30-Second Overview:
Former CCP United Front Work Department Minister You Quan once summarized the new era's strategy towards Taiwan as "moistening things silently"—aiming to narrow the psychological distance between the people of both sides rather than engaging in direct confrontation. From taking local village chiefs to Tiananmen Square to watch the flag-raising in the 1990s, to the million-follower creator livestreaming at the September 18 Historical Museum in Shenyang in 2025, the packaging of United Front Groups has changed, but the core logic remains the same: to make the feeling that "China is actually not that scary" linger for one more second in Taiwan society. This article deconstructs its institutions, incentives, and indirect effects.
On June 12, 2024, Taiwanese YouTube creator Potato King dropped a message bomb on social media: according to the information he received, the CCP's Cross-Strait Youth Association planned to invite 10 groups of Taiwanese influencers to China to film videos, with flights and accommodation fully covered, under the guise of the "Cross-Strait Youth Culture Month" 1. At that time, the China tours of Zhong Mingxuan and馆长 Chen Zhihan had not yet occurred—but Potato King wrote a sentence: "Consider this article a prophecy."
One year later, this prophecy came true. The scale, however, was larger than anyone had imagined.
Origins: Tiananmen Flag-Raising and the Logic of "First-Time Visitors"
The United Front work is not an invention of the digital age. Since the 1990s, a special tourism model has existed in Taiwan society: participants only need to cover the cost of airfare, while all other food, accommodation, and transportation are "hosted on the ground" by the Chinese side. The target audience for such activities often includes local village chiefs, retired military personnel, or student associations. Itineraries frequently include "red attractions" such as Tiananmen Square and the CCP History Museum, accompanied by symposiums and official speeches 2.
Taiwanese media personality Chen Tzu-chien (Shi Wangmo) has publicly discussed his personal experience participating in a cross-strait exchange camp during university: every night at 7 PM, the group collectively watched Xinwen Lianbo (News Simulcast). A single news item about Xi Jinping could last fifteen minutes, making Taiwanese students feel "the more they watched, the funnier it became"—this memory of dark humor later became the starting point for him to found Eyeball Central Television 3.
The turning point occurred at the strategic level. Former CCP United Front Work Department Minister You Quan proposed the direction of "moistening things silently," emphasizing narrowing the lifestyle and psychological distance between the people of both sides, rather than directly conveying political propositions 4. 2023 was designated by the Taiwan Affairs Office as the "Year of Large-Scale Exchange with Taiwan." The number of United Front Groups exploded, and the target audience shifted to Taiwanese youth who had never set foot on Chinese soil—officially referred to as "First-Time Visitors," with the goal of further turning them into "Frequent Visitors" 2.
Analysis from the Straits Exchange Foundation indicates that such low tour fees are often more than half below market rates, and ground hospitality is a common practice 2. The Taiwanese saying "There is no such thing as a free lunch" finds its most concrete interpretation in this scenario.
Institutional Network: Three-Layer Architecture, Who Pays?
The CCP's United Front work has a strict organizational hierarchy, forming a transmission mechanism from the central level to local levels and nodes within Taiwan:
Decision-Making Layer: The Central United Front Work Department sets strategic directions and narrative themes;
Execution Layer: Various provincial and municipal Taiwan Affairs Offices, the Cross-Strait Youth Association, the Chinese Overseas Friendship Association, and other institutions are responsible for resource allocation and specific reception;
Nodes in Taiwan: The United Alliance Party, hometown associations, clan associations, specific temples, and student associations use names such as "youth exchange," "religious visits," and "hometown fellowship" as recruitment channels, blurring political purposes 5.
The operation of this architecture sometimes violates the law. Zhang Cunfeng, branch president of the Pingtung United Alliance Party, and Huang Rongde, general secretary, were entrusted by officials from the CCP's Taiwan Affairs Office in 2023 to recruit citizens to travel to Hainan Province and Shanxi Province with ground hospitality. They violated the Anti-Infiltration Act and the Election and Recall Act. In the second instance in 2025, the High Court of Kaohsiung still sentenced each to four years and six months in prison, finalizing the case 6.
The Turning Point: Influencers' Cameras Yield Ten Times the Benefit of Village Chief Groups
Between 2024 and 2025, United Front operations completed their most important evolution: from "taking people over" to "having creators bring the footage back."
After Potato King's exposure,馆长 Chen Zhihan's China tour became the biggest ignition point for this surge in temperature. In 2025, he visited Shanghai, Hangzhou, Macau, and Shenzhen multiple times, emphasizing his identity as "self-funded," "civilian exchange," and "peace ambassador," livestreaming throughout the process and accumulating tens of millions of views. In October of the same year, he further visited Beijing, Dandong, and Shenyang. On October 31, he visited the September 18 Historical Museum, and on November 1, he watched the flag-raising ceremony at Tiananmen Square 7.
