecurity Industry Development — The frontline of gray zone warfare is not mines, but firewalls
• Taiwan's Aerospace Industry Development — From civilian satellites to defense communications, space is the new battlefield for Taiwan's national defense resilience
• 2026 Cheng-Xi Meeting: Ten Minutes of the First Reunion of KMT and CCP Leaders in Ten Years — When Cheng Li-wen proposed "institutional arrangements to prevent war," behind it is the political offensive and defensive battle of the national defense special budget
• Shen Po-yang — Co-founder of Black Bear Academy, strengthening Taiwan's total defense resilience through civil defense education; investigated by China for "crime of splitting the country" after studying CCP cognitive warfare for seven years
• Chuo Rong-tai — Main proponent of the NT$1.25 trillion national defense special budget at the Executive Yuan, proposer of "Taiwan's Shield" and "Three Good Balls"
• Lu Hsiu-yen — Vice Chairman of the KMT / Mayor of Taichung, adopted a "NT$800 billion - 1 Trillion" middle-ground stance in the 2026 arms purchase controversy
• Hsu Chiao-hsin — KMT Legislator / Proponent of the NT$800 billion arms purchase version, political prototype of repeated clashes with Lai Ching-te on the interrogation stage
• Chi Lin-lien — Vice Chairman of the KMT / Retired Lieutenant General, ignited the KMT's arms purchase route split at the Central Executive Committee meeting on April 29

References