The "local guides" accompanying him had their backgrounds revealed in investigations by The Reporter. Wang Xiao has over 2.51 million followers on Bilibili and was formerly a senior editor for Observer Network before 2021; Yang Shengzhi was still the chief reporter for the English version of Global Times until 2025, covering Chinese politics and diplomacy; Li Xiang holds the identity of "Executive Director of the Beijing Chaoyang District New Social Stratum Federation" and is also the Deputy Secretary-General of the Beijing Internet Famous Person Friendship Association—an organization promoted by the Beijing Municipal United Front Work Department 7.
They appear in the creators' cameras in the guise of "friends," assisting with itinerary arrangements and content planning.
📝 Curator's Note:
The accompanying figures appearing under the name of "friends" often have backgrounds at the intersection of state media, United Front organizations, and content platforms. Creators may truly believe this is just "industry cooperation"—and this is precisely the most accurate operation of "moistening things silently": making the spreaders of influence themselves believe it happened voluntarily.
The Reporter's in-depth investigation further revealed that the connection between the "Taipei Influencer Festival" and Continental Search for Wonder forms a hidden propaganda chain, translating the image of Chinese cities into daily consumer content through commercial packaging 4.
Incentive Structure: Taiwan Advertising Market vs. Chinese End Rewards
Beneath the "de-politicized" shell lies a clear economic logic. The average price for sponsored content by Taiwanese creators is usually far lower than the "high-value commissions" the Chinese end can provide—from full-process high-standard reception (business class, high-end hotels) and daily consulting fees, to cooperation fees for specific content, and even traffic revenue sharing on Douyin and Xiaohongshu, forming a complete matrix of incentives 8.
For creators pursuing traffic monetization, the "China Tour" represents both considerable income and market expansion opportunities. This blurs the line between "being bought" and "autonomous commercial behavior"—and this blurring itself is one of the conditions for the effective operation of this mechanism.
Indirect Effects: Making Taiwan Lose Its Footing
A deeper goal of the CCP's United Front strategy is to exhaust Taiwan society's energy in internal disputes—"falling in love with China" is merely the surface. The true strategic benefit lies in "dividing without fighting" 9.
After馆长's China tour, fierce debates erupted on social media: his past anti-China remarks were dug up and compared one by one, fan camps split, political party attacks followed, and media coverage amplified the situation. Taiwanese people consumed massive attention on the question of "whether馆长 was bought"—rather than jointly dealing with the institutional infiltration mechanism.
This internal consumption is the indirect effect of "dividing without fighting" 9.
On April 19, 2025, the "Reject United Front, Protect Taiwan" rally erupted on Ketagalan Boulevard in Taipei. The organizers announced that over 55,000 people were present at the site, demanding opposition to CCP infiltration and support for democratic freedom. Ba Jiong was one of the main organizers. A recall booth appeared on site, reflecting the accumulated social dissatisfaction with the continuous influx of influencer China tours and low-cost exchanges 10.
📝 Curator's Note:
The emergence of anti-United Front rallies indicates that the alert mechanisms of Taiwan's civil society are indeed functioning—but the same rally also became material for another wave of debates on social media: "Is this a DPP mobilization or a spontaneous gathering?" Even "anti-United Front" itself can become a lever point for social tearing.
Digital Upgrade: Precision Targeting in 2026
As of 2026, the National Security Bureau's "2025 CCP Cognitive Warfare Analysis Report" reveals five major methods of operation towards Taiwan: analyzing social conditions through data analysis, building diverse channels to distribute controversial messages, utilizing abnormal accounts to infiltrate public opinion, using AI to generate realistic audio-video, and conducting cyberattacks to steal citizens' accounts. Throughout the year, over 45,000 groups of abnormal accounts and 2.31 million controversial messages were seized 11.
The use of AI-synthesized audio-video has reached a new level: the Chinese side commissioned specific companies to develop intelligent voice systems, inducing citizens to record audio on Taiwanese websites to synthesize fake voice lines. Meanwhile, through "same-city tags" and "recommendation feed" algorithms, young Taiwanese users repeatedly encounter narratives of "China is safe and developed" in contexts of "travel guides" and "food and entertainment" 11.
| Evolution of Operational Methods |
|---|
| 1990s Traditional United Front Groups: Targeted local village chiefs and students / Ground hospitality with self-paid airfare / Itineraries to Tiananmen and Party History Museums / Strong official color, diminishing effects |
| 2023-2025 Influencer Traffic Chain: Targeted younger generations / Full high-standard reception or million-dollar commercial collaborations / Food and travel Vlogs / De-politicized, amplified by algorithms |
| 2025-2026 AI Precision Targeting: Algorithms precisely push to specific groups / AI-synthesized audio-video simulates real experiences / Stealing Taiwanese accounts to stir up controversy |
Current Situation: Where the Defense Lines Emerge
Facing increasingly difficult-to-identify cognitive operations, Taiwan's response is evolving in sync.
Polling data shows complex social attitudes: in surveys between 2024 and 2025, 56.3% of respondents supported amending laws to regulate the behavior of influencers cooperating with United Front activities, but only 37.9% of those aged 20-24 supported such legislation—the younger generation's trade-off between "exchange freedom" and "national security" remains on an open spectrum 12.
"Media literacy courses" have entered some high schools and university campuses, using "identifying AI-generated travel videos" and "template cities vs. comprehensive reality" as teaching materials. Within the Taiwanese creator community, spontaneous "counter-narratives" have also emerged: producing "same city, two lenses" comparison videos, using the same content format to counter specific narratives 13.
The effectiveness of the CCP's United Front work has no single answer in the public opinion fields of both sides.馆长's "crazy praise" video is sometimes criticized by Chinese netizens as "acting too much" or "useless"—propaganda does not necessarily reach its intended destination; it simply keeps uncertainty alive 7.
And uncertainty may well be the ultimate product of this cognitive game.
Further Reading
- [Cognitive Warfare](/society/Cognitive Warfare) — The systematic framework of cognitive operations and Taiwan's corresponding mechanisms, from academic analysis to concrete practices in civic education.
- [Falun Gong in Taiwan](/society/Falun Gong in Taiwan) — From the Yangming Mountain Flower Clock to Taipei 101, the same mirror image of cross-strait comparison, how religious freedom becomes a touchstone for Taiwan's democratic values.
- [Potato King](/people/Potato King) — The first Taiwanese creator to expose the details of influencer United Front invitations on a public platform; the beginning and end of the exposure event.
- [Ba Jiong](/people/Ba Jiong) — From United Front documentary maker to organizer of the Ketagalan Boulevard rally, Taiwan's civil society's attempts to counter cognitive warfare.
- [Poisonous Potato Cognitive Warfare](/society/Poisonous Potato Cognitive Warfare) — A false message about Taiwanese potatoes in 2022, how it became a typical case for observing cross-strait information warfare.
References
- "Potato King" Exposes Taiwanese Influencers Invited to China to Propagate — Radio Free Asia, June 14, 2024, the first systematic report on Potato King's exposure and its impact on Taiwan society.↩
- Challenges and Responses for the Youth Generation Facing CCP United Front Groups — Written by Hsu Li-jen, Cultural and Educational Division, Straits Exchange Foundation, June 2025, analyzing the "First-Time Visitor" strategy, low-cost hospitality mechanism, and policy responses for cross-strait exchanges.↩
- Chen Tzu-chien (Shi Wangmo) — Building a Tower of Mockery on the Ruins of State Media, and Then Dismantling It with His Own Hands at the Peak — Taiwan.md, recording Shi Wangmo's personal experience participating in the cross-strait exchange camp during university, and how it became the starting point for founding Eyeball Central Television.↩
- 馆长's China Tour, Taipei Influencer Festival, Continental Search for Wonder: The United Front Network Under Influencer Traffic — The Reporter's long-term tracking investigation series, April 2026, deeply analyzing the hidden connections from commercial cooperation to political propaganda.↩
- CCP's United Front Strategy Towards Taiwan and Its Impact — Mainland Affairs Council, January 2025, the Taiwan government's official analysis of the CCP's United Front organizational structure and policy stance.↩
- Helping the Taiwan Affairs Office Organize Tours, Intermediary for Elections: United Alliance Party Pingtung Branch President and General Secretary Sentenced to 4.5 Years — Liberty Times, 2025, reporting on the case of Zhang Cunfeng and Huang Rongde, cadres of the Pingtung United Alliance Party, being sentenced to 4 years and 6 months under the Anti-Infiltration Act.↩
- Analyzing the Concentric Circle of United Front Work:馆长's China Tour and the "Influencers" Surrounding Him — The Reporter, April 2026, in-depth investigation into the itinerary of each stop of馆长's China tour, the backgrounds of companions (Wang Xiao, Li Xiang, Yang Shengzhi), and their connections with United Front organizations.↩
- Analysis of Incentive Structure for Taiwanese Influencers Cooperating with China — Same as [^5], additionally citing reporting content on the high-value commission and traffic revenue sharing models from the Chinese end.↩
- Cognitive Warfare: Dividing Taiwan Society to Subdue the Enemy Without Fighting — Taiwan.md, systematically analyzing the goals, methods, and Taiwan society's responses to cognitive warfare, including the core logic of "making Taiwan lose its footing."↩
- "Reject United Front, Protect Taiwan" Grand Assembly — Wikipedia, recording the beginning and end, organizers, and main demands of the Ketagalan Boulevard rally on April 19, 2025.↩
- National Security Bureau Reveals 5 CCP Cognitive Warfare Methods, Mobilizes Net Army to Spread Controversial Messages — Central News Agency, January 11, 2026, the National Security Bureau released the "2025 CCP Cognitive Warfare Analysis Report," revealing five major methods of operation towards Taiwan and data on the seizure of 2.31 million controversial messages.↩
- Taiwan Poll: Over Half of Respondents Believe Laws Should Be Amended to Regulate United Front Influencers — The Epoch Times, December 20, 2024, citing a survey commissioned by the China Asia-Pacific Elite Exchange Association and conducted by Dadi Public Opinion Research Company via telephone interview of 1,001 citizens; 56.3% supported amending laws, only 37.9% of the 20-24 age group supported it.↩
- Media Literacy Education: Cognitive Warfare Defense Lines from Campuses to Society — Central News Agency, November 5, 2025, reporting on media literacy courses entering campuses and civil society's counter-actions against cognitive warfare.↩